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PREFACE 
he European Climate Platform (ECP) has been established as a 
partnership between CEPS and Clipore, the Climate Policy Research 
Programme of the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental 
Research (Mistra). It brings together policy practitioners and members of 
the research community to explore how the climate change agenda can be 
productively advanced. It operates at two levels: the first is the preparation 
of empirically-based analyses by leading researchers in the field; the second 
is informal but structured debate and interaction on these analyses in 
Brussels by policy practitioners and analysts. These meetings allow policy 
practitioners – and especially negotiato r s  –  t o  s t e p  b a c k  a n d  e n g a g e  i n  
discussions on the wider strategic issues that can help shape their 
subsequent deliberations and negotiations. They enable policy analysts and 
the research community to understand the realities that must be addressed 
before progress is to be achieved.  
It is difficult to assess precisely how productive this interface between 
the academic and the practical is, but we know, as joint chairs of the 
seminars, that they have been informed, enjoyable and helpful to those in 
the middle of the policy process to better understand the evidence and the 
wider context, and to the research community to know what are the key 
issues and priorities for research. 
It has been a pleasure and a privilege for us to play our small part in 
keeping this important and productive dialogue fresh and useful. The 
mutual enrichment that comes from interaction is perhaps the most 
important product of this effort. But it is also important to project insights 
and outputs to the wider community that was not fortunate enough to be 
party to these seminars. And this is what this volume aspires to be – a 
symbol and a manifestation of our endeavours. We expect that, in the 
swirling cacophony of paper, images and words that surrounds the Bali 
process and its aftermath, the insights this volume offers will strike a chord 
and make a contribution. 
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This book is a direct outcome of the ECP High-Level Colloquium on 
Climate Change: Key Actions for the Crucial Years ahead, which was held 
in Brussels on 22-23 March 2007. This event brought together more than 100 
climate change negotiators from all other the world, government and EU 
officials, researchers and business and NGO representatives.  
We wish to express our gratitude to Deborah Cornland for her 
contribution in launching the ECP, and to thank her for her support. 
Deborah  served as  the first Programme Director of Clipore until she 
stepped down from this position in 2007. Without her enthusiastic 
leadership, this book as well as the ECP would not have been possible.  
 
Frank  Convery    Bo  Kjellén 
Co-Chairman, ECP &       Co-Chairman, ECP & 
Heritage Trust Professor       Former Chief Climate Change 
of Environmental Policy,      Negotiator of Sweden 
University College Dublin 
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1.  FROM INCONVENIENT TRUTHS TO A 
COPENHAGEN PROTOCOL? 
CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER* 
nly the biggest optimist would have predicted even one year ago 
that governments participating in the global climate negotiations at 
Bali, Indonesia (COP13/CMP3) would agree on a roadmap 
towards a global climate change agreement to be completed by the end of 
2009, ready to fill the gap when the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
expire in 2012. Sure, agreement on the Bali Action Plan was only reached 
after many days of exhausting negotiations, which at times hovered on the 
brink of collapse. The primary issues were whether or not indicative 
percentage reduction targets of 25-40% should be included in the mandate 
and the precise wording to be to used to allow discussion of reduction 
commitments for developing countries. Both issues lie at the heart of the 
climate change negotiations and will undoubtedly continue to prove 
extremely controversial in the future. But in essence, these are the questions 
that ministers and negotiators will have to resolve in the final hours of 
Copenhagen in 2009.  
What is far more important, however, is that the Bali Action Plan 
firmly sets out the four key elements that should be considered – 
mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing – by the new Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 
with a mandate to complete its work in 2009. All governments supported 
an end date of 2009.  
                                                      
* Christian Egenhofer is a Senior Research Fellow at both CEPS and the Centre for 
Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at the University of Dundee, 
Scotland and serves as a member of the ECP Steering Group. 
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There have been additional signs that the international community is 
seriously willing this time round to strike a deal. For the first time, finance 
ministers met during the climate change negotiations to better understand 
the scale of the challenge and to explore the potential need for transfers, 
which undoubtedly will be required in the final hours of the negotiations. 
Almost in parallel, there has been a first meeting among trade ministers on 
climate change issues in the so-called ‘Informal Trade Ministers Dialogue 
on Climate Change’ (ITMD), initiated by the government of Indonesia. 
Essentially, it was an exchange of views leading to a number of procedural 
recommendations calling inter alia for an urgent and successful conclusion 
of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations, and for more 
comprehensive research and better empirical evidence on the linkages and 
interface between international trade developments. This reinforces the 
impression that the momentum towards a global deal is gathering pace.  
Such momentum will be needed. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the world will have to find about 30 
gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent reductions from baseline by 2030 to reach the 
lower stabilisation levels of 440-490 parts per million of CO2 equivalent. 
This means globally at least 50% below 2000 levels by 2050 or for 
developed countries listed in Annex I, 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020.  
The contributions in this book examine some of the most difficult and 
controversial questions that global climate change negotiators face between 
now and the emergence of a ‘Copenhagen Protocol’ in 2009, and even 
beyond. The different chapters to explore the four principal elements in the 
Bali Action Plan – mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing from 
different country, stakeholder or political perspectives.  
Fortunately, there is a long history of negotiations and a stock of 
already-acquired knowledge on a future climate change regime upon 
which the Bali Action Plan can rely. They are presented in chapter 2. The 
different discussion processes both within the UNFCCC but also outside, 
such as the G8+5, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate and the Major Economies Meetings, seem to lead to a more 
enhanced consideration of the issue of climate change at the international 
level. On the other hand, the urgency of action that is suggested by climate 
science has yet to lead to accelerated analytical work that could feed into 
negotiations on the time scale needed to ensure that there is no gap 
between the first and second commitment periods. And even if such 
acceleration were to happen, it would equally require that negotiators are FROM INCONVENIENT TRUTHS TO A COPENHAGEN PROTOCOL? | 3 
 
capable of absorbing the increasing body of analytical work. There is no 
guarantee that the various future action-related processes and the Bali 
Action Plan can deliver a result in a timeframe that is able to avoid 
dangerous interference with the climate system. This is where political will 
be required, a recurrent theme throughout the book.  
Chapter 3 makes the case that estimating the global mitigation 
potential will need to be at the heart of any effort towards the daunting 
task of reducing reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels. If the 
mitigation potential is properly identified, attention can turn to how it is 
realised. However, translating the potential into action will require better 
organisation, more resources and a firm international commitment. The 
review of ongoing activities to estimate mitigation potential in different 
fora or reports such as the Fourth Assessment Report, the UNFCCC, the 
Stern Review and especially the Ad-hoc Working Group on Future 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG) document the impressive progress that has been made in this area. 
The review however also reveals the many methodological difficulties the 
concept of ‘mitigation potential’ faces; for example, mitigation potential can 
be viewed from several perspectives, including market potential, economic 
potential, socio-economic potential, technological potential and physical 
potential.  
One conclusion of chapter 3 is that after 2012, there is likely to be a 
much larger spread around an average figure for GHG reduction 
commitments than in the first commitment period. At the same time, 
mitigation potentials will evolve over time, as the concept is a dynamic one. 
Evolution in the type of economic activity – for example, moving from a 
manufacturing to a service economy, or technological breakthroughs – 
could increase the mitigation potential. If the potential were to increase, 
countries could take on more ambitious targets. This argues for post-2012 
arrangements having built-in flexibility, unlike the first commitment period 
where no change was possible even though the commitments were 
negotiated over ten years before they became effective. Various possible 
instruments for flexibility exist – regular review, breaking down targets by 
sectors, sectoral agreements, some form of adjustment mechanism 
according to changes in economic or technological factors. The flexibility, 
however, would find its limits in the necessity for stability of carbon 
markets. One suggestion is to make post-2012 targets provisional before a 
fully-fledged, legally binding global agreement is in place. This could give 4 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
 
the market a positive signal, without reducing the necessary flexibility 
pending final decisions.  
Chapter 4 provides a sobering perspective from a fast-growing 
developing country where GHG mitigation policies compete with other 
priorities, notably development and adaptation. Developing countries are 
faced with numerous ‘inconvenient truths’:  
•  Climate change is already happening because of natural drivers duly 
accelerated by anthropogenic activity. 
•  Industrialised countries have consumed the bulk of the global carbon 
budget while developing in an unconstrained world, thereby 
threatening to leave limited headroom for developing countries.  
•  A climate-constrained world might actually impose real limits to 
growth; if so, distributional conflicts will accelerate. 
•  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  p o o r  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  g r o w ,  
representing roughly one-third of total world population. People 
dependent on biomass to meet up to 90% of their household energy 
needs will even rise from 2.5 billion today to 2.7 billion by 2030. The 
world will need to accept a threshold level of development for the 
poor and to make this a priority over all other global endeavours. 
•  It is well known that the emissions from industrialised countries 
must peak soon, calling current lifestyles and patterns of production 
and consumption into question. It is clear that addressing this will 
entail huge costs and it is near impossible to see how that would be 
politically impossible without a binding global agreement with 
targets. 
•  And still industrialised countries would need to fund even the no-
regret mitigation options in developing countries since 
developmental outlays will take precedence over mitigation in a 
resource-constrained developing country.  
•  Even if industrialised countries succeed in bringing down their 
emissions to a level that is 80% below their 1990 level by 2050, their 
emissions would still be a multiple of its fair share under a per capita 
metric. 
•  As technological breakthroughs by 2030 are very unlikely, the bet is 
on making current low-carbon and energy-efficient technologies 
universally available and promote collaborative research. FROM INCONVENIENT TRUTHS TO A COPENHAGEN PROTOCOL? | 5 
 
Neither developed nor developing countries on their own can 
effectively address global climate concerns. Cooperation and collaboration 
on a much broader scope and scale is likely to be needed. For example, we 
should expect a post-Kyoto regime with more collaborative efforts in the 
future energy research. This might entail appropriate sharing of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) to allow that available energy efficient and climate 
friendly technologies are put into limited public domain to avoid a carbon-
intensive and business-as-usual developing country growth trajectory that 
repeats the development paths of industrialised countries. While this is a 
difficult and delicate issue, discussion on it cannot be avoided. The post-
Kyoto regime will also need to recognise that energy security is a global 
need and not just the right of some countries. From a developing countries 
perspective such as India, a post-Kyoto regime would seek to curb 
unsustainable lifestyles wherever they exist, renew commitment to meeting 
the Millennium Development Goals and eradicating poverty; the additional 
funding to achieve this would need to come from developed countries, 
although in different possible forms such as carbon markets, global funds 
or direct assistance by developed countries.  
Chapter 5 zooms in on climate change as threat to development, a 
regularly neglected issue. The topic of climate change remains remote to 
people living in low-income countries, compared to more immediate 
problems like poverty, disease and hunger, although the consequences of 
climate change will affect development in a major way. However, climate 
change will significantly increase the frequency and strength of extreme 
weather events. Many regions of the world already have a long history of 
serious disaster-related problems. But natural disasters occur only when 
communities are exposed to potentially hazardous events without being 
able to absorb the impact. While it is common to talk about natural 
disasters, it is too often forgotten that both vulnerability and hazard are 
conditioned by human activities. The international response to millions of 
poor people who are already experiencing the effects of climate change is 
insufficient. It is commendable that the Swedish Government recently 
launched an International Commission on Risk Reduction and Adaptation 
to explore and promote effective ways to integrate risk reduction and 
adaptation to climate change into development and poverty reduction 
plans in developing countries and to secure future investment in 
development aid to take full account of climate stresses and increased 
disaster risks. In a practical sense, this means: i) to identify and analyse the 
incentives as well as the barriers for developing countries to undertake 6 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
 
risk-reduction and climate-proofing measures in their development efforts; 
ii) to consider how to best combine long-term efforts for climate change 
mitigation and the urgent need to support adaptation effort; iii) to map out 
directions for international development cooperation in the field of 
adaptation and risk reduction; and iv) to consider how to achieve policy 
coherence by integrating concerns for climate change in wider 
development efforts.  
Chapter 6 discusses how climate change affects business. It draws a 
useful distinction between the ideal situation with adequate public and 
private responses and the actual situation, where industry faces increased 
risks. Unless international and national policy-makers respond adequately, 
uncertainty in business conditions will continue to increase.  Whenever 
there is uncertainty, for example if a sector is threatened by regulation, 
investments are put on hold until the uncertainty has disappeared. Current 
global climate policy exemplifies this uncertainty, which spreads in many 
ways. Managers are faced daily with the questions of which sectors will be 
included in climate policy, whether global transport will continue to be 
exempt from GHG policies, and when will Europe and other signatories to 
the Kyoto Protocol be joined in their efforts. If emissions from production 
plants can be 'exported' from Europe only to be 'imported' again in the 
form of finished products, a politically-led, relatively short-term allocation 
becomes a determining factor in long-term investment decisions. Politicians 
must not exacerbate this uncertainty by taking short-term, ambiguous 
decisions. The clearer the rules of the game are, the easier will be the 
transformation to a low-emission economy.  
The challenge of adequately addressing adaptation to climate change 
impacts in developing counties by means of international collaboration is 
examined in chapter 7. It finds that adaptation work has matured from 
discrete, localised solutions towards a more comprehensive development-
based perspective. This has drawn policy-makers’ attention towards the 
possibility of making adaptation part of development policy, which is 
referred to as ‘mainstreaming’. Neverhteless, developed countries’ 
development agencies still appear to attach insufficient attention to 
adaptation. Yet the same can be said of developing countries and their 
policy priorities. 
One of the thorny issues is funding. Given the magnitude of the 
challenge, adequate adaptation will require considerable additional 
financial flows from developed countries to developing countries. The key FROM INCONVENIENT TRUTHS TO A COPENHAGEN PROTOCOL? | 7 
 
to unlocking significant financial flows seems to lie with a reasonable 
assurance that developing countries have enough absorptive capacity to 
use those funds towards effective and efficient adaptation activities. This 
will require improvements in knowledge and expertise, institutional 
strength, good governance, transparency and accountability. The chapter 
argues that the discussion about the source of the financing (i.e. how to 
share the burden among developed countries) should not wait until all 
questions on implementation (i.e. how the financial resources are used for 
developing country adaptation) are resolved. A too narrow link between 
the two might leave us in a chicken-and-egg situation. The chapter finishes 
with a number of concrete and operational recommendations. It sets out a 
sequence of steps towards the evolution of a global adaptation regime, 
defines the linkages between adaptation and human development, before 
ending with financing and the need for further informal dialogues.  
The two following chapters deal with technology development and 
diffusion. Chapter 8 takes stock of existing activities on technology and 
innovation for both developed and developing countries, including finance 
and investment issues. The chapter reviews all major approaches within the 
UNFCCC (e.g. the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, the Global 
Environmental Facility and the Clean Development Mechanism) or outside 
(such as the Climate Technology Initiative under the Gleneagles Plan of 
Action, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, 
the Major Economies Meetings or sectoral approaches) and groups them 
according to four categories of technology-oriented agreements (TOAs):  
1)  knowledge-sharing and coordination, 
2)  research, development and demonstration (RD&D),  
3)  technology transfer and  
4)  technology deployment mandates, standards, and incentives. 
It finds that to date, most existing TOAs fall into the first category, i.e. 
knowledge-sharing agreements that are relatively low cost by focusing on 
information exchange, the promotion of common standards or horizontal 
innovation schemes. Their effectiveness is limited by the voluntary, non-
binding nature of the frameworks, however. Technology cooperation 
agreements, i.e. category 2, which primarily focuses on fundamental 
research and demonstration projects exist, but are few in number. Most 
likely such agreements will find their limits, however, when the technology 
moves from the pre-competitive to the post-competitive stage. Technology 
transfer, i.e. category 3, has been attempted within the UNFCCC. However, 8 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
 
simply transferring patents is not enough, as most technology transfer 
depends on know-how. Category 4, technology deployment mandates offer 
particular potential in the form of harmonised standards for renewable 
energy, building codes, energy efficiency or requirements for carbon 
capture and sequestration. Yet, there are few, if any successful examples of 
this kind of agreement. All of these categories are useful, however, and 
should simultaneously be expanded.  
The complementary technology chapter 9 by Tom Brewer proposes a 
taxonomy for structuring analyses and negotiations. Thereby it focuses on 
the needs of analysts and negotiators who are involved in negotiations for a 
post-2012 climate regime. In concrete terms, the taxonomy is in four parts, 
each of which is focused on a particular element of a decision-making 
process: i) describing technologies (What are their key features? How are 
they similar and different?); ii) identifying the context of technologies (How 
do economic and political factors affect the development and use of 
technologies?); iii) evaluating technologies (What goals and criteria are 
relevant for evaluating technologies?) and iv) pursuing pathways into the 
future (How can the development and use of mitigating or adaptive 
technologies be facilitated? How can detrimental technologies be 
constrained?). These elements are then discussed separately in the chapter 
and expressed in the form of an analytic tree in the concluding section. 
Chapter 10 focuses on encouraging actions to reduce GHG emissions 
from deforestation and degradation in developing countries (REDD) 
through the so-called ‘dual markets approach’. This approach combines 
elements of market and fund-based approaches. With approximately 20% 
of carbon dioxide emissions globally coming from tropical deforestation, 
REDD is crucial to addressing global climate change.  
By creating a separate REDD market, in contrast to other market-
based proposals, the Dual Markets framework would maintain the 
integrity of the existing carbon market, while generating more financing 
than an exclusively fund-based approach. The idea is that developed (i.e. 
Annex I) countries agree to specific REDD targets, providing a guaranteed 
level of demand for developing country REDD credits while safeguarding 
stabilisation goals against potential uncertainties of REDD reductions. The 
proposal would provide a range of options to both developing and 
developed countries, including voluntary participation, borrowing from 
f u t u r e  R E D D  t a r g e t s ,  m a k i n g  u p  R E DD shortfalls with carbon market 
credits and review by the COP to consider linking to the post-2012 carbon FROM INCONVENIENT TRUTHS TO A COPENHAGEN PROTOCOL? | 9 
 
market. The dual markets approach would facilitate a system of learning-
by-doing for the upcoming post-2012 commitment period and allow the 
international community to craft a workable incentive system to reduce 
emissions from deforestation. Such a REDD mechanism would be capable 
of addressing many issues, including the establishment of reference 
scenarios and baselines, creating effective incentives for developing and 
developed countries and ensuring a sufficient and consistent flow of 
funding. Fortunately, Parties have submitted a variety of proposals for an 
international REDD mechanism, relying on carbon market integration 
and/or voluntary contributions. 
The two concluding chapters 11 and 12 deal with international 
aviation and maritime emissions, a small, but rapidly increasing, 
percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions. A business-as-usual 
scenario could put emissions from international aviation and maritime 
shipping or so-called ‘bunker fuels’ at 15% of global emissions by 2050. To 
date, very little has been done to curb this trend. This development, 
coupled with the growing political popularity of emissions trading, has put 
the spotlight on the option of an integrated international trading system, 
including international aviation and shipping. The idea would be to 
address emissions from international aviation and shipping and capture 
the cost savings that a broad emissions trading system offers.  
However, the characteristics of bunker fuel emissions, with close 
links to international trade and competition, the difficulties of allocating 
emissions on a country level and the complexities in estimating climate 
impact from emissions, make the feasibility and effectiveness of a 
conventional emissions trading system questionable. Furthermore, a full 
integration of international transport and industry could cause significant 
negative effects for industry, without achieving substantial cuts in bunker-
fuel emissions. In the medium term at least, these negative effects seem to 
offset the advantages of an integrated system.  
The two chapters come to different conclusions from this analysis. 
Chapter 11 considers a sectoral approach – although not yet defined in 
detail – as a more promising option for bunker fuels than incorporating 
them into an integrated emissions trading system. Even though this would, 
in theory, raise the total cost of reaching a global emissions target as 
compared to an integrated emissions trading system, it offers several 
advantages. Most importantly, it seems feasible from a technical and 
political point of view and would allow the negative effects on industry to 10 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
 
be managed, without compromising an effective control of emissions from 
international aviation and shipping.  
Chapter 12 proposes a separate emissions trading system (ETS) for 
international transport alone in which transport emissions could effectively 
be controlled. The impact on the industrial allowance price can be reduced, 
at least to some extent. But even with separate systems, the transport sector 
will indirectly influence the allowance price in industry. Both sectors will 
compete for the same emissions reductions such as bio energy, clean 
electricity and CERs (certified emissions reductions) or other offsets. The 
transport sector is likely to increase the demand for these solutions and 
thus indirectly increase the allowance price in the industrial ETS.  
These are only some of the thoughts and proposals that are 
elaborated in greater depth in the following chapters. By addressing the 
difficult and controversial topics that global climate change negotiators 
face, the chapters make a contribution to the task of finding a new global 
framework for avoiding dangerous climate change beyond 2012. 
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2.  THE HISTORY AND STATUS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
ON A FUTURE CLIMATE AGREEMENT 
NIKLAS HÖHNE, FARHANA YAMIN 
&ERIK HAITES* 
1.  Introduction 
The objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations to 
avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Several countries, including the 27 member states of the European Union, 
and many environmental NGOs have agreed that the global average 
temperature increase should be limited to 2°C above pre-industrial levels to 
avoid such dangerous interference. To have a 50% probability of achieving 
this target, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases would need to 
be stabilised at no more than 450 ppmv CO2eq (parts per million by volume 
of carbon dioxide equivalent) (Meinshausen, 2005).  
To stabilise atmospheric concentrations, current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases must be reduced significantly. The lower the desired 
concentration, the sooner the decline in global emissions must start. Under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, participating countries agreed on 
different commitments and emissions reduction targets. To start to reduce 
global emissions, more substantial reductions of greenhouse gases are 
necessary.  
                                                      
* Niklas Höhne is a consultant at Ecofys in Cologne; Farhana Yamin is a researcher 
at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex and Erik Haites is 
with Margaree Consultants in Toronto. 14 | HÖHNE, YAMIN & HAITES 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the history of the negotiations 
under the climate change regime and the resulting commitments under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It also summarises current activities 
relating to the negotiation of an agreement setting out commitments over 
and beyond those made in the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and the 
arguments advanced over whether such an agreement should be within or 
outside the UNFCCC. Finally, the paper gives more detailed information 
on the negotiating positions of important countries or groups on the 
timing, scope and nature of such negotiations.  
2.  Current commitments under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
protocol 
This section provides an overview of the current commitments of countries 
under the UNFCCC regime. It is based on Depledge (2000), Oberthür & Ott 
(1999), Yamin & Depledge (2004) and Höhne (2006). 
The UNFCCC’s ultimate objective is to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system (see Box 1). 
Box 1. Article 2 of the UNFCCC 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that 
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
To reach this goal, the UNFCCC builds upon the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of Parties. 
Accordingly, countries are divided into three groups for the purpose of 
differentiating the obligations or commitments under the Conventions and 
later the Kyoto Protocol (see also Table 1): 
a)  Parties included in Annex II to the Convention: countries that were 
members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1992. HISTORY & STATUS OF A FUTURE CLIMATE AGREEMENT | 15 
 
b)  Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties): both the 
Annex II Parties and countries with ‘economies in transition’ (EITs), 
the Russian Federation and several other Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
c)  Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties): 
those countries that are not listed in Annex I, including all newly 
industrialised countries and developing countries. 
Table 1. Members of Annex I and their commitment under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Annex B) 
Country 
Member 
of 
Annex I 
Member 
of 
Annex II 
Economies 
in transition 
Commitment inscribed 
in Annex B (within 
parenthesis the outcome 
of the EU burden-
sharing agreement) 
Australia X  X    108 
Austria X  X    92  (87) 
Belarus X    X 92  d 
Belgium X  X    92  (92.5) 
Bulgaria X    X  92 
Canada X  X    94 
Croatia X  a   X  95 
Czech Republic  X a   X  92 
Denmark X  X    92  (79) 
Estonia X    X  92 
European 
Community 
X X    92 
Finland X  X    92  (100) 
France X  X    92  (100) 
Germany X  X    92  (79) 
Greece X  X    92  (125) 
Hungary X    X  94 
Iceland X  X    110 
Ireland X  X    92  (113) 
Italy X  X    92  (93.5) 
Japan X  X    94 16 | HÖHNE, YAMIN & HAITES 
 
Kazakhstan X  b    X  To be negotiated 
Latvia X    X  92 
Liechtenstein Xa     92 
Lithuania X    X  92 
Luxembourg X  X   92  (72) 
Monaco X  a     92 
The Netherlands  X  X    92 (94) 
New Zealand  X  X    100 
Norway X  X    101 
Poland X    X 94 
Portugal X  X   92  (127) 
Romania X    X  92 
Russian Federation  X    X  100 
Slovakia X a   X  92 
Slovenia X a   X  92 
Spain X  X    92  (115) 
Sweden X  X    92  (104) 
Switzerland X  X    92 
Turkey X  c    e 
Ukraine X    X  100 
United Kingdom  X  X    92 (87.5) 
United States  X  X    93 
a Added to Annex I at the third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto 1997 (COP 3). 
b Added at COP 7 only for the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol (see FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4, section 
V.C). 
c Deleted from Annex II by decision 26/CP.7. 
d Belarus had not ratified the Convention when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. A commitment was 
agreed as an amendment to the Protocol at COP/MOP 2 by decision 10/CMP.2. Belarus has to 
maintain a reserve of an additional 7% at the end of the first commitment period. The amendment 
and the target will only enter into force once ratified by at least three-fourths of the Parties to the 
Protocol. 
e No limit specified. Turkey had not ratified the Convention when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. 
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Under the Convention, all Parties have certain general commitments 
(Article 4.1, UNFCCC): 
•  to prepare national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions;  
•  to implement measures to mitigate climate change; 
•  to promote and cooperate in the development, application and 
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes 
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions; 
•  to preserve sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases; 
•  to cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change; 
•  to promote and cooperate in research on climate change; 
•  to exchange information related to climate change; 
•  to promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness 
related to climate change ; and 
•  to report information related to the above in ‘national communications’. 
Figure 1. Country groupings 
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In addition to those general commitments, certain groups of countries 
have additional obligations or rights under the UNFCCC: 
•  Annex I Parties are to take the lead in modifying longer-term trends 
in emissions by adopting national policies and measures with the (not 
legally binding) original objective of returning their greenhouse gas 
emissions individually or jointly to 1990 levels by the year 2000 
(Article 4.2, UNFCCC).  
•  The Parties included in Annex II have the further commitment to 
provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed 
full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with 
their obligations (Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, UNFCCC). 
•  Economies in transition are allowed a certain degree of flexibility in 
implementing their commitments (Article 4.6, UNFCCC); for 
example, several of those countries have chosen a base year other 
than 1990. 
•  A Developing Country Party (a term that the COP has historically 
been unable to define so that it now simply means any Party not 
included in Annex I) is eligible for funding of the implementation of 
its general commitments (Article 11, UNFCCC). The extent of their 
implementation must take into account both the availability of 
funding from Annex II Parties and the fact that development and 
poverty reduction are the overriding priorities of developing 
countries. The requirement for regular reports (‘national 
communications’) from developing countries is also conditional on 
receipt of full funding, and their content and frequency are less than 
required for Annex I Parties. The guidelines for the preparation of 
national communications for non-Annex I Parties, for example, do 
not speak of “policies and measures” but of “steps taken or envisaged 
to implement the Convention”.  
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, adds new commitments for 
Annex I Parties and confirms the general commitments from the 
Convention for non-Annex I Parties without modifying them in any 
significant respect. 
With the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties agreed to reduce aggregated 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur HISTORY & STATUS OF A FUTURE CLIMATE AGREEMENT | 19 
 
hexafluoride (SF6) in the period 2008 to 2012 relative to 1990 levels. Annex I 
Parties have individual limitation or reduction targets, as shown in Table 1. 
To a certain extent, countries can reach their targets by trading 
emissions allowances with other countries or by implementing emissions 
reduction projects in other Annex I countries (via Joint Implementation or 
JI) or in developing countries, which do not have quantified targets 
themselves (via the Clean Development Mechanism or CDM).  
Countries may also choose to implement the commitments jointly as 
a group (i.e. ‘bubble’). The European Union has chosen to do so and has 
internally negotiated revised national targets that will be the basis for the 
assessment of their individual compliance with the Kyoto Protocol (see also 
Table 1).  
Since the text of the Kyoto Protocol left some questions unanswered, 
the COP agreed on a substantive package clarifying the conditions of the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Marrakech in 2001, the so-called 
‘Marrakech Accords’ (UNFCCC, 2001). 
Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol required ratification by 55 
Parties including Annex I Parties responsible for 55% of the Annex I CO2 
emissions in 1990. Since the US (responsible for 36%) rejected the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2001, it was the Russian Federation (responsible for 17%) that 
had the decisive vote.1 In October 2004, Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
which made the instrument enter into force on 16 February 2005. 
3.  History of the negotiations on a future agreement 
The Convention states in Article 4.2(a) and (b) that Annex I Parties shall 
adopt and implement policies and measures to return their greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2000 to 1990 levels. A review of the adequacy of those 
paragraphs was called for to take place at the first session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP 1) and a second review no later than 31 December 1998, 
and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the COP, until the 
objective of the Convention is met. 
Figure 2 presents a timeline of past and future steps in the discussion 
on commitments, which are summarised below. 
                                                      
1 For an analysis on the voting power of countries to bring the Protocol into force, 
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Figure 2. Timeline of the negotiations on a future agreement 
First review of commitments launches process to agree by COP3
Second review of commitments: 
No agreement whether the issue includes commitments for developing 
countries - issue deferred
UNFCCC adopted
First review of adequacy to be at COP1 
Second review of adequacy to be in 1998
COP1 1995
1992
Kyoto Protocol adopted COP3 1997
COP4 1998
No agreement - issue deferred COP5 1999
No agreement - issue deferred COP6 2000
No agreement - issue deferred COP7 2001
Initiation of process of new targets for 
Annex I Parties (AWG)
COP11 2005
COP/MOP1
No agreement on adequacy - issue deferred
Implicit discussion of commitments under Delhi Declaration
COP8 2002
First review of the Kyoto Protocol COP12 2006
COP/MOP2
No agreement on adequacy - issue deferred COP9 2003
No agreement on adequacy - issue deferred
Agreement to hold a seminar
COP10 2004
No major decisions COP2 1996
Kyoto Protocol enters into force Feb 2005
Seminar of governmental experts (SOGE) on past and future May 2005
Initiation of a dialogue to discuss 
the future
Adoption of the Marrakech Accords
Agreement to conclude AWG by 2009 COP13 2007
COP/MOP3
Initiation of an Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Cooperative Action
to conclude by 2009
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol
 
 
The first review at COP 1 (1995) concluded that the paragraphs in 
Article 4.2(a) and (b) were not adequate. With the ‘Berlin Mandate’, the 
COP initiated a process to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties 
without introducing any new commitments for non-Annex I Parties. The 
negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) resulted 
in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and its binding quantified targets for 
Annex I Parties at COP 3 in 1997. Although the subject of developing 
country commitments continued to be raised in the AGBM and at Kyoto 
itself, with a suggestion by some developed countries for a ‘Kyoto 
Mandate’ comparable to the Berlin Mandate, deep political divisions meant 
such proposals were not agreed.  HISTORY & STATUS OF A FUTURE CLIMATE AGREEMENT | 21 
 
The second review of adequacy was discussed at COP 4 in 1998, 
overshadowed by the issue of a future mandate that would allow 
discussion of additional developing country commitments. No agreement 
was reached. At COP 5 in 1999, again no agreement was reached and the 
agenda item was deferred in the following year to COP 6. Due to more 
urgent matters relating to Kyoto’s unfinished business and the absence of 
any movement in Parties’ positions, again no agreement was reached. 
The text of the Kyoto Protocol, adopted at COP 3, left several details 
of its implementation open, e.g. how emissions from land use change and 
forestry would be counted. The Marrakech Accords, adopted at COP 7 in 
2001, prescribe detailed rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The completion of the Kyoto ‘rulebook’ provided an opportunity for 
raising the issue of future climate policy, but the uncertainty caused by the 
US withdrawal from the Protocol in March 2001 confounded political 
expectations. No one wanted to raise the deeply divisive issue given that 
the only future issue of concern to everyone was much more immediate: 
whether the Protocol would enter into force given that the US had 
pronounced it ‘dead’ and the double trigger required not only 55 countries 
but also coverage of 55% of Annex I emissions.  
At COP 8 in 2002, the second review of the adequacy of Annex I 
Parties’ commitments could not be resolved and was again deferred. 
However, the issue of a mandate that would allow discussion/negotiations 
of developing countries’ commitments was raised in the context of the 
negotiations on a Delhi Declaration, which was to become the main 
outcome of the conference. The final Delhi Declaration, however, does not 
refer to the future. It was welcomed and supported by the G77 and the US, 
while the EU and Japan and Canada and the Central Group-Eleven (CG11, 
comprising most economies in transition included in Annex I) voiced their 
disappointment.  
At COP 9 in Milan in 2003, all countries were silent on commitments 
after 2012 in the official negotiations. The EU did not want to repeat the 
negative experience of COP 8. But on the margins and at side events, the 
issue of commitments post-2012 was intensively discussed.  
The COP 10 in Buenos Aires in the following year saw a fresh attempt 
to start official negotiations on commitments and actions beyond those set 
out in the UNFCCC/Kyoto. The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 
Russia just prior to the Conference, ensuring Kyoto’s entry into force on 15 
February 2005, gave a considerable political boost. Text was agreed to hold 22 | HÖHNE, YAMIN & HAITES 
 
a ‘seminar’ on the future and the past, “bearing in mind that this seminar 
does not open any negotiations leading to new commitments” (UNFCCC, 
2004). 
The Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force served as the background to the 
Seminar of Governmental Experts (SOGE), held in May 2005. Although it 
was a one-off event and informal in nature, the SOGE proved that sufficient 
political will existed amongst a sufficiently wide range of Parties to 
commence consideration of the legal nature and scope of additional future 
actions.  
The Kyoto Protocol itself demands review of existing commitments 
within two articles. In Article 3, on the quantified commitments for Annex I 
Parties, the review of commitments inscribed in Annex B of the Protocol for 
Annex I Parties shall be initiated in 2005. Article 9 of the Kyoto Protocol 
calls for a general review of the Protocol coordinated with the review of the 
Convention, starting at the second meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, 
held in 2006.  
COP 11 (2005) in Montreal was also the first Meeting of the Parties to 
the Protocol (COP/MOP 1). Two processes with relevance to a future 
agreement were agreed. The review of commitments for the post-2012 
period for Annex I Parties inscribed in Annex B of the Protocol was 
initiated. An open-ended, Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) was formed. 
These discussions will be undertaken only by the countries that ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, i.e. excluding the US and Australia.2 In addition, a two-year 
process was launched to discuss “long-term cooperative action to address 
climate change”. Such action can commence any time and thus the process 
is not tied to the 2008-12 period. The process took the form of a dialogue 
held under the UNFCCC and therefore included the US and Australia. The 
mandate speaks of sustainable development, adaptation, technology 
potential and market-based opportunities as topics, but does not speak 
explicitly of emissions reductions. The mandate also states that it “will not 
open any negotiations leading to new commitments”.  
At COP 12, which is also COP/MOP 2, in November 2006, the first 
review of the Kyoto Protocol was initiated and completed without 
substantial conclusions. The discussion was deferred by the decision that 
the second review will take place in 2008. The review “shall not lead to new 
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commitments for any Party”. It decided to consider the scope and content 
of the second review already in 2007. 
In Bali in December 2007, COP 13/MOP 3 initiated the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention to 
finalise its work by COP 15, i.e. by the end of 2009. This group is to discuss 
“mitigation commitments or actions” by all developed countries and 
“mitigation actions” by developing countries. The conference also agreed 
that the ad hoc working group (AWG) under the Kyoto Protocol would 
complete its work in December 2009 too. 
4.  Current activities relevant to a future international agreement 
The UNFCCC is the primary forum for discussion on climate change, but 
the scope and timing of a future agreement to combat climate change at the 
international level is also being discussed in other political fora. Figure 3 
includes a few of these, which are discussed below. It is expected that in the 
long run, deliberations in all of these fora will lead to a more effective 
future international system to combat climate change.  
Figure 3. Overview of different strands of activities relevant to future international 
climate policy 
Open ended ad-hoc working group (AWG) for new reduction targets for 
Annex I countries
Dialogue on future steps for cooperative 
action under the Convention
2005
Review of the Kyoto Protocol
2006 2007
Other efforts like the G8, Asia Pacific Partnership, UN high 
level climate talks, US major economies meeting
2008 2009
Ad hoc working group on long-
term cooperative action
 
4.1  Activities within the UNFCCC 
Many of the activities within the UNFCCC process are relevant for the 
development of the future agreement. The most important ones are 
discussed in more detail below and include: 
•  New commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and 
•  Further action under the Convention. 24 | HÖHNE, YAMIN & HAITES 
 
4.1.1  New commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
The first Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP 1, 2005) initiated 
the process of establishing commitments for the post-2012 period to be 
inscribed in Annex B of the Protocol for Annex I Parties. An open-ended, 
ad hoc working group was formed (AWG). A deadline for its completion 
was not fixed. These discussions are under the legal authority of Kyoto 
Parties with non-Parties such as the US having observer status.  
At its first meeting in May 2006, the AWG did not decide a deadline 
for decisions, but stated that it should be in time so that there is no gap 
between the first and second commitment periods (UNFCCC, 2006). The 
group is now entering an analysis phase where countries are invited to 
present information relevant to reduction commitments, including 
mitigation potentials.  
At COP/MOP 2 in November 2006, the AWG focused on the 
development of a work plan and a schedule for further meetings. The 
future work programme will include:  
a)  analysis of mitigation potential and ranges of emissions reduction 
objectives, 
b)  analysis of possible means to achieve mitigation objectives and 
c)  consideration of further commitments.  
During its third session in May 2007, a roundtable took place to 
provide delegates an opportunity to discuss the current status of the 
scientific understanding and relevant experience.  
At the first part of the fourth session in Vienna in August 2007, the 
AWG agreed for the first time an overall ambition level by recognising the 
findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that 
emissions of global greenhouse gases need to peak in the next 10 to 15 
years and be reduced to very low levels, well below half the level in 2000 
by the middle of the 21st century. It also noted that Annex I Parties as a 
group would need to reduce emissions in a range of 25-40% below 1990 
levels by 2020. Taking these ranges as “useful initial parameters for the 
overall level of ambition”, the AWG turned to the next item of its work 
plan, i.e. the means to achieve the mitigation objective. 
In December 2007, the AWG agreed a detailed work programme to be 
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COP/MOP 2 had agreed to have a second review of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2008 and to discuss its scope in 2007. In 2007 the elements of the 
review were agreed. The decision still states that “the second review shall 
not lead to new commitments for any party”.  
4.1.2  Further action under the Convention 
A two-year ‘dialogue’ process was launched at COP 11 (2005) to discuss 
“long-term cooperative action to address climate change”. This process 
took the form of an open-ended dialogue by the COP itself, including the 
US and Australia. The mandate speaks of sustainable development, 
adaptation, technology potential and market-based opportunities as topics, 
but does not explicitly refer to emissions reductions. The mandate also 
states that the dialogue “will not open any negotiations leading to new 
commitments” but the two co-facilitators of the dialogue will report to COP 
12 and COP 13.3 
At the first meeting of the Convention dialogue, held in Bonn, 15-17 
May 2006, Parties exchanged their views openly. Countries emphasised 
which topics should be the focus of the discussions. The theme of positive 
incentives for action in developing countries was heard many times. 
During the second workshop of the Convention dialogue during COP 
12 in November 2006 in Nairobi, several topics were presented and 
discussed. These included e.g. the Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change, the World Bank Investment Framework on renewable 
energies, positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation in 
developing countries and integrating climate change into development 
strategies. Discussions were held e.g. on advancing development goals in a 
sustainable way and realising the full potential of market-based 
opportunities. 
The third workshop of the Convention dialogue took place in Bonn in 
May 2007. It focused on realising the potential of technology and 
addressing action on adaptation. The fourth workshop in Vienna in August 
2007 focused on financial flows necessary to slow climate change and on a 
possible future process. No formal decisions were adopted. The co-
facilitators reported to COP 13 (2007). 
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At COP 13/MOP 3 in Bali, a process was agreed to negotiate a global 
climate change agreement by the end of 2009.  The AWG on long-term 
cooperative action under the Convention shall complete its work for 
adoption by COP 15. The work programme will be developed at the first 
meeting and the aim is to “enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, 
now, up to and beyond 2012.” A “shared vision including a long-term goal 
for emission reductions” will be addressed taking into account common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Four major 
elements will be considered: mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
financing. 
During the many discussions, the developing countries making up 
the G 77 and China made clear that the two tracks (the long-term 
cooperative action and the AWG) must remain separate and ensured that 
there was little discussion of their linkage. This was achieved and both the 
AWG and the long-term cooperative action under the Convention will 
continue in parallel under separate leadership. China also strongly 
opposed the Russian proposal on procedures for the approval of voluntary 
commitments (the third track). Russia was encouraged to continue 
discussion of its proposal under Article 9 and the AWG on long-term 
cooperative action.  
One of the major decisions was the agreement that funding for 
adaptation projects in developing countries should begin under the 
supervision of the newly established Adaptation Fund Board. This should 
enable a rapid start for the Adaptation Fund (which is funded by a 2% levy 
on CDM projects and has currently reached €37 million with an increase 
expected to an estimated $80-300 million in the period 2008-12 with projects 
in the CDM pipeline). There was no agreement on additional practical 
adaptation measures and the issue will be re-visited at SBSTA4 in June 
2008.  
Another of the big successes at Bali was the adoption of a pilot work 
programme for further methodological work to reduce emissions from 
                                                      
4 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, established at the first 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in August 1995 to provide the 
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deforestation and forest degradation. This programme will focus on 
assessments of changes in forest cover and associated greenhouse gas 
emissions, methods to demonstrate reductions of emissions from 
deforestation and the estimation of the amount of emissions reductions 
from deforestation. Demonstration activities and capacity-building will be 
undertaken. Norway offered considerable funding to support this decision.  
4.2  Activities outside the UNFCCC 
Outside the UNFCCC, several processes with relevance to a future climate 
agreement have been initiated. Four are of particular relevance: the 
Gleneagles G8 discussions on climate change, the Asia-Pacific Partnership 
(AP6), the United Nations high-level climate change talks and the US major 
emitters initiative.  
4.2.1  Gleneagles G8 plus 5 process 
During the G8 meeting 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland, at which five 
developing countries – Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa – 
participated, the Gleneagles Communiqué and Plan of Action on Climate 
Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development was released. The 
G8+5 group emphasise the need to stop and reverse the increase of 
greenhouse gas emissions. It includes three areas of future work: the 
ministerial dialogue, cooperation with the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) and with the World Bank. 
Ministerial dialogue 
A major commitment of the G8 Summit in Gleneagles was to “take forward 
a Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable 
Development, and to invite other interested countries with significant 
energy needs to join”. This Gleneagles Dialogue is an informal forum for 
discussion. Its objective is to complement and reinforce the formal 
negotiations within the UNFCCC by trying to create the conditions 
necessary for successful agreement.  
The dialogue encompasses 20 countries (G8+5 together with 
Australia, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Poland, South Korea and Spain), the 
European Commission and key international organisations including the 
World Bank and the IEA. The UNFCCC Secretariat also participates. 
The July G8 Summit in Russia (2006) included a series of meetings 
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Nevertheless, the Russian Summit reaffirmed the G8’s commitments to 
meet the objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and of dealing 
with climate change, including through promoting an inclusive dialogue 
on further action in the future. The second ministerial dialogue meeting 
was hosted by Mexico in October 2006 (UK Defra, 2005). 
Under the German Presidency, the G8 continued working on the 
Gleneagles Plan in 2007. The G8 countries committed to reduce global CO2 
emissions by 2050 by at least 50%. This aim shall be reached within the UN 
process and in cooperation with emerging economies. It agreed to finalise 
an agreement of the large emitters by 2008 and a global agreement under 
the UNFCCC by 2009.  
The 2008 G8 Summit, presided over by Japan, will conclude the G8 
process on climate change with a final report on previous work under the 
dialogue being submitted for the consideration of G8+5 leaders in Japan.  
IEA 
For the future cooperation between G8 and IEA, the Gleneagles 
Communiqué describes the IEA as advisor “on alternative energy scenarios 
and strategies aimed at a clean, clever and competitive energy future” (UK 
Presidency of the G8, 2005).  
As part of this work, the IEA has published a major new report called 
Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050 (IEA/OECD, 
2006). Another publication in this context focuses on energy efficiency in 
industry (IEA, 2007). The IEA’s key findings will be delivered at the G8 
Summit in Japan in 2008 (IEA, 2005). 
World Bank 
In the Gleneagles Communiqué, the participants describe the future role of 
the World Bank as taking “a leadership role in creating a new framework 
for clean energy and development, including investment and financing” 
(UK Presidency of the G8, 2005). 
International financial institutions can be an important source of 
finance, policy and technical advice regarding the financing of investments 
needed for clean energy development. Also the creation of new financing 
instruments could support this effort in several possible ways (World Bank, 
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•  Clean Energy Financing Vehicle (CEFV). This could provide a 
mechanism to transfer high-efficiency technology by blending grants 
and carbon finance. 
•  Power rehabilitation financing facility. Failures of supply can cause high 
costs. This facility could enable developing countries to rehabilitate 
inefficient plants without loss of power. 
•  Project Development Fund. ‘Bankable’ projects seem to be needed. Such 
projects with participation of the public and the private sector could 
be addressed with this fund. 
•  Venture capital funds for technology adoption. These funds could finance 
the development, adoption and penetration in the market of 
promising, new and clean technologies. 
The G8 process has created new momentum for the international 
discussions on climate change. It has raised the issue to the level of heads of 
state and given new direction to existing institutions such as the IEA and 
the World Bank. It is seen as a process that can reintegrate the US and at the 
same time engender a constructive dialogue with the largest developing 
countries. By creating the conditions under which any future agreement 
could be successfully implemented, the G8 activities can complement the 
UNFCCC process. 
4.2.2  Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) 
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), 
also known as AP6, was initiated by Australia, China, India, Japan, South 
Korea and the US (see http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org), and 
recently joined by Canada. The participating countries first met under this 
non-legally binding framework in January 2006.  
The purposes of this partnership are to “advance clean development 
and climate objectives […] The Partners will enhance cooperation to meet 
both [… their] increased energy needs and associated challenges, including 
those related to air pollution, energy security, and greenhouse gas 
intensities, in accordance with national circumstances.”  
The six founding countries represent about half of the world’s 
economy, population and energy use. Globally, they are important 
producers of coal (65%), cement (61%), steel (48%) and aluminium (35%) 
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The main institution of the AP6 is the Policy and Implementation 
Committee, which is chaired by the US. It is responsible for management of 
the implementation of the cooperative activities of the partnership and its 
task forces. The Administrative Support Group, which coordinates the 
communication, is also established by the US. Eight government-industry 
task forces have been set up, focusing on power generation and key 
industry sectors of the partner countries: cleaner fossil energy (co-chaired 
by Australia and China); renewable energy and distributed generation (co-
chaired by Korea and Australia), power generation and transmission (co-
chaired by the US and China); steel (co-chaired by Japan and India); 
aluminium (co-chaired by Australia and the US); cement (chaired by 
Japan); coal mining (co-chaired by the US and India) and buildings and 
appliances (co-chaired by Korea and the US). The transport sector is not 
covered. The task forces will formulate action plans that outline short-and 
medium-term action necessary to reach the Partnership’s aims. 
The task forces shall “drive improvements with regard to best 
practices and ensure that a range of technologies is developed and 
repeatedly demonstrated so that scale is increased and costs are reduced” 
(AP6, 2006). 
The funding of this partnership is voluntary. The US pledged to 
contribute up to $50 million in 2007 (US OMB, 2006). The Australian 
Government plans to invest a further $100 million in Australian dollars 
(roughly $75 million) over five years (Australian Government, 2006). 
The economic research agency of the Australian government 
concluded that the efforts from the Asian-Pacific Partnership could reduce 
global emissions from 22 GtCeq (gigatonnes of carbon equivalent) in 2050 
under a reference case to 17 GtCeq, i.e. emission reductions of 23% 
compared to the reference case (ABARE, 2006). The WWF criticises this as 
being far too little because the emissions would still lead to a global 
temperature increase of 4°C (WWF, 2006). A target of 2°C would require 
global emissions to be below 1990 levels (7 GtCeq) in 2050.  
The Asia-Pacific Partnership is seen by some of its members as an 
alternative to the UNFCCC and Kyoto process and by others as a 
complement to it. Its impact alone does not seem sufficient to keep the 
average global temperature increase below 2°C, which is the goal for some 
countries. It also still has to prove to be operational as a new institution. 
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process. Indeed, it could complement it well, if it focuses on the 
development of particular technologies. 
4.3  United Nations High-Level Climate Change Talks 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced in May 2007 that he hoped 
to bring the world's leaders together to discuss a future agreement on 
curbing greenhouse gas emissions “as recognition of the fact that climate 
change needed to be addressed at a higher level than that of environmental 
ministers, because the issue also had developmental and economic 
impacts”. The meeting, on 24 September 2007, coincided with the UN 
General Assembly. At least 100 countries attended, over half of which 
represented by heads of state. The meeting provided impetus for COP 13 to 
adopt a mandate for a future climate agreement in Bali, Indonesia in 
December 2007. 
4.4  The US major economies meetings  
In May 2007, just before the G8 summit in Germany, US President George 
W. Bush announced a new initiative, to bring together the largest emitters 
to agree on a framework for future action on climate change by the end of 
2008. Under the initiative, each of the major emitting countries would 
establish its own greenhouse gas emissions targets, goals and programmes 
according to national circumstances. The pledges would be reviewed 
regularly.5 Prior to the first meeting on 27 September 2007, the initiative 
was re-named the major economies meeting on energy security and climate 
change. 
France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan, China, Canada, India, Brazil, 
South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, South Africa and the 
UN participated in the first meeting, held in Washington, D.C., on 27-28 
September. The invitation letter stated that: “The United States is 
committed to collaborating with other major economies to agree on a 
detailed contribution for a new global framework by the end of 2008, which 
would contribute to a global agreement under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change by 2009.” 
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The timing of this initiative raised speculation that it was intended to 
distract attention from the G8 and the UNFCCC process. Many observers 
commented that such a voluntary pledge and review process could hardly 
achieve the significant reductions that would be necessary to limit global 
temperature increases to 2°C. This concern became secondary after the US 
agreed to the ‘Bali Roadmap’, and several additional meetings of the major 
economies initiative are planned during 2008. 
5.  Conclusions 
Starting in 2005, a new momentum entered the negotiation process. After 
the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, climate change received high-
level political attention in several parallel initiatives (UNFCCC, G8, APP, 
UN high-level talks, major economies meeting). With the start of two 
dialogues under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the G8 
follow-up processes, the APP, the United Nations high-level meeting and 
the US major economies meeting, enormous momentum was built up for 
the COP in Bali 2007. Some argue that the large number of processes 
outside the UNFCCC could threaten the authority of the UNFCCC process 
as the international forum on climate change. But it seems that these 
processes have positively influenced the UNFCCC negotiations and have 
provided new input to them. And in the end, all processes influence each 
other and an agreement in one will most certainly play an important role in 
the other processes. The negotiating efforts will be intensified in the next 
two years, to reach a global agreement by the end of 2009.  
Looking at the positions of countries, there are many gaps and areas 
of disagreement that must be bridged before any new universal agreement 
can be adopted. Countries will have positions that go further than they 
officially announce, but it is unlikely that all have solid positions on all 
topics necessary to form a full regime. The ‘Bali Roadmap’ intends to cover 
mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing.  
The issue of ambition level has received some attention, but only a 
few countries have spoken openly about it. The EU and other countries are 
in favour of a 2°C target, The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) calls it 
unacceptably high, but many countries have been silent on the issue of a 
long-term goal. Translating any long-term goal into global mid-term 
emission levels was only done by the EU, calling for at least 50% reduction 
of global emissions in 2050 below 1990 levels. Numbers for necessary 
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(30%) and the environmental NGOs (30-35%). It is remarkable that the 
AWG has made a quite firm decision to aim for 450ppmv CO2eq. and for 
reductions by Annex I countries 25-40% below 1990 levels in 2020. The 
mandate for the ad hoc group under the convention could not agree on 
such a goal. 
All countries seem to agree that some developing countries should be 
given ‘positive incentives’ to participate, but no country has specified 
exactly how such positive incentives should be designed. No country has 
mentioned a list of countries. The EU and AOSIS have suggested that it 
should be determined on the basis of capability and responsibility.  
All countries agree that adaptation will be a major element in a future 
climate treaty, but no Party has made concrete proposals on how it should 
be done. Here also the scientific policy-related literature has far fewer 
insights and proposals compared to mitigation.  
In conclusion, it seems that the large number of discussion processes 
can lead to a more enhanced consideration of the issue of climate change at 
the international level. But the urgency of action that is suggested by 
climate science has yet to lead to accelerated analytical work that could 
feed into negotiations on the time scale needed to ensure that there is no 
gap between the first and second commitment periods. Progress now 
seems possible under the various future action-related processes and the 
‘Bali Roadmap’ for reaching agreement by 2009. It remains to be seen 
whether such an agreement can be reached with sufficient stringency to 
avoid dangerous interference with the climate system. 
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3.  GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT MITIGATION 
POTENTIAL: THE WORK OF THE AD 
HOC WORKING GROUP ON FURTHER 
COMMITMENTS FOR ANNEX I PARTIES 
UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
ADRIAN MACEY* 
1.  Introduction 
Prior to Bali, the only negotiations leading to binding commitments to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions after 2012 are taking place in the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under Article 
3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol (AWG). The negotiations are being carried out in 
light of the overall objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) of stabilising greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a 
safe level, with developed countries required to continue to take the lead. 
The first stage of the AWG work programme involves analysis of 
mitigation potential,1 which is seen as a key input to determining overall 
reduction ranges for Annex I parties and ultimately to individual national 
commitments. Before discussing the AWG’s work on mitigation potential, 
it will be helpful to see where it is situated in the global context. 
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2.  The global context 
The effort needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels is 
daunting, when business as usual projections of emissions for the next few 
decades are shown. Can the world achieve this ambitious task? Estimating 
the global mitigation potential is the beginning of the answer. If the 
potential is there, attention can turn to how it is realised. Translating the 
potential into action will require organisation, resources and international 
commitments, and will pose challenges to all economies in adopting low 
emissions pathways without compromising development.  
The scale of the challenge is best understood if the figures are allowed 
to speak for themselves. In its Fourth Assessment Report, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the 
world will have to find about 30 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent reductions 
from baseline by 2030 to reach the lower stabilisation levels of 440-490 parts 
per million of CO2 equivalent.2 This means globally at least 50% below 2000 
levels by 2050 or for Annex I Parties 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020. This 
range is identified by the IPCC as most likely to limit the global 
temperature rise to between 2-3°C, beyond which there is an increased risk 
of severe impacts.  
The Fourth Assessment Report contains an estimate of mitigation 
potential, which shows that such reductions are theoretically achievable, at 
a cost, without assuming any major technological breakthroughs. The IPCC 
makes use of both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ studies to derive its figures, 
and concludes that there is increasing convergence of these two 
approaches. At two different prices of carbon ($50 and $100), both much 
higher than current prices, it estimates that Annex I countries could find 
between 6 and 11 gigatonnes reductions, and non-Annex I countries, 
between 6-19 gigatonnes.3 At $50 the chances of achieving the target range 
would be marginal, but at $100 it could be exceeded. A note of caution 
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should nonetheless be sounded as the IPCC points out that this “economic 
potential” is greater than the “market potential”4 realisable under current 
conditions without changes to government policy settings.  
Notwithstanding their limitations, the IPCC figures on the potential 
and costs of mitigation on the global level tend to support the broad 
findings of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,5 that 
mitigation is achievable at cost levels around 0.1% lower per annum 
growth in world GDP, and at any rate far below the assumed long-term 
costs of inaction. It is clear, however, that such global targets can only be 
achieved by measures in a wide range of countries, and notably in the 
major economies that are responsible for the bulk of global emissions. 
The figures in the Stern Review, and even more so those in the IPCC 
report because they are endorsed by governments, are helpful politically 
because they indicate that it is worth making the effort. The target is not 
out of reach if early action is taken. But this information is of little practical 
use by itself. The figures are not broken down by country and so have no 
operational value in the short to medium term, which is what is needed by 
Parties in the AWG negotiations. It should also be noted that the Annex I 
mitigation potential figures in the IPCC’s report overstate what could be 
achieved post-2012 by present Kyoto Protocol Parties, by up to 30%, as they 
include both Australia and the US, which do not currently have 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.  
There are also many uncertainties in the overall figures. The stimulus 
that could be given by an expanded and efficient global carbon market 
could be considerable. Technological advances beyond steady 
improvements that can be assumed in such areas as energy intensity are 
also impossible to predict. It is to be expected that the longer the period 
being addressed, the more the likelihood of major technological 
breakthroughs that could increase mitigation potential. Finally, no current 
calculations of mitigation potential take account of another set of factors – 
lifestyle changes – that is likely to have significance for countries pursuing 
sustainability policies for their economies and societies, or where the 
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population itself embraces a more sustainable lifestyle. For sectors such as 
transport, these lifestyle changes could be an important tool in emissions 
reduction.  
There is a requirement for there to be no gap between the end of the 
first commitment period (2008-12) and the start of the second one, which 
gives the work of the AWG some urgency. The section of the AWG’s work 
programme dealing with mitigation potential of Annex I Parties provides 
for the consideration of the “policies, measures and technologies” at their 
disposal, as a basis for determining possible ranges of emissions 
reductions. This is quite a broad sweep but necessary to the ultimate 
determination of specific commitments by country. Most notably, it enables 
national circumstances to be taken into account, reflecting the fact that 
there are large differences among the economies of Annex I Parties.  
An understanding of mitigation potential is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for determining commitments. Parties will want to see 
their future commitments in light of the global context of the overall post-
2012 climate arrangements. Relevant factors will include whatever global 
reductions goal may be decided, the evolution of the science, the actions of 
Parties that do not presently have commitments, and indeed the ambition 
of new commitments taken on by other Parties that already have 
commitments. The present Kyoto Protocol negotiations cannot deliver a 
comprehensive post-2012 agreement, and it is implicit in the AWG’s work 
that Annex I Parties alone cannot deliver the stabilisation objective of the 
Convention. There is no provision for involving other countries in a second 
commitment period, despite references to a ”shared vision” and to the 
overall objective of the Convention. Some Parties may judge that they need 
to make future commitments conditional on wider uptake of mitigation 
measures. The EU for example has made its level of ambition contingent on 
participation and comparable efforts by others, and its expectations extend 
beyond Annex I countries.  
3.  How should mitigation potential be determined? 
The commonsense understanding of mitigation potential as what each 
country is capable of doing to reduce GHG emissions does not address the 
issue of the basis for comparison. There is no agreed definition of 
mitigation potential, still less of the method for determining it. Mitigation 
potential can be viewed from several perspectives, including market 
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potential and physical potential.6 Should account be taken of simply 
economic and technological factors, i.e. the cost and availability of 
technologies? Should it include the possibility of lifestyle changes? To what 
extent should it include the possibility of countries changing the focus of 
their economies, for example to exit relatively emissions-intensive 
activities? If this simply leads to carbon leakage, a geographical transfer of 
the same emissions, it is not net mitigation from the perspective of the 
planet. Mitigation also has co-benefits that can reduce net costs – should 
the domestic costs be therefore reduced and mitigation potential 
correspondingly increased? Ideally, the answer would be yes, but this 
could require cost-benefit analysis for which there do not appear to be 
adequate tools at present. Finally, it would probably be advisable from the 
same point of view of clarity and comparability to treat mitigation potential 
separately from the use of sinks.  
A first distinction that will be useful in the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations is that between domestic and total mitigation potential. There 
are in fact two types of distinctions possible here. First, between domestic 
potential realisable entirely within national borders and the greater 
potential at similar cost using international mechanisms such as emissions 
trading or the Clean Development Mechanism. Should estimates of 
mitigation potential be increased to take account of the possibility of using 
the international market to reduce costs? At the first stage this is probably 
not useful, especially as there is no certainty about the state of the 
international carbon market after 2012. There may also be a risk of double 
counting – for example a Joint Implementation project reducing emissions 
in one Annex I country paid for by a business in another. The second 
possible distinction is between domestic mitigation potential and a 
‘responsibility target’, which would include an additional quantity of 
emissions reductions, unrelated to domestic mitigation potential that 
would be undertaken as part of a country’s contribution to the global effort. 
This could take place in third countries through Clean Development 
Mechanism projects or indirectly through purchasing emissions units on 
the market. One might expect there to be a correlation between this 
additional element and ability to pay, as measured for instance by GDP.  
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This discussion will concentrate on domestic potential, which is 
important to get right as a baseline for the other dimensions, and which 
also provides useful comparative information among countries. Rather 
than seek a definition, it will be more instructive to look at the factors that 
are commonly used in discussions of mitigation potential. Domestic 
mitigation potential should initially be an objective statement about what is 
possible to achieve, and at what cost, not what should be done. The ‘is’ 
must be established before getting to the ‘ought’. Mitigation potential 
should thus be distinguished from such concepts as responsibility for past 
emissions and capability, or ability to pay, important as these factors may be 
in the determination of final targets or commitments.7  
Whatever the base year taken, the actual costs that Parties will incur 
are through mitigation action applied to future emissions. The base year 
1990 used in the Kyoto Protocol is a logical point of reference for Parties 
with existing commitments. But given the strong divergence of growth of 
economies and emissions since 1990, a base year closer to the present day 
would be more useful as a point of reference in order to compare 
mitigation potential among countries. Having some comparative mitigation 
potential information will be useful in building confidence that one’s 
country is being fairly treated and conversely, that others are making a 
contribution commensurate with their ability to do so. This fair burden-
sharing aspect is likely to be increasingly important in the final stages of 
the negotiations.  
4.  AWG discussions 
The UNFCCC secretariat completed a ‘technical paper’ in July 2007 
(UNFCCC, 2007), for the AWG to help in the assessment of mitigation 
potential. This is a useful survey of relevant factors and indicators (the term 
‘criteria’ in its mandate from the AWG was judged inappropriate because 
of the risk of compromising the secretariat’s neutrality). The factors and 
indicators are brought together from the literature on the subject as well as 
from submissions from Parties and presentations to the UNFCCC. The 
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Secretariat does not advocate any one approach or set of factors, but few of 
these indicators are controversial and there appears to be a degree of 
common understanding. So despite its technical nature, the paper will 
remain very useful to inform policy beyond its short-term purpose in the 
AWG negotiations, and would be worth developing further.  
The paper discusses both nationwide and sectoral indicators. The 
nationwide figures include per capita emissions, which are often suggested 
as the most reliable and equitable indicator for the future. However this 
shows an average of 11 tonnes CO2 equivalent per capita among Annex I 
countries, with a variation of 3.0 to 27.7 tonnes, so is unlikely to be useful 
on its own without reference to the underlying sectors. Per capita emissions 
could certainly be useful in the very long term, but as a guide to action in 
the short to medium term they are of little use. They can also be 
misleading. A high per capita figure may not necessarily indicate an 
inefficient economy with high mitigation potential. For example, to take the 
case of New Zealand, where 49% of GHG emissions come from methane 
and nitrous oxide from agriculture, there is no available mitigation 
technology that can currently make an impact, especially on methane from 
enteric fermentation. New Zealand’s per capita emissions therefore appear 
relatively high despite its agricultural sector being close to or at world’s 
best practice in terms of greenhouse gas intensity. Similarly, a heavily 
trade-dependent economy whose exports are more emissions-intensive 
than its imports may also have above-average per capita emissions. 
A further objection to using per capita emissions as the predominant 
metric is that it carries a connotation of a right to emissions per se rather 
than a right to growth, whereas the focus of the international community 
should be on a right to growth, but along a low-emissions pathway.  
Other nationwide indicators also show wide variation, for example, 
estimated population growth (a key push factor for emissions) between 
2004 and 2020 varies from –16% to +20%. GHG emissions trends 
themselves show a huge variation between 1990 and 2004, from –60% to 
+73%. Such variations are a good illustration of why no single metric 
would give an accurate representation of mitigation potential.  
National circumstances are best described on a sectoral basis, because 
aggregates can mask some key differences among economies. The 
UNFCCC paper shows variations in the sectoral indicators to be at least as 
great as for national indicators. A key indicator of mitigation potential is 
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value of 21.3%, but shows huge variations between negligible and 100%. 
Given the large proportion of global emissions growth coming from the 
energy supply sector, this is a highly important indicator. Mitigation 
potential in the energy sector will be much lower for countries with a high 
proportion of renewables and will greatly affect national aggregate 
emissions reductions commitments that they can take on. These countries 
will have to look for gains in energy efficiency. 
Given that no single indicator of potential is going to prove sufficient, 
it would be theoretically possible to agree on a combination of indicators 
with appropriate weightings for each and expressed as a mathematical 
formula, to be applicable to all economies. It is unrealistic to expect this to 
be negotiable, as each country would naturally seek to gain advantage from 
the weightings. A sectoral breakdown of mitigation potentials (which could 
be aggregated to give a national figure) will give the most informative basis 
for cross-country comparisons. For the present, reference to both 
nationwide and sectoral indicators is appropriate. One broad metric that 
would be useful would be sectoral abatement cost curves showing costs per 
tonne of CO2 equivalent GHG reduction, but this information is not widely 
available yet. Nor are accurate figures available for the macroeconomic 
effects of mitigation action at the country level.  
One conclusion that can be drawn from the albeit incomplete figures 
available so far is that after 2012, there is likely to be a much larger spread 
around an average figure for GHG reduction commitments than in the first 
commitment period. This information was not available at the time of the 
negotiation of the first commitment period. For European Union members, 
national and sectoral differences can be accommodated within a single 
overall EU target for the purposes of the negotiation. While this flexibility 
is theoretically available to other Annex I members under Article 4.1 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, it does not seem a practical proposition. So whereas the EU 
is able to agree to a target and negotiate internal burden-sharing later, that 
negotiation will have to take place earlier for non-EU Annex I countries, 
whose economies are as diverse as those of EU members.  
Mitigation potential is dynamic because it will evolve through time. 
This fact should be taken into account in the post-2012 arrangements. If 
potential were to increase, countries could take on more ambitious targets. 
Evolution in the type of economic activity – for example moving from 
manufacturing to a service economy, or technological breakthroughs – 
could increase the mitigation potential. To return to the New Zealand 44 | ADRIAN MACEY 
 
example of agricultural emissions, with current technologies, there has 
been a gradual improvement in methane intensity from livestock, but if the 
combined stimuli of the proposed emissions trading scheme8 and increased 
international research efforts9 were to lead to a breakthrough on enteric 
fermentation, New Zealand might be able to increase its domestic 
mitigation efforts. Strong economic growth could increase affordability of 
mitigation but will also tend to increase net emissions.  
This argues for post-2012 arrangements having built-in flexibility, 
unlike the first commitment period where no change was possible even 
though the commitments were negotiated over ten years before they 
became effective. The flexibility would need to be limited, because some 
stability is necessary to allow for the efficient functioning of carbon 
markets. Flexibility could be achieved in various ways – regular review, 
breaking down targets by sectors, sectoral agreements, some form of 
adjustment mechanism according to changes in economic or technological 
factors. Before a global agreement is in place, post-2012 targets may well be 
provisional – this would give the market a positive signal, without 
reducing flexibility pending final decisions.  
In a context where uncertainties remain, the concept of an ‘iterative’ 
process used by the AWG is useful. There is unlikely to be a simple linear 
progression through the work programme from potentials through 
reduction objectives and available means to establishing final 
commitments. There is incomplete information at all stages of the process, 
including some of the underlying science, so it may be necessary to revisit 
elements that have already been traversed once or more by the AWG, 
before reaching final decisions.  
Beyond the AWG, estimates of mitigation potential using these 
national and sectoral indicators could be equally useful in the case of 
voluntary GHG reduction action by non-Kyoto Parties or developing 
countries, or different forms of commitment other than the national 
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‘quelros’10 of the first commitment period, through sectoral agreements for 
example.  
5.  Conclusion 
Addressing mitigation potential is a necessary step in the work of the 
Kyoto Protocol Parties towards establishing commitments after 2012 and 
could also have a wider application in a comprehensive post-2012 
agreement. Final decisions about global goals, commitments and burden-
sharing will be decided through negotiations where equity and efficiency 
will be important considerations. Informed discussions about mitigation 
potential, including economic modelling and comparisons across different 
economies, will enable those decisions to be better-informed and more 
transparent. Government and stakeholders already have more information 
at their disposal than at a comparable time in the negotiations of the first 
commitment period. This work will also be valuable in the longer term as 
potentially the Kyoto Protocol negotiations become more closely linked 
with negotiations under the Convention. 
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4.  MORE INCONVENIENT TRUTHS: 
TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
SURYA P. SETHI* 
he international debate on climate change is not placing sufficient 
emphasis on the issue of equity while seeking a post-Kyoto regime. 
Sir, Gordon Brown, the British Prime Minister, underscored the need 
for an equitable global climate regime when he stated: “Climate change is 
an issue of justice as much of economic development. It is a problem 
caused by the industrialised countries whose effects will disproportionately 
fall on developing countries”.1 This statement should be the beacon for 
those framing the post-Kyoto regime. 
Unfortunately, the internationally quoted body of work on climate 
change typically combines scientific uncertainty with controversial value 
choices to estimate the social cost of carbon and the expected cost of 
catastrophic events resulting from high levels of greenhouse gas 
concentrations. It then goes on to do a cost-benefit analysis to choose the 
most economically viable, and, one might add, politically palatable though 
less-constraining, mitigation trajectory. Finally, it deftly finesses the 
implicit high probability of setting in motion critical non-linear positive 
feedbacks that could lead to the catastrophe that the ‘cost-effective’ 
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1 Speech by the Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the 
Energy and Environment Ministerial Roundtable (G8 Environment and Energy 
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environment/env_brown050315.htm). 
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stabilisation trajectory was designed to avoid in the first place. Thus if one 
was to impose a different set of value choices, one could argue, with equal 
legitimacy, that 5% or 10% of the global GDP would be required to reduce 
the risk of the catastrophic damage function to a benign 5-10% level. Now 
who decides which value choice or what probability of a catastrophic event 
occurring is acceptable. Who decides the value of an Indian life or, for that 
matter, how much more is life worth in the developed world? 
Should we accept the 450-PPM (parts per million) trajectory that has 
even odds of setting in motion an irreversible melting of the Greenland ice 
sheet or would we rather be safer and accept the 2°C stabilisation bound 
that reduces the probability of such a risk to 20% or less. Remember, that 
the 450-PPM bound gives an extra 10-12 years of emissions growth before 
emissions need to decline sharply and the 550-PPM bound, more 
conveniently, doubles that period. An incremental approach that is 
politically acceptable is just politics and not a solution to the urgent 
problem of climate change.  
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to establish the most 
appropriate stabilisation path but to demonstrate that climate change is 
primarily a political and socio-ecological issue. The socio-economic 
considerations, estimates of costs and benefits and who pays can be 
addressed only after political consensus emerges on ethical issues that 
would recognise the right of all human beings to a minimum development 
threshold. Such consensus would define national obligations towards 
global climate goals that are commensurate with each country’s 
responsibility for the problem and their capacity to address global climate 
concerns while attaining the minimum development threshold. 
Despite the urgency in developing a global climate compact, the 
climate debate is stuck because of unsustainable economic inequities. 
Populations are divided by wealth and other measures of well-being both 
among and within nations. A global compact that addresses both climate 
and inequality together is the only one that is likely to succeed. Further, 
such a compact must not attempt to distinguish investments in human 
development from adaptation activities. There are practical and conceptual 
problems with trying to determine the additionality of adaptation 
activities, and with trying to quantify incremental costs of adaptation over 
baseline costs of development. 
Once one looks at the problem with the foregoing perspective, one 
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debate on globalisation, trade, intellectual property rights (IPRs), energy 
security and development. An environment and climate-friendly business 
community, investment and technology, though essential are not sufficient 
to drive climate change by themselves. If such market forces alone could 
address climate concerns then the world would not be in the current 
situation wherein the energy intensities of even the rich developed nations 
vary by a factor of two despite access to technology and funding and the 
presence of competitive and enlightened market players. Markets and 
businesses typically react to global political, social, ecological and 
developmental agendas – they do not and cannot provide the leadership to 
create consensus on such compacts. Such leadership lies squarely in the 
political domain and has, unfortunately, been missing.  
The following eight inconvenient truths highlight the need for 
enlightened leadership from the developed world. In listing these 
inconvenient truths, the intention is not to cast any negative value 
judgement on any country or group of countries. 
•  First, climate change is already upon us because of natural drivers 
duly accelerated by anthropogenic activity. 
•  Second, the North has consumed the bulk of the global carbon budget 
while developing in an unconstrained world. There is little left for the 
South. Yet, the North’s emissions will continue to rise till 2030 even 
under alternate benign scenarios. Both the IEA (International Energy 
Agency) and EIA (US Energy Information Administration) project 
that the world’s fossil fuel dependence and the carbon intensity of its 
fuel mix will rise over the next 25 years.  
•  Third, a climate-constrained world imposes real limits to growth. 
Even if one takes the IPCC’s modest ‘B1’ scenario for the developing 
world and plots it against the 2o C or the 450-PPM scenario, it is clear 
that the growth in emissions from the South would hit a roadblock 
even as the South is fighting to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals and eradicate poverty. The South recognises this and, rightly, 
should not accept any uncompensated reduction in emissions that 
locks in poverty. The post-Kyoto negotiators would do well to 
recognise that this is not simply a bargaining position and should 
embrace the South’s right to development at least up to a negotiated 
minimum threshold. Without such a realistic approach, the world 
will, together, fail to deliver global climate targets. TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME | 49 
 
•  Fourth, the IEA projects that the number of people dependent on 
biomass to meet up to 90% of their household energy needs will rise 
from 2.5 billion today to 2.7 billion by 2030. This will be a third of this 
future generation – almost mirroring the current share of have-nots. 
Climate negotiators from the developed world and the multilateral 
community must recognise that they are committed to delivering a 
threshold level of development to this third of the next generation. 
More importantly, this commitment takes precedence over all other 
global endeavours because delivering upon this commitment will 
give the world’s have-nots a stake in its stability, thereby eliminating 
the most dominant source of conflict in the world. 
•  Fifth, current lifestyles and patterns of production and consumption 
in the North are simply unsustainable. The emissions from the North 
must peak soon – even yesterday may not be soon enough. 
Correcting this will entail huge costs and imposing them would be 
politically impossible without a binding global compact. Remember it 
has taken 15 years to introduce the concept of an ‘emissions freeze’ 
into the American political dialogue. 
•  Sixth, the North would need to fund even the no-regret mitigation 
options of the South since developmental outlays will always take 
precedence over mitigation in a resource-constrained South. And 
rightly so for growth and development also delivers the essential 
adaptive capacity as a by-product. 
•  Seventh, even if the North succeeds in bringing down its emissions to 
a level that is 80% below its 1990 level by 2050, the North’s emissions 
would still be a multiple of its fair share under a per capita metric. 
•  And eight, nobody is forecasting a technological breakthrough by 
2030. Our best bet is to make current low-carbon and energy-efficient 
technologies universally available and promote collaborative 
research. 
Each of the foregoing inconvenient truths is a blazing turning point 
that suggests immediate action by the North. Yet the international 
community continues debating developing country commitments while 
ignoring unilateral initiatives by countries such as India that, although 
driven by national concerns of energy security, economic development and 
local environment, have, nevertheless, delivered global climate benefits. 
India presents a compelling example of the cost that the world’s fourth-50 | SURYA P. SETHI 
 
largest economy is paying due to inequity in the global energy/climate 
regime. 
With 17% of the world’s population, India consumes less than 4% of 
the global supply of fossil fuels. India’s per capita commercial energy 
consumption is below 5% that of the US, below 36% that of China and 
below 22% of the world average. While India’s energy mix is dominated by 
coal with a share of 35%, renewable energy follows closely with a share of 
33%. Even though fossil fuels in India’s energy mix will mirror the world 
average by 2030, renewable energy will remain the third most important 
energy source with a share of around 15%. 
With 3.5 times the US population and more than twice the population 
of the EU, India has, since 2002, delivered more than twice their growth 
while consuming lower amounts of fossil fuels on an incremental basis in 
absolute terms – I repeat absolute terms and not in per capita terms. 
Compared to India, China’s growth has been 25% higher but China’s fossil 
fuel consumption has been over 9 times that of the EU, over 10 times that of 
the US and over 11 times that of India on an incremental basis since 2002 in 
absolute terms. In fact China’s incremental fossil fuel consumption since 
2002 is about 130% of India’s total fossil fuel consumption. 
India accounts for less than 4% of the global CO2 emissions or about a 
fourth of the Chinese share. With an 8% plus GDP growth, Indian 
emissions are rising by 3.5% annually, whereas Chinese emissions are 
rising at over 9.5% per annum to support its 10% plus growth. More 
importantly, India’s CO2 intensity of GDP growth has been falling at the 
rate of 4.7% per annum. 
India emits only 5-10% CO2 compared to industrialised countries 
when it comes to putting food on the table, moving people or heating or 
cooling space. And per capita consumption of aluminium, cement and steel 
per unit of inhabited land area is also a fraction compared to industrialised 
countries. If India were to match the EU15’s low consumption levels of 
these three construction materials, India’s total emissions would rise to 2.7 
times their current levels. Most importantly, recycling rates in India remain 
the world’s highest. 
The energy intensity of India’s GDP growth, today, is half of what it 
used to be a generation ago and is the fifth lowest in the world. The 
Integrated Energy Policy of India, that I have recently crafted, details policy 
initiatives that will close even this gap. India has successfully decoupled 
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years, delivered 8% growth with just a 3.7% growth in primary energy 
consumption. While China adds 100 GW of power generation capacity 
annually, India’s total installed capacity is only 150 GW. India’s per capita 
energy consumption in 2031-32 will reach 15% of the current US level, 70% 
of the current world average and match that of China today! 
India’s achievement did not come without cost. In PPP terms, Indian 
taxes on energy and energy prices are the highest in the world. The paying 
Indians are being charged the highest tariffs for energy in the world in PPP 
terms. Indian lifestyles are far more sustainable and key energy-intensive 
industries have either achieved or are close to achieving world energy 
efficiency standards. India has recognised that energy efficiency and 
conservation provide the largest assured energy access and hence energy 
security to India. 
Again, one must also look at the above Indian achievements from the 
perspective of 830 million Indians who, even today, live below the 
threshold of two dollars a day; or the perspective of over 700 million 
Indians who, even today, use some form of bio-mass for their predominant 
energy need, namely cooking; or the perspective of some 600 million 
Indians who, even today, live without electricity. While the world debates 
questions of global ethics, responsibility, costs and benefits of mitigation 
strategies, these fellow Indians, and the more vulnerable women and 
children among them, are busy combating local and indoor air pollution, 
unsafe drinking water, disease, infant and maternal mortality, illiteracy, 
gender bias, security of food and shelter – all key elements of a broad-based 
adaptive capacity; capacity that the multilateral community committed to 
deliver through the Millennium Development Goals and through 
Eradication of Poverty. Economic growth and the access it delivers offer the 
only hope that these fellow Indians have for their survival and 
empowerment. 
The above analysis is not an attempt to assign blame, but simply to 
place facts on the table that show that there are differences among 
developing countries, just as there are differences among the developed 
countries. It is an attempt to show that while both India and China face 
common challenges, the tendency to talk of the two countries in the same 
tone is simply ill-researched. And finally, it is an attempt to show that some 
developing countries are unilaterally sharing the global climate burden 
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In conclusion one can say that climate is a global responsibility but 
equally, environmental space is a global common and all humans have the 
right to a threshold level of development. While we are all in this together, 
the South cannot address global climate concerns alone, just as the North 
cannot do it alone. The global climate policy-makers should ensure that 
available energy-efficient and climate-friendly technologies are put into 
limited public domain to avoid a carbon-intensive and business-as-usual 
Southern growth trajectory that repeats the mistakes of the North. The 
post-Kyoto regime must ensure that future energy research would be 
conducted under collaborative efforts with appropriate sharing of IPRs. 
The post-Kyoto regime must recognise that energy security is a global need 
and not just the right of some. Such a post-Kyoto regime would seek to 
curb unsustainable lifestyles wherever they exist, renew commitment to the 
Millennium Development Goals and eradication of poverty and ensure that 
the additional funds to achieve all of the foregoing would come from those 
capable of providing them. | 53 
 
 
5.  CLIMATE CHANGE: A THREAT TO 
DEVELOPMENT 
ANDERS WIJKMAN* 
We basically have three choices – mitigation, adaptation and 
suffering. We are going to do some of each. The question is what 
the mix is going to be. The more mitigation we do, the less 
adaptation will be required, and the less suffering there will be. 
John Holdren, President of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science  
 
he issue of climate change may seem remote to people living in low-
income countries, compared to more immediate problems like 
poverty, disease and hunger. Yet we know that the consequences of 
climate change will affect their living conditions in a serious way.  
The world’s poorest nations bear little responsibility for the build-up 
of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere, yet they are likely to suffer 
the brunt of the consequences of climate change. More extreme weather 
events, sea-level rise and water scarcity constitute serious threats to 
development efforts and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
in many regions of the world. The Fourth Assessment Report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change depicts the following 
consequences: 
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Africa 
•  75–250 million people across Africa could face severe water shortages 
by 2020.  
•  Agricultural production and access to food will be severely 
compromised due to lost agricultural land, shorter growing seasons 
and lower yields. In some countries, yields from rain-fed crops could 
be halved by 2020.  
•  Rising water temperatures will decrease fish stocks in large lakes, 
already depleted by over-fishing.  
Asia 
•  Glacial melt from the Himalayas will increase flooding and 
avalanches, followed by reduced water supplies. Throughout Asia, 
the loss of fresh water could affect one billion people by the 2050s.  
•  In Central and South Asia, crop yields could fall by up to 30%, 
creating a high risk of hunger in several countries.  
•  Increased deaths and illness from diarrhoeal disease due to flooding 
and drought, as well as from cholera due to higher sea temperatures.  
•  Coastal areas, especially in mega-delta cities, will be at greater risk 
due to increased flooding both from the sea and rivers. 
Latin America 
•  Shifting rainfall patterns and the loss of glaciers will significantly 
reduce water availability for human consumption, agriculture and 
power-generation. 
•  In dry areas, agricultural land will become salty and sandy, lowering 
crop yields and livestock productivity, thereby undermining food 
security. 
•  In tropical forests, higher temperatures and the loss of ground water 
will reduce biodiversity, affecting the livelihoods of indigenous 
communities. 
•  Rising sea levels will cause more flooding in low-lying areas, and 
warmer sea waters will diminish fish stocks. CLIMATE CHANGE: A THREAT TO DEVELOPMENT | 55 
 
 Small islands 
•  Rising sea levels and increased storm surges will threaten the homes 
and livelihoods of communities, forcing some to migrate 
permanently.  
•  Coastal erosion and coral bleaching will undermine incomes from 
fishing and tourism.  
•  Freshwater resources on small islands are likely to be seriously 
compromised, especially in the Pacific and the Caribbean. 
Climate change aggravates existing problems  
While climate change will significantly increase the frequency and strength 
of extreme weather events, many regions of the world already have a long 
history of serious disaster-related problems. Both the frequency and scope 
of recorded disasters have risen markedly over time. A summary of natural 
disasters, compiled by Munich Re, world’s second-biggest reinsurer point 
to a rapid increase over the past 50 years.1 Figures from the International 
Red Cross2 and elsewhere the corroborate this trend. 
Weather-related disasters outnumber the geo-physical  – by nine to one 
over the past decade! According to data from Munich Re, disasters caused 
by heavy storms and floods have increased six-fold since the 1950s. The 
Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2007) provides strong evidence that this increase will be 
exacerbated because of climate change. 
Natural disasters have claimed the lives of more than two million 
p e o p l e  o v e r  t h e  p a s t  2 0  y e a r s ,  w i t h  an estimated 98% of the casualties 
occurring in low-income countries. For every reported death, there have 
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2 “Preparedness for climate change: a study to assess the future impact of climatic 
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Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in cooperation with the 
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been thousands of people seriously affected, often losing everything they 
have. Decades of development efforts are literally swept away. 
Low-income countries are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. 
Rich countries are far better placed to provide the infrastructure needed to 
reduce risk and vulnerability. Furthermore, in addition to the much greater 
capacity to mainstream risk reduction into development planning, the 
existence of insurance and re-insurance schemes provides important 
protection. In developing countries, vulnerable populations face the double 
jeopardy of being at much greater risk and having no capacity what so ever 
to transfer risk through insurance schemes. 
Disasters = Failed development 
Natural disasters occur when communities are exposed to potentially 
hazardous events without being able to absorb the impact. While it is 
common to talk about natural disasters, both vulnerability and hazard are 
conditioned by human activities. Reducing the effects of disasters means 
tackling the development challenges that lead to the accumulation of 
hazard and vulnerability that preceded the disaster. As underlined by a 
UNDP (2004) report “Natural disasters destroy development gains, but 
development processes themselves play a role in driving disaster risk.” 
When looking for the causes behind the rapid increase in natural 
disasters, we are confronted with a complex reality. In addition to climate 
change, a host of factors are of specific importance: 
•  Poverty. Extensive poverty inevitably leads to increased vulnerability in 
the face of various natural hazards. People are forced to settle down 
or remain in highly risk-prone areas. 
•  Population growth. Demographics is an important element in 
explaining the increase in the number of natural disasters and 
disaster victims. While fertility rates have decreased in most countries 
over the past decades, the growth in numbers is bigger than ever 
before. A large proportion of the new inhabitants end up in risk-
prone areas. 
•  Rapid urbanisation. While the global population has doubled over the 
past 40 years, the number of people living in urban areas has 
increased five-fold. Most of the new residents in urban environments 
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taken against natural hazards such as earthquakes, flooding and 
tropical storms. 
•  Environment degradation. When forests are indiscriminately logged, 
soils eroded and wetlands are diked, future natural disasters are in 
the making. The irony is that while disasters are triggered by natural 
phenomena, a healthy natural environment is often the best possible 
protection against storms, heavy rains or droughts turning into 
disasters.  
•  Disaster prevention overlooked. Although disasters are no longer 
viewed as extreme events caused by natural forces alone, disaster 
prevention and risk reduction are often overlooked. This comment 
goes both for national governments and development agencies. Out 
of more than 60 poverty-reduction strategies prepared to date, less 
than a fifth have incorporated aspects of hazard risk management.  
Risk reduction a priority in the North… 
Western countries spend billions of dollars at home in reducing the risks 
associated with floods, heavy storms and earthquakes. Many new 
initiatives have been launched to assess the increased risk panorama 
because of climate change and to suggest investments for risk reduction.  
The European Commission’s recently launched a Green Paper on 
“Adapting to Climate Change in Europe – Options for EU Action” 
(European Commission, 2007), which underlines the scale of the challenge 
facing Europe. The document warns that, unless there is advance planning, 
European countries will be left to respond “to increasingly frequent crises 
and disasters which will prove much more costly and also threaten 
Europe’s economic and social systems and its security”.  
The Green Paper identifies a host of problems, like health risks and 
social problems, including the threat to employment and decent living and 
housing conditions. Moreover, climate change will affect crop yields and 
livestock management, putting farm incomes at risk in some regions. The 
document predicts that climate change will specifically affect industries like 
construction and tourism: “Major infrastructure such as bridges, ports and 
highways have lifetimes of 80-100 years, so today’s investments must take 
full account of the conditions projected for the end of the century.” 
If all this is true for countries in Europe, the situation is many times 
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...but mostly overlooked in the South 
Low-income countries are by far the most vulnerable to disasters and the 
increased risks of climate change. As explained above, current 
development patterns often result in increasing vulnerability of local 
communities in the face of natural disasters.  
In spite of the often-devastating impacts that natural hazards can 
have, most policy-makers have been hesitating to commit significant funds 
to risk reduction. Yet, there is ample evidence that mitigation pays.  
Many studies have demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of prevention 
and risk reduction, both in terms of lives saved and ‘disaster-related’ 
economic losses. On a general level, it is estimated that €1 invested in 
disaster-risk reduction equals €5-10 invested in dealing with the disaster 
once occurred. The cost-effectiveness of early implementation of adaptation 
measures is particularly high for sectors like infrastructure. Furthermore, 
many ongoing development activities – like the destruction of coastal 
mangroves and coral reefs and/or human settlements in risk-prone areas – 
may irreversibly constrain future adaptation efforts.  
Although its long-term benefits may seem obvious, there are several 
reasons why risk reduction and adaptation are often overlooked:  
•  Short timescales often dominate development planning, causing a 
general neglect of disaster risks in decision-making. More specifically 
– and as explained in a recent OECD report3 – there is also often a 
mismatch between the time and space scales of climate change 
projections and the information needed by development planners. 
The main sensitivity to climate change is usually at a local scale, for 
which credible data are often lacking.  
•  Mainstreaming of climate change risks often proves difficult because 
of the pressing needs that governments feel in relation to more 
immediate issues, like poverty. 
•  It is easier to raise funding for high-profile humanitarian relief 
operations than for prevention. As Kofi Annan once expressed it: 
“The disaster that did not happen will create no headlines.” 
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In addition, developing country governments as well as aid agencies 
seldom command the overall skills and resources to effectively address 
disaster risks. The current challenge is to raise adaptation to the top of the 
political agenda – both in terms of policy priorities and in terms of funding 
– despite these inherent obstacles.  
Costs of risk reduction staggering  
Millions of poor people who are already experiencing the effects of climate 
change are doing their best to find ways to cope with it. The ADAPTIVE 
research project4 f o u n d  t h a t  p e o p l e  i n  A f r i c a  w e r e  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  l e s s  
frequent rains by planting more drought-resistant crops, eating wild fruits, 
collecting wild seeds, selling their animals, seeking paid jobs in towns, etc.  
But there are clear limits to how far poor people can adapt without 
support from the outside. Many people lack viable opportunities to 
diversify their livelihoods and also lack access to reliable climate 
information that would help them to plan better.  
The most obvious place to provide leeway for adaptation and risk 
reduction measures would be in Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs), 
providing the framework for the low-income countries' long-term 
development planning. However, most of the PRSs so far adopted have 
made limited efforts to incorporate aspects of hazard risk management. 
There are exceptions, like Honduras, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Bangladesh and 
Mozambique. But for most of the PRSs, disaster risk reduction is not a 
priority, and in most cases is not even mentioned. 
Cost estimates for adaptation to climate change differ widely. 
According to the Stern report, the additional costs of making new 
infrastructure and buildings resilient to climate change in OECD countries 
could be between $15-150 billion per annum. Taking into account only the 
costs required to ‘climate-proof’ investments, the World Bank (2006) has 
estimated that the annual adaptation costs in developing countries could 
range anywhere between $10 billion and $40 billion. In a recent report by 
OXFAM (2007), it is suggested that adaptation in developing countries will 
cost at least $50 billion each year. Evidently, there is a great need to gain a 
more precise picture of the costs for adaptation.  
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The international community: Insufficient response so far 
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) developed by the 
United Nations is one attempt to help reduce vulnerability among the 
billions of people who live in disaster-prone areas. The ISDR has seen 
increased momentum after the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, 
held in Kobe in January 2005. The Conference adopted the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA), with its five priority areas, with a strong 
focus on action at the national level. After the follow-up Global Platform on 
Disaster Reduction in 2007, ISDR has been reformed into a system to support 
the wide compliance with and implementation of the HFA. 
Several humanitarian organisations have also been pro-active in 
calling for more attention to risk reduction and disaster prevention. One 
prominent example is PROVENTION – a global coalition of international 
organisations, governments, the private sector, NGOs and academic 
institutions dedicated to increasing the safety of vulnerable communities 
and reducing the impacts of disasters in developing countries. 
PROVENTION acts somewhat as a ‘think tank’ for the international 
system, in particular on tools for mainstreaming risk reduction and 
adaptation into development planning. 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) recognises 
the right of poor countries to receive support in adaptation to climate 
change (e.g. Articles 4.8 and 4.9). But action has been slow. Three different 
funds of a voluntary nature have been established to help support 
developing countries address different aspects of climate change: 
•  Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund – whose main objective is to 
support LDCs to carry out assessments of their National Adaptation 
Plans of Action (NAPAs); so far only a few countries have made 
commitments to this fund and only a handful of NAPAs have been 
undertaken. 
•  Special Climate Change Fund will assist developing countries – not just 
the LDCs – to deal with climate change, including adaptation as well 
as mitigation measures. So far an estimated $500 million have been 
committed. 
•  Adaptation Fund, which will consist of the proceeds of a special 
adaptation levy placed on transactions under the Clean Development 
Mechanism. So far the levy has mobilised very limited funds.  CLIMATE CHANGE: A THREAT TO DEVELOPMENT | 61 
 
In addition, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has established a 
special fund – Strategic Priority on Adaptation – as a three-year initiative to 
pilot capacity-building adaptation measures in developing countries. 
Funding so far amounts to $50 million.  
Yet another international mechanism should be mentioned – the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) – launched by the 
World Bank in 2006. The role of the GFDRR is to offer technical assistance 
at country level, primarily through country-risk assessments. The facility 
does not engage in risk-reduction investments, however.  
It is also worth mentioning that the European Commission currently 
is in the process of drafting a Communication on Disaster Risk Reduction 
(DRR), with the purpose of linking adaptation with the broader disaster 
prevention agenda. This is a welcome step towards a more coherent 
approach.  
Although progress has been slow and governments – both in the 
North and the South – are only starting to pay serious attention, many 
experts now see a momentum emerging, aiming at expanding the political 
space dedicated by governments to disaster risk reduction . But the overall 
picture of risk reduction and adaptation still remains fragmented and the 
funding required to effectively address risk reduction in low-income 
countries is simply not there.  
Compared to the estimates provided both by the World Bank (2006) 
and OXFAM (2007) with regard to adaptation and ‘climate-proofing’, the 
three voluntary funds within the UNFCCC as well as the initiatives by the 
GEF and the World Bank only represent a very modest start. New and 
additional resources have to be mobilised – either through dedicated 
funding streams for adaptation, like a special global levy on air travel or 
part of the revenues from future auctioning of emission permits, through 
increased ODA (official development assistance) or through some kind of 
market-based mechanisms (by creating a market in ‘adaptation credits’ or 
‘vouchers’). 
Swedish initiative in the making 
Tackling climate change will require a high degree of cooperation at the 
international level. The evidence so far of such cooperation is limited. 
Industrialised countries have only just started curbing their own emissions 
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efforts to assist developing countries both in mitigation and adaptation 
have been extremely limited.  
If we are genuinely interested in a post-2012 agreement, the situation 
must change dramatically. Industrialised countries have to recognise their 
responsibility for historical emissions and help developing countries to 
reduce disaster risks as well as curb emissions. 
Why otherwise would developing countries agree to be party to an 
ambitious international agreement on emission reductions? 
A  crash programme is needed at international level to address the 
problems of adaptation and risk reduction. The main focus should be on 
weather-related disasters and impacts related to climate change. However, it 
is not possible to isolate the impacts from climate change from natural 
variations with regard to extreme weather events. Therefore a 
comprehensive approach to risk reduction should be pursued, one that 
recognises all major disaster risks.  
The risk reduction and adaptation initiatives that have been launched 
recently – like International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), a global 
platform for disaster risk reduction, the World Bank Global Facility, UNDP 
GRIP (Global Risk Identification Programme) initiative on disaster risk 
mapping and the efforts of PROVENTION on vulnerability assessments – 
merit attention and support. But what has been done is far from sufficient. 
What is badly needed are systematic efforts that pull together the many 
scattered initiatives undertaken so far.  
To respond to the needs, the Swedish Government recently launched an 
initiative that hopefully will make a difference. An International Commission on 
Risk Reduction and Adaptation will be established under the chairmanship of 
the aid minister, Gunilla Carlsson. The Commission’s main task is to explore 
and promote effective ways to integrate risk reduction and adaptation to climate 
change into development and poverty reduction plans in developing countries and to 
ensure  that future investments in ODA take full account of climate stresses and 
increased disaster risks.  
The work shall concentrate on the following main objectives: 
First, identify and analyse the incentives as well as barriers for 
developing countries to undertake risk-reduction and climate-proofing 
measures in their development efforts. The main focus shall be on weather-
related disasters and impacts on development related to climate change. A 
comprehensive approach to risk reduction, recognising all major disaster risks 
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Second, consider how to best combine long-term efforts for climate 
change mitigation and the urgent need to support adaptation efforts in 
developing countries as a result of climate change. 
Third, identify directions for international development cooperation in 
the field of adaptation and risk reduction, with a focus on leadership required 
in development assistance to ensure integration of long-term objectives such 
as risk reduction, adaptation and resilience in policy-making.  
Fourth, consider how to achieve policy coherence by integrating 
concerns for climate change in wider development efforts and elaborate a 
methodological approach for an Integrated Analysis for Climate-Proof 
Development. 
The Commission shall also give specific attention to the following: 
•  Help increase awareness about the need to mainstream risk reduction 
and adaptation into Poverty Reduction Strategies and ensure coherence 
in development strategies; 
•  Explore and propose new methodologies for integrating climate change 
aspects into development strategies; 
•  Assess the role of ecosystems in disaster prevention and devise 
strategies to strengthen their capacity to meet climate change; 
•  Give special attention to the hazards experienced by an estimated one 
billion slum dwellers and identify people-centred solutions to reducing 
their vulnerability; 
•  Give priority to slowly developing disasters, such as prolonged 
droughts and chronic instability stemming from water scarcity; 
•  Assess if and in that case how risk management mechanisms within the 
insurance industry can be used in informing about risk reduction and 
adaptation measures in developing countries. 
The raison d´etre for an initiative like this are obvious. The Millennium 
Development Goals are seriously at risk unless disaster risks can be 
significantly reduced. Moreover, the possibilities to strike a post-2012 
climate agreement very much depend on a much greater readiness by 
industrialised countries to meet their historical responsibilities and help 
developing countries cope with the consequences of climate change. I 
sincerely hope the Swedish initiative will be able to add value and help 
strengthen the worldwide efforts to mainstream risk reduction and 
adaptation into development and poverty reduction plans. 
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6.  THE BUSINESS CASE OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
LARS G. JOSEFSSON* 
1.  How companies are affected by climate change 
Gudrun is an ancient Nordic name meaning prophetess. But ever since 8 
January 2005, the name has taken on another, more sinister meaning.  
It began with a storm warning out in the North Atlantic. Soon the 
first reports of flooding and damage in Scotland and northern England 
were coming in. A freighter off the coast of Denmark foundered after its 
crew had been safely rescued. 
Gudrun was a storm. With wind speeds of over 80 mph, she reached 
hurricane strength at times. This can seem modest compared to the 
hurricanes spawned in the Caribbean basin, but in northern Europe it is 
unusual – and therefore deadly. When Gudrun took aim on southern 
Sweden, she chanced upon an unprepared landscape. Within the space of 
just a few days 250 million trees were felled. Roofing tiles flew, nuclear 
power stations suffered emergency shutdowns and the first reports of 
fatalities soon arrived.  
No one can say with certainty that Gudrun was a result of global 
warming. What we do know however, is that climate change will bring 
about unusual meteorological phenomena in the future, and one such 
phenomenon is severe storms. 
And how does this pose a risk for business? The answer is quite 
simple. All companies with sensitive infrastructures spread out over wide 
areas can be hurt badly by storms. 
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In the specific case of Gudrun, 20,000 kilometres of power lines were 
wiped out within the course of a few hours. Seen from the electricity 
companies’ perspective, it naturally involved great costs for repairs and 
new investments – the total bill is yet to be presented. 
But this perspective is too narrow. A natural catastrophe cannot be 
viewed solely from the perspective of the business world. The power lines 
that were destroyed supplied 630,000 households. Of these, 12,000 
customers had to wait 20 days before power was restored. Others were 
forced to hold out for months. 
Gudrun illustrates how the climate threat is a danger to our entire 
habitat, and as such a danger to people and companies alike. In other parts 
of the world, where a lack of drinking water can be the most serious result 
of global warming, large areas risk becoming uninhabitable. How can 
companies flourish in places where no one can survive? Who wants to 
work where noone wants to live? 
Therefore we can draw the simple conclusion that humanity and 
business are mutually dependent upon one and other. A threat to humanity 
is just as much a threat to business. And this brings us to another question: 
why should companies get involved in the climate debate? 
Since 2005, Vattenfall has pursued a dynamic climate initiative. It is a 
commitment that reaches above and beyond those formal demands placed 
on a viable business enterprise that authorities and other interested parties 
usually direct towards an energy supplier. Our commitment started with a 
concrete, business-critical issue, namely what position should we adopt 
regarding the coal-fired power stations that were a significant part of the 
acquisitions we made in Germany 2001–03. It is well known that carbon 
dioxide is an inescapable bi-product of coal combustion. This involved a 
new kind of environmental outcome for Vattenfall, which until then had 
primarily dealt with safety issues and environmental consequences 
regarding hydro-electric and nuclear power. The company management – 
myself included – realised that we needed to learn more about the 
complexities of the climate problem. Much more. Otherwise we could not 
have carried through the acquisition with sufficient background 
knowledge. Thus far was the climate threat a threat to our company. 
During the past year climate change has come to be perhaps the 
foremost globally debated issue. This was not the case in 2003, and 
therefore I was personally surprised and alarmed when I realised just how 
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precise moment the basis for our involvement changed. From having been 
about coal-fired power stations and Vattenfall, the issue changed to one 
concerning our responsibility as a large energy company to contribute 
towards solving a problem shared by all of humanity. 
The answer to the question of “Why should companies get involved 
in climate issues?” is therefore … because we must. As companies we are 
also part of society. As a private individual, I am part of society.  
This may sound a bit obvious. The problem is that the role of 
business in the climate debate has not been obvious. We are seen 
sometimes – by politicians, pundits and environmental organizations – as 
being a narrow special-interest group with a hidden agenda. Before any of 
our suggestions are ever considered our intentions are always considered 
first. And in some ways I can understand this. Traditionally industry has 
taken a defensive position on the environment. Whenever new restrictions 
find favour with legislators, companies either adapt or move on 
somewhere else. Seldom has the initiative for restrictions been taken by 
industry itself. 
But the climate issue is a genuine global challenge. If one of us loses, 
we all lose. It is therefore extremely important for me to emphasize the 
mutual dependency which is the mainstay of our commitment. Not just to 
be seen as credible but also because the ideas and models in our 
suggestions build on the whole world’s – every nation, every community 
and every individual – reaching agreement on what must be done. 
2.  How companies are affected by climate policy 
The discussion on how climate policy affects companies can be divided into 
two parts. Firstly, how it ought to affect us; i.e. the ideal situation, and 
secondly, what risks arise for industry if the ideal situation cannot be 
realised. 
In connection with the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006, 
Vattenfall introduced ‘Curbing Climate Change’ – our model for how all 
the nations of the world can cooperate to reduce emissions to an acceptable 
level. It builds on the following main elements: 
•  Up until 2100, world nations should not discharge more than a total 
of 1,600 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide. The figure is an estimate – in 
the final stage this level may be adjusted up or down. But if we 
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concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere being altogether 
too high, which would directly affect global warming. 
•  Even though 1,600 billion tonnes does sound like a lot, it represents in 
fact a gigantic reduction. It requires our reducing today's emissions 
by around 80%. 
•  How will the burden of reductions be shared among the nations of 
the world? For a start, we must all be part of the same system. The 
situation today, where the EU has taken it upon itself to abide by the 
Kyoto Protocol, is unfair and untenable in the long term. 
•  The system in Vattenfall’s model is based on every country being 
allotted a limit to its emissions. How these limits are made use of is a 
matter for individual governments. At the end of the chain, every 
company is allotted a ceiling for its emissions – let us call it emissions 
rights – which management can use for their business or sell on. 
•  How will allocation be accomplished? Vattenfall has chosen a simple 
method: You pay what you can afford. Calculated per unit of GDP, 
developing countries may emit more carbon dioxide compared to 
richer nations. The gives developing countries the opportunity for 
continued development, and ensures at the same time that they must 
contribute something. As prosperity increases, so too does the 
requirement for restrictions. 
•  The very poorest of nations would be subjected to no restrictions at 
all. Every affluent country in the world must contribute from the very 
beginning, but there is an upper limit to how quickly restrictions are 
applied, to avoid creating economic crises in individual countries. 
•  If market forces are allowed free rein, global prices for carbon dioxide 
emissions would soon be established. 
And how would industry be affected by such a model? Because states 
– and not companies – constitute the basis for the distribution of emissions 
reductions, companies will be affected differently depending on where 
their business is conducted. Yet this difference will be lower compared to 
today’s situation where European companies are subjected to restrictions 
while companies in other parts of the world are not compelled to do 
anything. In Vattenfall’s model, all of the world's companies – via their 
home countries – are part of the same system and contribute over the long 
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Since Vattenfall’s model was introduced, as just one of many 
suggestions for discussion, the global debate has evolved. An American 
proposal has been presented to begin discussions on a coming climate 
regimen. Additionally, the EU, during the German Presidency led by 
Angela Merkel, has agreed on new objectives for reductions aimed at 2020. 
I was pleased to note that several of Vattenfall’s ideas were raised in 
the discussion, among others the need for a global effort (everyone must be 
on board) and the necessity for market solutions and a worldwide carbon 
dioxide price. 
But it remains unclear what mechanisms will be constructed for 
sharing the emissions burden. Or what time frame will be applied. If we 
end up too far from the ideal situation, which in my world is the same 
thing as Vattenfall’s model, my fear is that several risks to business can 
arise. Here are the most manifest: 
•  Uncertain business conditions. For industry to flourish, the prerequisite 
has always been reliable, secure and transparent business conditions. 
Whenever a sector is threatened by regulation, investments are put 
on hold until the new rules of the game are known. This is the kind of 
uncertainty factor that can result from climate policies. Uncertainty 
spreads in many ways. Consider emission rights in Europe. Is it only 
our continent that must tighten its belt? Which sectors will be 
included and which will be exempted? Will global transportation 
continue to be excluded from carbon dioxide charges? In today's state 
of affairs, emissions from production plants can be 'exported' from 
Europe (production takes place where no regulations apply) only to 
be ‘imported’ again in the form of finished products. Even within 
Europe, emission rights cause consternation. In Sweden, for example, 
significant investments in natural gas-fired heat and power stations 
were called into question when the allocation of emissions rights was 
taken into account. Thus a politically-led, relatively short-term 
allocation became a determining factor in long-term investment 
decisions. Another aspect, which is peculiar to the energy sector in 
which Vattenfall is active, concerns the regulation of other forms of 
energy. In many parts of the world, nuclear power is recognised as a 
competitive, carbon dioxide-free alternative. But in a number of 
countries there is considerable uncertainty at the political level as to 
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expanded and improved. This uncertainty naturally results in no 
investments being made. 
My message to politicians is: do not exacerbate this uncertainty with 
short-term, unclear decisions. The clearer the rules of the game are, 
the easier the transformation to a low-emissions economy will be. 
•  Risk of unnecessary value destruction. Whenever the volume of the 
climate debate is turned up, the risk increases for rash decisions on 
how emissions reductions should be achieved. It is easy to become 
fixated on those plants and machines that emit the largest quantities 
of carbon dioxide. Certainly, all industrial enterprises should in 
principal strive to achieve zero emissions in the long term, but we 
also need to work out where we should begin. It would be reasonable 
to seek out the easiest and cheapest solutions first. And this is also the 
idea behind the market solutions to reductions in place. If we can 
arrive at a global system based on market principles, then the 
transformation to a low emissions society will occur naturally. In the 
worst case, its opposite would be a mad scramble where desperate, 
dirigist powers-that-be prohibit certain types of business activity. The 
latter scenario does not just result in great costs to society. It may also 
be ineffective.  
•  Energy policy as foreign policy. There was a time when countries with 
abundant energy resources could attract direct investments by 
offering low electricity prices. Today there are few who can afford to 
use electricity as a come-on. Energy has become far too valuable. 
Sometimes so valuable that it can be used as a foreign policy weapon. 
Such a situation risks running off the rails with war as the ultimate 
consequence, which would entail both great suffering and huge costs 
for society. However, this risk would be much lower if all nations 
part of a long-term system. 
3.  What can companies do about climate change? 
In opening, I declared my views regarding the role of companies as 
community citizens, and the importance of understanding the mutual 
dependency between industry and people. With this approach comes 
responsibility. Merely noting social responsibility is not enough. Business 
executives who want to take their role seriously must be prepared to act – 
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our time. Which raises the next question: what can individual companies 
do? 
At this point it would be easy to be oh-so-wise and serve up edifying 
pieces of advice. Instead of telling others what they ought to be doing, I 
would rather provide a few examples from Vattenfall’s – and my – journey 
to becoming committed contributors to the climate debate. 
Before Vattenfall began to ponder its acquisition of the German 
businesses, i.e. before 2003, I must honestly admit that I was not well-read 
on the subject. My knowledge of the effect that carbon dioxide emissions 
had on climate was at best that of a inquiring engineer's curiosity about 
current events. I kept abreast from a distance; stayed up-to-date. But I had 
no real insight – it had never occurred to me just how enormous and 
essential reductions were. 
As I mentioned, my road to understanding began when I was 
defending my company's interests. I wanted to examine what it would 
entail to own coal-fired power stations in an age when more and more 
raised voices were saying that climate change was accelerating. I soon 
realised that this issue concerned much more than just Vattenfall’s 
acquisitions in Germany. It was about the future of us all – and I bemoaned 
the absence of industry's voice in the debate. 
That insight was the first step. Ever since then, we have acted. The 
model Curbing Climate Change gave us a theoretical foundation. It was 
followed by a book, “The Future in Our Hands”, in which I explain the 
model and why Vattenfall became involved in the climate issue. The book 
was published in five languages, and was distributed to all of our 
employees. The next big campaign was Climate Map – a survey showing 
how emissions can be dramatically reduced by quite simple means. Using 
concrete examples we show how all of industry, divided into six large 
sectors, can effect reductions by the year 2030. The goal for that year is to 
emit no more than 31 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents globally. 
In this way we can prevent the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere from exceeding 450 ppm. If we do nothing at all, emissions risk 
exceeding 58 billion tonnes, which is untenable.  
Models and books are all well and good. The most effective means of 
communication is nevertheless meetings between people. A large part of 
my time as CEO has therefore been dedicated to taking part in various 
forums, among others the G8 Climate Change Roundtable. At the end of 
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Chancellor, Angela Merkel. In this capacity I have had the privilege of 
contributing knowledge and putting forward arguments in a forum I 
otherwise most likely would not have had access to. 
Vattenfall is also a driving force in its own forum, namely the 
previously-mentioned ‘3C – Combat Climate Change’ a business leaders’ 
initiative’. The number of companies rallying to the call grows continually 
and at the time of writing is more than 40. 
To further emphasise the long-term nature and strength of our 
commitment, a special department responsible for climate policy at 
Vattenfall was established at the beginning of 2007. 
In conclusion, I would like to underline that it is not the responsibility 
of companies to formulate coming climate regulations. This falls to the 
democratically elected representatives. Our role is to contribute knowledge, 
form opinions and support politicians in their efforts. We have suggested 
models and shown potential ways ahead, and now we look forward to a 
resolution that aims at a global system to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. 
Thanks to our quest for knowledge, I know this to be possible. All we need 
is the will. 
 
APPENDIX 
Climate Map – A summary 
Together with McKinsey, Vattenfall has studied the potential for radically 
reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases by the global economy over the 
next 25 years. 
If nothing is done, the total annual emissions will increase from 40 
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents in 2002, to 58 billion tonnes in 
2030. The emissions level in 1990 was, calculated in the same way, around 
35 billion tonnes. For a development that restricts the total greenhouse 
effect to 2°C to be possible with a reasonable degree of certainty, the 
persistent content of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere must be limited 
to 450 ppm (+ 50 ppm). By 2030 total emissions of greenhouse gases must 
be restricted to 31 billion tonnes, i.e. a reduction in the order of 27 billion 
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Vattenfall’s survey shows this to be eminently possible. More than 
two-thirds of the measures for 2030 can be effected with solutions already 
available today. 
How can the change be made? We must set a price for emissions and 
in this way utilise market forces to effect the change. The nations of the 
world must agree to binding emissions restrictions. For this to be possible, 
restrictions must be drawn up such that they do not present an obstacle to 
development and do not cause economic shock for any individual nation, 
and at the same time their effect on international competitiveness must be 
moderate and acceptable to all concerned. 
A summary of the most important steps in such a process is set out below: 
•  Firstly, there must be a mutual ambition to reach a mutual goal, 
which ultimately must be expressed as a temperature. Given the 
knowledge we have today, it is reasonable to attempt to limit global 
warming measured as an increase in the mean temperature measured 
at the Earth's surface to 2°C in relation to the pre-industrial level. This 
means that concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
must be limited to 450 ppm (+ 50 ppm). 
•  Secondly, a framework must be established that makes possible the 
creation of value from emissions reductions. Value creation is 
possible when the credibility of emissions pricing reaches a level at 
which revenue and cost flows can be capitalised. Mechanisms for 
trading emissions must be maintained and developed further.  
•  Thirdly, mutual efforts must be made leading to ever-better solutions 
being developed, and their being made available globally. This will 
involve demands being placed on products, systems for marking and 
the dissemination of information, investments in the propagation of 
knowledge and establishing proficiencies. It will also involve efforts 
that increase and accelerate technical exchange by supporting the 
development of key technologies and measures that speed up their 
market introduction. 
•  Fourthly, it will involve finding ways for the mutual assumption of 
responsibility regarding the necessary adjustments to the 
consequences of climate change. 
The climate issue is about lasting welfare development and global 
stability. The give-and-take necessary for establishing global understanding 
must occur on this basis. The foundation must be a common acceptance of 74 | LARS G. JOSEFSSON 
 
responsibility and mutual commitment. The survey of potential measures 
carried out by Vattenfall shows clearly that it is not possible to counter the 
climate threat by efforts in certain regions or business sectors; the entire 
global economy must make the changes. 
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7.  ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE 
FOR THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
SIVAN KARTHA* 
 
1.  Introduction 
The tragic irony of climate change is that those who are the least 
responsible are the most vulnerable. It is the poor in developing countries 
who will bear the brunt of its impacts. Industrialised countries, including 
the member states of the European Union, bear a large degree of 
responsibility for these impacts and are thus morally obliged to help 
shoulder the costs of adaptation. But it is also in their self-interest to do so. 
In this increasingly globalised world, the effects of insufficient adaptation 
in developing countries will be felt in industrialised countries, for example 
through a decline in world trade activity, an increase in the spread of 
disease, escalating disaster-relief expenditures and increased migration 
flows (IPCC, 2007). To the extent that countries might ultimately be held 
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legally responsible for causing climate change in other countries, ignoring 
the issue might lead to legitimate claims for compensation in the future. 
Moreover, a global or near-global climate mitigation regime would be 
difficult to negotiate without an effective framework for addressing 
adaptation. This is because meaningful support for adaptation is likely to 
be a condition for developing countries to participate in mitigation aspects 
of any future climate regime in a meaningful way.  
This chapter examines the nature of adaptation and draws some 
lessons regarding the characteristics of a climate regime that would enable 
sufficient and timely adaptation in developing countries. This is a topic that 
has risen in prominence on the agenda of the international climate change 
negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and other international forums 
as well.  
The ‘Bali Roadmap,’ agreed at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia, has further 
fixed adaptation as one of the four pillars of an effective global climate 
effort. Establishing a new body known as the ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, the goal is an 
agreement covering adaptation, mitigation, technology and provision of 
financial resources, in time for adoption at COP 15 in 2009.  
2.  Adaptation concepts  
The close link between climate change and sustainable development is now 
universally acknowledged. Human-induced climate change will adversely 
affect agricultural and hydrological systems, forests, fisheries, health and 
economic infrastructure, and other natural and socioeconomic resources. 
The impacts will exacerbate existing conditions of poverty, malnutrition 
and illness, thereby posing a threat to the achievement of development 
objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see also 
chapter by Sethi elsewhere in this volume). 
There is a growing understanding that, to be effective, adaptation 
efforts must address vulnerability, that is, build resilience to stresses on 
economic, social, political and environmental systems (Smit & Pilifosova, 
2001; Turner et al., 2003) A comprehensive definition of adaptation 
comprises two complementary elements: implementing adaptive responses 
and enhancing adaptive capacity. Adaptive responses refer to measures 
adopted in response to existing or anticipated climate impacts. Adaptive 
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effective adaptive responses without compromising future adaptive 
capacity (see also chapter by Wijkman elsewhere in this volume). 
Adaptive responses should not be interpreted too narrowly. Localised, 
technology-based and infrastructure-focused interventions that anticipate a 
specific climate impact and are targeted at a specific sector are too limited 
for a number of reasons (Klein et al., 2007; Patt et al., 2005; Burton & van 
Aalst, 2004). First, the reliance on climate change projections makes the 
long-term effectiveness of specific, localised adaptive responses subject to 
great uncertainty. Second, individual adaptive responses tend to be partial 
– often short-term – solutions. Third, when the definition of adaptation is 
limited to responses that are specific to climate change, it neglects the fact 
that vulnerability to climate change rarely occurs in isolation, but rather as 
a syndrome accompanied by other types of vulnerability. For example, it 
may help to provide a rural household that grows a particular subsistence 
crop with a more drought-resistant variety, but a robust and 
comprehensive strategy would seek to improve food security generally 
through a set of coordinated measures that includes, say, agricultural 
extension, crop diversification, integrated pest management practices and 
rainwater harvesting.  
The concept of building adaptive capacity is yet more fundamental and 
far-reaching (Smith et al., 2003). It recognises that it is not possible to 
anticipate the exact impacts of climate change and put in place precise 
defensive mechanisms to deal with them and the multiple other stresses 
that vulnerable communities face. It recognises that these combined 
stresses create a syndrome of vulnerability that can best be addressed 
through fundamental investments in building resilience. For example, the 
rural household is most capable of successfully implementing adaptive 
responses (i.e. the set of food security measures mentioned above) if it has 
adaptive capacity in the form of, say, access to investment capital through 
local financial institutions, close integration into intact social networks, an 
open channel for conveying concerns and priorities to local decision-
makers, and a literate family member.  
The report entitled Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the 
Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation, issued by eleven bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies (Interagency Report, 2003), usefully 
summarises the keys to enhancing adaptive capacity:  
•  Supporting sustainable livelihoods by targeting development efforts 
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and restore natural capital, secure appropriate physical capital, 
enhance human capital and secure financial capital; 
•  Ensuring equitable growth by fostering growth in areas of the 
economy that provide opportunities for increased employment and 
higher returns for poor people’s unique assets and contexts; 
•  Improving governance by making public institutions responsive, 
participative and accountable to those they serve in order to make 
decision-making processes and implementation activities robust and 
effective. 
The specific elements of adaptive capacity is thus highly location-
specific. Effectively enhancing adaptive capacity is heavily reliant on local 
knowledge and local involvement in design and implementation (Lim et 
al., 2005; Downing et al., 2005; Interagency Report, 2003). Indeed, 
“adaptation is largely a place-based activity, and a great deal of it can and 
should take place spontaneously or autonomously within those sectors and 
by those people, communities and enterprises most directly at risk” (Burton 
& van Aalst, 2004).  
This highly location-specific nature of adaptation does not mean that 
adaptation can be wholly local, nor can it be undertaken without 
considerable external support. Adaptation is a combination of 
implementation, which is largely undertaken at the local level, and 
facilitation, which involves roles for actors from local to national to 
international levels. Facilitation includes creating an enabling environment 
in which the local implementation of adaptation is feasible. It also involves 
generating and sharing knowledge, building institutional capacity, carrying 
out coordination and management tasks and, not least, providing 
technological and financial resources.  
The link to human development is central to this understanding of 
the term ‘adaptation’. There is considerable overlap between efforts to 
enhance adaptive capacity and efforts to achieve broad human 
development goals. Like human development itself, effective adaptation 
will require not only improved understanding and more institutional 
capacity, but also significant financial resources. The World Bank estimates 
that the costs of ‘climate-proofing’ ODA (official development assistance), 
foreign direct investments and domestic investment in developing 
countries could range between $10 billion and $40 billion annually (World 
Bank, 2006a). Oxfam International (2007) estimates adaptation funding 
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billion by 2015, and the UNFCCC Secretariat Dialogue Working Paper 
(UNFCCC Secretariat, 2007a; 2007b) offers an estimate of $49-171 billion 
annually by 2030.  These estimates do not include a range of other 
adaptation costs related to building resilience and sustaining livelihoods in 
the face of climate change, which may not be direct capital investments, but 
which are critical elements of adaptation nonetheless.  
In contrast to these estimates, the total amount of resources 
committed to adaptation (and other related preparatory activities such as 
the National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs) through 
UNFCCC channels is dramatically smaller. It has come to less than $0.4 
billion cumulatively over roughly the last ten years. A comparable amount 
is to come in the future from pending pledges plus the revenue expected 
through 2012 from the CDM adaptation surcharge.1 Addressing the striking 
discrepancy in scale between the need and the supply of resources for 
adaptation is a key challenge of a future climate regime, and indeed was a 
focus of the Bali negotiations. 
3.  Current status of adaptation efforts 
Initially, the UNFCCC was focused primarily on mitigation. Adaptation 
was considered less urgent as it was initially assumed that significant 
climate change impacts would not be evident for some decades. Today, the 
international negotiations appear to be looking at all the issues in the 
context of the four main strands identified for the dialogue on ‘long-term 
cooperative action to address climate change’ launched at COP 11 in 
December 2005: sustainable development, technology, adaptation and 
market opportunities. In reality, however, much of the negotiation effort 
and emphasis are still on mitigation, and burden-sharing is currently 
discussed only in the context of mitigation. Some analysts have informally 
observed that the adaptation regime is a decade behind the mitigation 
regime. They say that adaptation is at a comparatively embryonic stage 
                                                      
1 The 2% charge on the CDM for the Adaptation Fund, and by COP 13 in December 
2007 it had generated €37 million in resources, and is estimated by the World Bank 
to be able to generate $270-600 million (based on low and high 2012 estimates for 
CDM volume and prices). (See Steve Gorman, “Institutional Arrangements for 
Adaptation Fund: World Bank view”, paper presented at the UNFCCC Workshop 
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characterised by institutional development, knowledge generation and 
preparation, which have to take place before on-the-ground progress can 
be made in communities suffering from climate impacts.  
3.1  Adaptation in the existing climate regime 
To the extent that adaptation efforts were initially envisioned in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they were 
embodied in the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC (COP 1) guidance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to 
initiate a three-stage process of short-, medium- and long-term support for 
adaptation. At present, the existing climate regime is channelling some 
resources towards adaptation through these initial GEF channels, as well as 
the three funds under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: the Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) 
and the Adaptation Fund.2 Most of the resources result from a pledge made 
by the EU and other industrialised countries in 2001 when developing 
country support was needed to ‘keep Kyoto alive’.3 The resources 
committed through this pledge are channelled through the GEF, bilateral 
and multilateral ODA and the three funds. The fact that these resources are 
provided through diverse channels (including ‘additional’ ODA and the 
proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism levy) makes it difficult 
to ascertain whether the pledging countries are meeting their 
commitments. Deriving financing from these diverse sources and for 
multiple purposes also makes it difficult to ascertain what proportion of the 
funds is in fact allocated to adaptation activities.  
Increased attention to adaptation since COP 8 in New Delhi 
culminated in the adoption of a Five-Year Programme of Work on Impacts, 
Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change at COP 11 in Montreal. 
This five-year work programme for the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) is intended “… to improve understanding 
and assessment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and to make 
                                                      
2 Decision 7/CP.7 and decision 10/CP.7, respectively. 
3 The EU plus Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland have 
pledged $410 million (€450 million at July 2001 exchange rates) per year by 2005 in 
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informed decisions on practical adaptation actions and measures …” 4 It left 
unspecified whether this five-year effort is focused exclusively on 
advancing knowledge (i.e. stocktaking, assessments, sharing of experiences, 
methodological development, data management and dissemination, etc.), 
or whether it allows for implementation of concrete adaptation measures.  
The COP decision adopting the five-year programme specifies several 
‘implementation modalities’ that do not entail the implementation of 
concrete adaptation measures, although the decision does leave room for 
the adoption of additional modalities that could include implementation. 
This issue was heavily debated at COP 11 and at the ensuing SBSTA24 in 
May 2006, which was given the task of further developing the modalities of 
the five-year programme, consistent with SBSTA’s mandate to serve as an 
advisory body. The developing countries argued strongly in favour of an 
action-oriented approach that emphasises practical implementation and 
learning-by-doing. The course of the debates on the five-year programme 
closely mirrored the discussions surrounding the other sources of 
adaptation funding (GEF, SCC Fund, LDC Fund and Adaptation Fund) and 
resources for adaptation under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol generally.  
When the COP first introduced the Five Year Programme of Work (in 
Decision 1/CP.10), it also decided that the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) should support implementation of pilot or demonstration projects 
(1/CP.10 7(b)(v) along with several other capacity-building and 
knowledge-enhancing activities. Until recently, the GEF had no explicit 
operational programme on adaptation, and its adaptation activities were 
secondary to its existing focal areas, which target global environmental 
benefits rather than locally needed adaptation. The three Marrakech funds 
are more directly targeted at adaptation activities, but the SCCF and the 
LDCF are funded through discretionary pledges, and the Adaptation Fund 
is subject to the uncertainty of the scale of the CDM and the market value 
of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs).5 A major decision at 
                                                      
4 Decision 2/CP.11 taken at COP 11 (reported in FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, 30 
March 2006) (unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/05a01.pdf).  
5 It has been pointed out that the Adaptation Fund surcharge on the CDM is, 
ironically, a tax on developing country Parties insofar as it reduces both the 
volume of CERs traded (in favour of domestic reductions, emissions trading and 
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COP13/MOP 3 was, however, the agreement that the Adaptation Fund 
should be operationalized under a governing Board, with the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) serving as its secretariat. This should enable the 
Adaptation Fund to move towards disbursing funds for adaptation 
activities. There was however no agreement on additional practical 
adaptation measures and the issue will be re-visited at SBSTA in June 2008. 
The above points suggest that adaptation is an underdeveloped and 
fragmented part of the climate regime. The feeling, especially among 
developing countries, is that despite the widespread instances of climate 
impacts now being witnessed, the COP has not yet created sufficient 
elements of the climate regime aimed at implementing adaptation (Mace, 
2005). One explanation offered for this situation is that the past decade has 
been a period of preparation. Implementation on the ground can only take 
place once this preparation has been done. Another reason is the small level 
of resources. Because contributions to adaptation funding to date have been 
voluntary and have not been directly tied to any particular underlying 
rationale, measurement of obligations or indicator of needs, they have thus 
been small in relation to the scale of the challenge. This is despite the fact 
that, by ratifying the UNFCCC, signatories have accepted a legally-binding 
commitment (within Article 4 of the UNFCCC, Article 11 of the Kyoto 
Protocol and in the Marrakech Accords) to provide financial resources in 
support of adaptation. Today, investment in adaptation per se is a minute 
fraction of the estimated need. The question remains as to whether 
adaptation funding based on voluntary pledges and a CDM levy can grow 
to the scale that is consistent with the adaptation challenge, and if not, then 
what type of framework would facilitate funding on the scale that is 
needed.  
3.2  Adaptation in mainstream development thinking 
Given that adaptation is intrinsically linked to the broader development 
agenda, efforts to address adaptation can only be successful if they are 
integrated into mainstream development thinking. While such integration6 
                                                                                                                                       
Joint Implementation) and the CER revenue available for the countries hosting 
CDM.  
6 It is widely accepted that energy-based reductions can be effective only when 
mainstreamed into energy policy through comprehensive, sector-wide measures 
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has long been accepted in the case of mitigation, the same realisation has 
only dawned slowly when it comes to adaptation (Klein, 2006).  
Although not much has happened in the recent past in terms of 
integrating adaptation into ODA (Agrawala et al., 2003 a-d; McGuigan et 
al., 2002; Burton & van Aalst, 2004; Klein et al., 2007; Klein, 2001), it is now 
emerging as something that policy-makers widely agree on. This was 
demonstrated at the 2006 meeting of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee and the Environment Policy Committee, where the 
development and environment ministers of the OECD nations adopted a 
Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development 
Cooperation.7 The key element of the ministers’ declaration was a 
commitment “to better integrate climate change adaptation in development 
planning and assistance”. Simultaneously, the OECD development and 
environment ministers issued a Framework for Common Action Around 
Shared Goals (OECD, 2006b; 2006c), which reaffirms that threats to the 
environment have serious implications for poverty reduction and seeks to 
improve the coherence of efforts by development cooperation and 
environmental agencies in OECD countries in support of poverty reduction 
and the MDGs. Consistent with this approach, the Swedish Government 
announced at COP 13 in Bali the creation of an International Commission 
on Climate Change and Development, the purpose of which is to serve as a 
forum for sharing and operationalising of strategies on ‘climate-proofing 
development’. Screening tools are now being developed in support of such 
work (e.g., Klein et al., 2007 and the OECD, 2007) has performed a 
stocktaking of mainstreaming efforts by donor agencies. 
                                                                                                                                       
such as, for example, carbon taxes, renewable portfolio requirements and efficiency 
standards. 
7 Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-
operation, adopted by Development and Environment Ministers of OECD Member 
Countries at the Meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the 
Environment Policy Committee, 4 April 2006, OECD, Paris (www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/44/29/36426943.pdf). The ministerial declaration recognises that 
“responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic 
development in an integrated manner, taking into account the legitimate priority 
needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustainable economic growth 
and the eradication of poverty”(OECD, 2006a). 86 | SIVAN KARTHA 
 
The World Bank (2006b) has elevated its attention to enhancing risk 
management approaches to enable development institutions and their 
partner countries to better address the growing risks from climate change 
and make current development investments more resilient to climate 
variability and extreme weather events. Many development agencies and 
NGOs (such as the Red Cross) are investing in efforts to learn from their 
long-standing experience with risk and crisis management of disasters, 
including those caused by extreme weather events, so that they can apply 
this knowledge to climate adaptation.  
Ultimately, the purpose of integrating adaptation into development 
decision-making is to prevent climate change from being separated from 
the other stresses and trends that affect development as experienced by 
vulnerable citizens. However, it is important to note that development is 
primarily driven by the vast majority of investments that are not part of 
ODA. Non-ODA foreign and domestic investment in developing countries 
(~$1.6 trillion/yr) is roughly two orders of magnitude larger than ODA. 
Integrating adaptation into mainstream development, therefore, will 
ultimately involve not just influencing ODA investment decisions, but 
those much larger non-ODA investments as well. This ambitious objective 
implies not just a change in thinking, but changes in terms of institutional 
capacity, policy coherence and human and financial resources.  
4.  An adaptation regime: Looking forward 
Given the magnitude of the climate change challenge ahead, significant 
resources − probably in the range of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars 
per year − will be needed in the future to cover costs related to building 
adaptive capacity and implementing adaptive responses in developing 
countries. This will inevitably entail transfers from industrialised to 
developing countries. A key question is how to obtain the level of political 
acceptability needed to create and expand the financial flows required to 
support developing country adaptation efforts (Parry et al., 2005). Various 
explanations can be put forward as to why the EU and other industrialised 
parties would choose to provide substantial resources for implementing 
adaptation in developing countries.  
First, there is a political argument for funding adaptation as a means 
of engaging developing countries. It is thought that extending meaningful 
adaptation assistance to developing countries will help to encourage them 
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Developing countries have unambiguously staked out a position that they 
are entitled to funding for adaptation and that it should be provided by 
industrialised countries, and that without this funding a more substantive 
form of participation in the mitigation aspects of the regime would be 
unlikely. Indeed, little further progress in international negotiations can be 
expected without taking these concerns into account (Ott et al., 2004).  
The second explanation, like the first, is also based on enlightened 
self-interest. This argument justifies industrialised countries funding of 
adaptation as a means of ensuring that developing countries remain viable 
partners for economic growth, global governance and international 
security. Climate change without proactive adaptation could arguably 
cause significant damage to the economies and governance systems of 
developing countries, and perhaps ultimately generate a flow of 
environmental refugees (Byravan & Rajan, 2005; 2006; Barnett & Adger, 
2006; Sachs, 2007).  
The third explanation has its origins in the ethical and legal context in 
which the debate about climate change is unfolding. It argues that 
industrialised countries have a responsibility to contribute resources 
towards adaptation in developing countries. It is discussed in more detail 
in the following section, as a) it carries the greatest sense of inevitability as 
a motivator of EU investment in developing country adaptation, b) it may 
offer some quantitative measure of the obligation industrialised parties 
may have to fund adaptation in developing countries, and c) it helps in the 
elaboration of fundamental principles consistent with the Climate 
Convention around which a future adaptation regime can be envisioned.  
4.1  Fundamental characteristics of adaptation 
This section sets out three fundamental characteristics of adaptation that 
provide a framework within which proposals for a future adaptation 
regime can be assessed.  
4.1.1  The link to human development  
The first fundamental characteristic derives from the intrinsic connection 
between effective adaptation and human development. As discussed in 
section 8.2, adaptation must include both adaptive responses and 
enhancement of adaptive capacity. The most effective adaptation strategy 
in the long-term is to provide secure livelihoods, foster equitable economic 
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(2003), “adaptation requires the development of human capital, 
strengthening of institutional systems, and sound management of public 
finances and natural resources. Such processes build the resilience of 
countries, communities and households to all shocks and stresses, 
including climate variability and change, and are good development 
practice in themselves.”  
If an adaptation regime is to induce the most effective adaptation, 
then a major component of its objective must be identifying and promoting 
those activities that can most effectively enable and accelerate these “good 
development practices”.  
4.1.2  Responsibility for climate change and climate impacts 
The second characteristic relates to the scale of the adaptation challenge, 
not just in terms of creating institutions and generating knowledge, but in 
terms of additional costs that will have to be borne, either to make 
adaptation possible or to compensate damages. (See above estimates of 
additional costs of adaptation.) The need for such resources inevitably 
raises the question of the responsibility of nations for causing climate change 
and, in turn, damages caused by this climate change. As Baer (2006) writes: 
That it is wrong to harm others (or risk harming them) for one’s 
own gain, and that one owes compensation if one does such harm, 
is as close to a universal ethical principle as exists. It is a principle 
that is justified in all kinds of ethical or moral frameworks, from 
divine revelation to deontological ethics to social contract theory 
and others. It is in fact a prime example of what some philosophers 
call common (or commonsense) morality. 
Over time this common moral principle has become firmly encoded 
in national case law and legal reasoning with respect to environmental 
pollution within national boundaries. International law, too, echoes this 
same principle. The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 declares in the famous 
Principle 21 (reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration) that states 
have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” and reiterates in Principle 22 that 
“States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding 
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
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control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction” (UN Conference 
on the Human Environment, 1972). 
The UNFCCC, however, specifically avoids establishing legal 
responsibility for climate damage,8 although it does potentially lay the 
basis for recognising state-based responsibility in a manner that is 
reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. UNFCCC 
Annex II countries are obligated to assist developing countries in meeting 
adaptation costs under specified circumstances (as detailed in Articles 4.3, 
4.4, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.11). In particular, Article 4.3 commits UNFCCC Annex II 
countries to “provide new and additional resources to meet the agreed full 
incremental costs of implementing measures…” including “preparing for 
the adaptation to the impacts of climate change”. In addition, Article 4.4 
states that UNFCCC Annex II countries “shall also assist the developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”. 
Some have interpreted this latter clause as “an implicit acceptance of 
responsibility for causing climate change” but this has not been 
unambiguously established.9 The Kyoto Protocol (Article 11) further 
requires that the “implementation of these existing commitments shall take 
into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds 
and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among developed 
country Parties”. 
                                                      
8 As Tol & Verheyen (2004) discuss, the industrialised nations successfully resisted 
any codification of state-based responsibility for compensation for climate 
damages at the time of the UNFCCC negotiations. In response, and in anticipation 
of the future evolution of the climate regime or legal action, several member states 
of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) issued a declaration that 
“…signature of the Convention shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any 
rights under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse 
effects of climate change…” Such a clause was in fact unsuccessfully proposed for 
inclusion in the UNFCCC text itself (see submissions of Vanuatu on behalf of 
AOSIS, Elements for a Framework Convention on climate change, in a set of 
informal papers provided by delegations, related to the preparation of a 
framework convention on climate change, UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add3). 
9 Tol & Verheyen (2004) quoting P. Sands (1992), “The United Nations Framework 
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4.1.3   Facilitating and implementing local solutions 
The third fundamental characteristic is the fact that effective adaptation, 
like human development itself, is ultimately a highly localised process that 
defies generic solutions. Vulnerable communities and households suffer 
from constellations of stresses with complex and location-specific 
interactions, and the interventions that build resilience tend to be 
correspondingly location-specific. As discussed in section 2, effective 
adaptation therefore requires both facilitation and implementation of 
location-specific efforts to adapt to environmental change.  
While implementation of adaptation is largely undertaken at the local 
level, facilitation relies on actors at local to national to international levels. 
Generating and sharing knowledge across these scales is challenging. Even 
more challenging is to mobilise resources and efficaciously distribute them 
to local levels. But successful strategies have evolved over time within the 
development community. These tend to be participatory, stakeholder-
driven undertakings. They are often based on the close involvement of local 
civil society organisations, place strong value on local information and 
knowledge, and invest heavily in building local trust in and acceptance of 
the undertakings as well as building durable links between the different 
levels (Lim et al., 2005, for example). As explained in the Interagency 
Report (2003), “In Southern Africa numerous adaptation techniques are 
used by poorer farmers to deal with anticipated drought. These include 
water and soil management techniques, resistant crop varieties and food 
production methods. However, these techniques are often known only 
locally, or to certain ethnic groups.”  
The challenge then for an adaptation regime is to move between the 
local, regional and national levels and effectively channel knowledge and 
resources to the local sites where they are needed for the implementation of 
adaptation. 
4.2  A climate regime to support effective adaptation 
It remains unclear how adaptation will be addressed within the UNFCCC. 
What is clear, though, is that a regime that successfully manages to support 
adaptation will need to overcome the three challenges implied above: i) to 
respect the close link between adaptation and development, ii) to create an 
acceptable framework for recognising responsibility for generating 
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objectives of facilitating and implementing local adaptation activities via 
good coordination between the local, regional and national levels. 
Importantly, in order for legally binding commitments to be 
accepted, an adaptation regime will need to inspire a high level of 
confidence that adaptation will be supported in a manner that is effective 
and efficient. Securing adaptation funding will not be easy, and, without 
significant assurances that resources would be efficiently and equitably 
allocated to adaptation activities, those funds will not be forthcoming. The 
notions of effectiveness and efficiency cover several elements: 
•  Efficient institutions and mechanisms, which allow resources to 
contribute directly to adaptation without their being wasted on 
bureaucracy or diverted due to corruption.  
•  Assurance that resources are being put towards bona fide adaptation 
activities rather than activities that would be taking place anyway. 
(That is not to say that scaling up of existing activities could not be 
legitimate adaptation.) 
•  Governance structures must enable equitable decision-making and 
instil trust in the governments that are providing resources for 
adaptation, the governments receiving resources and the 
communities that need the resources. 
•  Developing countries in need of adaptation will need to build 
sufficient absorptive capacity to make effective use of adaptation 
funding. In many countries, this level of absorptive capacity does not 
exist today and will not exist without improvements in knowledge 
and expertise, institutional strength, good governance, transparency 
and accountability.  
•  A specific legal instrument for adaptation must not ‘ghettoise’ 
adaptation, and make it harder, rather than easier, to ultimately 
integrate adaptation into mainstream development activities (as well 
as other multilateral environmental agreements and trade 
agreements).  
With these points in mind, we now consider each of the three 
fundamental characteristics of adaptation in turn with respect to their 
ramifications for an adaptation regime.  
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i)  The link to human development. In today’s regime, UNFCCC 
Annex II countries have sought some assurance that the money they 
provide is going towards new activities in developing countries 
rather than ‘business as usual’ activities directed towards existing 
development objectives.10 One can anticipate that this concern with 
‘additionality’ will only grow more pressing if the climate regime 
progresses beyond the current stage in which commitments to 
finance adaptation efforts are voluntary and contributions are 
donated under the banner of philanthropy, and evolves into a regime 
in which Parties accept legally-binding commitments to contribute 
resources towards adaptation. However, given that a major objective 
of an adaptation regime is to build adaptive capacity, which entails 
investments in fundamental improvements in livelihoods, equitable 
growth and democratic governance, then it might prove 
counterproductive if UNFCCC Annex II countries cling to the 
additionality construct with respect to adaptation activities. Firstly, as 
argued in section 8.2, it will be a burdensome and unrewarding 
challenge to attempt to distinguish many adaptation activities per se 
from broad-based development activities in general. Secondly, 
attempts to demonstrate additionality would be likely to channel 
attention towards those adaptation activities that may be the most 
easily discernible as additional, but not necessarily the most 
important urgent, or cost-effective contributors to adaptive capacity. 
This phenomenon – sometimes referred to as the ‘paradox of 
additionality’ (Sugiyama & Michaelowa, 2001) − favours separate and 
immediate project-based activities, often focused on well-defined 
marginal improvements to localised infrastructure rather than broad-
based and long-term activities that may much more effectively 
address the underlying drivers of vulnerability and build adaptive 
capacity. As discussed by Klein et al. (2007), programme budget 
support may ultimately be more efficient and effective than project-
based investments. 
                                                      
10 The most explicit example of this is the CDM in which mitigation must be 
‘additional’ to ongoing technological and sectoral change. In the adaptation realm, 
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ii)  Responsibility. In order to generate sufficient funding for adaptation 
or, in the words of the Convention, to ensure ‘adequacy and 
predictability’ and ‘appropriate burden sharing’ in funding 
adaptation, the climate discussion will have to evolve from general 
acknowledgement of ethical and legal principles to specific 
definitions of responsibility and their quantification. One example of 
fairly concrete methods is the typology of quantitative indicators of 
responsibility recently produced by the World Resources Institute 
(Baumert & Markoff, 2003). A fairly large and developed body of 
work exists exploring options for explicitly linking commitments to 
specific quantifiable indicators of responsibility (AOSIS, 1991; Brazil, 
1997; Ott et al., 2004; Government of Tuvalu, 2005; Oxfam 
International, 2007; Baer et al., 2007)11 As adaptation funding 
requirements are assessed, with due account taken of the magnitude 
of anticipated climate change impacts, the obligation to provide 
funding would then be allocated to Parties according to an agreed 
definition of responsibility.12 
There should be no illusions that a discussion of responsibility will be 
easy. Industrialised Parties will continue to be extraordinarily wary 
of any obligations that commit them to providing significant 
additional adaptation funds. Moreover, it would be unwise to 
establish any system to generate more financial resources for 
adaptation than could be absorbed. Yet initiating the discussion will 
still be useful. It would encourage industrialised country Parties to 
articulate very clearly the conditions under which they could be 
confident that adaptation resources would be used effectively. More 
generally, it would advance the global dialogue, which began at the 
global climate change summits in Stockholm and Rio de Janiero, on 
                                                      
11 Negotiating an acceptable indicator of responsibility will be challenging. Parties 
can be expected initially to put forward proposals that favour their interests, and 
rationalise them as “appropriate burden sharing” in keeping with “their common 
but differentiated responsibilities”. In addition, Parties may need to resolve issues 
such as the attribution of emissions to importers or exporters and the distinction 
between ‘luxury’ and ‘subsistence’ emissions.  
12 One can also anticipate this leading, as in the case of mitigation, to issues 
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responsibility for trans-boundary environmental impacts. Moreover, 
early and effective deployment of resources for adaptation in 
developing countries will lessen the likelihood that, in the longer 
term, significant damages will lead to legal claims for compensation. 
iii)  Local solutions with accountability. Any attempt to use adaptation 
funds to facilitate and implement dispersed and tailored activity at 
the local level will bring with it the challenge of addressing the need 
for transparent management and accountability. It will be necessary 
to ensure accountability to those providing the funding as well as to 
the recipient communities. Industrialised countries will not willingly 
fulfil their responsibilities to provide resources for adaptation if the 
recipient countries do not also transparently uphold their 
responsibility to efficiently and effectively undertake the intended 
adaptation. An adaptation regime involving legally-binding 
commitments would therefore need to allow for oversight and ensure 
accountability, while avoiding micro-management and keeping 
decision-making authority and discretion within the host countries 
and communities. 
The balance of control between the Party providing the funds and the 
Party (or community) receiving the funds will be a challenging one to 
strike. From the perspective of the Party providing the funds, 
relinquishing any control may be unappealing and may undermine 
their willingness to accept an adaptation regime. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of the Party receiving the funds, these funds 
may be considered obligatory payments as a result of ongoing 
climate change damage caused by the Parties that emit high levels of 
pollution, and thus control should rightfully be in the hands of the 
recipient. The basic tension is between an implicit charity mentality 
versus a perspective of compensation or liability. To date, a mutually 
acceptable balance has arguably still not been struck (Mace, 2005; 
Mönher & Klein, 2007; Müller, 2006a; 2006b). 
Institutional mechanisms 
Various institutional mechanisms are being considered for administering 
and delivering adaptation activities. Four major ones are: 
•  to expand ODA infrastructure to accommodate adaptation 
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•  to create locally-focused funds (“Autonomous Adaptation Funds”13) 
•  to establish an insurance mechanism for adaptation14 
These options will undoubtedly be fleshed out in more detail as more 
is learned from on-the-ground experiences about effective methods for 
delivering adaptation. Each of them will have its strengths and weaknesses 
with respect to the three fundamental principles outlined above for 
effective adaptation. Some of these can be anticipated. 
With respect to the link to development, the first and third of these 
four options provides a built-in link by definition, whereas the connection 
is somewhat tenuous for the second and, especially, the third options. 
With respect to responsibility, it would in theory be possible to 
explicitly link obligations for funding to countries’ responsibility, 
regardless of whether the funding is then channelled as additional 
appropriations for a country’s ODA budget, replenishment schedules for a 
globally centralized fund or local funds, or premiums for insurance 
mechanisms. The question, then, is how to do this in a rigorous, 
transparent, and principled way. 
With respect to local solutions, while all the options can be tailored to 
local needs in theory, the third option is only one that is structured around 
the notion of locally appropriate delivery. The ODA system has become 
increasingly capable, over the years, of internalising ‘bottom-up’, locally-
appropriate responses, but it is still maturing in this area and still has its 
serious critics. 
                                                      
13 For a discussion, see for example: African Association for Public Administration 
and Management AAPAM, Nairobi, and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 
Uppsala, Sweden under the title “Autonomous Development Funds in Africa. 
Report of the Expert Consultation on the role of Autonomous Funds as 
intermediaries in channelling money for social and economic development in 
Africa.” Kampala, Uganda, 4-6 April 1995. A similar construct, which was put in 
place in various Latin American states as a way of minimising the negative impacts 
of structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s (and continues to operate 
today), has also been identified as a viable mechanism for achieving adaptation 
(Cruz, 2005). 
14 See, for example, AOSIS (1991), Mills & Lecomte (2006), Germanwatch (2005), 
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While much more can be said and much more needs to be learned, 
consistency with the three underlying principles of adaptation should serve 
as a criteria in assessing the appropriateness and viability of proposed 
institutional mechanisms for delivering adaptation.  
5.  Closing comments 
In summary, a climate regime that attempts to effectively address 
adaptation is faced by key set of issues that derive from the very nature of 
adaptation.  
•  How can the link to human development be internalised into adaptation 
efforts? There are intrinsic similarities between activities that enhance 
adaptive capacity and those that advance basic development. This 
suggests that it may be counterproductive to attempt to draw a firm 
distinction between adaptation projects and other development 
efforts. It also suggests that there are significant lessons to be 
transferred from the long history of ODA, such that investments in 
building adaptive capacity can start immediately.  
•  How and to whom should responsibility be attributed? A certain amount 
of climate change is now inevitable, and adaptation to limit the 
damages will require considerable resources, especially in developing 
countries. Industrialised countries, with their GHG emissions per 
capita much in excess of the global average, have a certain legal and 
moral responsibility to provide resources, as well as pragmatic 
reasons for wanting to do so. 
•  How can adaptation needs be identified and prioritised in a manner that 
respects the local nature of adaptation? Implementing adaptive 
responses is a very location-specific endeavour, implying that the 
intimate involvement of local communities is a key ingredient for 
effective implementation. At the same time, activities at higher levels 
(sub-national, national, or international) can provide a facilitate role, 
in order to enable successful local adaptation. 
•  What would be effective and appropriate institutions or mechanisms for 
achieving adequate levels of adaptation? In other words, what institutions 
or mechanisms would effectively take into account the intrinsic links 
with development, the twin objectives of facilitation and 
implementation of local responses, and the need to provide adequate 
resources by relating funding commitments to national responsibility.  ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE FOR THE CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS | 97 
 
The scientific and empirical findings that have led to an increased 
sense of urgency with regard to mitigation are now also precipitating a 
more urgent response on adaptation. This chapter has focussed on issues 
related to constructing an adaptation regime with the aim of supporting 
and achieving adaptation in developing countries at a level that is 
commensurate with the challenge. We have sought to set out some of the 
relevant background, including three fundamental characteristics of 
adaptation for consideration when attempting to define a viable regime.  
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REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
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1.  Introduction 
Tropical deforestation accounts for approximately 20% of global carbon 
dioxide emissions.1 Modelling by the European Commission estimates that 
limiting global temperature increases to less than 2°C with a 50% 
probability through cost-effective measures requires net global emissions 
from land use changes to fall to near zero by 2020. In Montréal in 2005, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
began a series of workshops to discuss potential post-2012 policy 
instruments to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing 
countries. UNFCCC workshops on the subject were held in Rome in 2006 
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and in Cairns, Australia in March 2007. The climate negotiations at COP-13 
in December 2007 led to the adoption of a pilot work programme for 
further methodological work to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation. This programme will focus on assessments of changes 
in forest cover and associated green house gas emissions, methods to 
demonstrate reductions of emissions from deforestation and the estimation 
of the amount of emission reductions from deforestation. The issue will 
continue to play a large role in the negotiations stemming from the Bali 
Roadmap. 
In this chapter, the Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) presents the 
‘dual markets approach’ for reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation (REDD). This approach creates a new market for emissions 
reductions from deforestation and degradation, not directly linked with the 
post-2012 global carbon market. Annex I countries would meet a portion of 
their post-2012 greenhouse gas reduction target through this REDD-only 
market. The COP would set a maximum on the percentage any single 
Annex I country can achieve through overseas REDD. Annex I countries 
would specify at the outset which developing countries’ deforestation and 
reduction programmes they will invest in to achieve their REDD target. A 
pre-2012 preparation phase for developing countries – to include emissions 
inventories, capacity building and pilot projects – will allow developing 
countries to design effective programmes for the post-2012 REDD market.  
This new proposal is presented in the context of REDD policy 
discussions underway in the UNFCCC. Various structures have been 
proposed for a mechanism for providing positive incentives to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and degradation, and over 60 countries and 
15 non-governmental organisations have submitted position papers to the 
UNFCCC. The chapter first reviews important issues any REDD 
mechanism must address and lays out the specific proposals endorsed by 
Partie and then moves on to two general approaches to incentives for 
REDD that have shaped the discussions: the integrated market approach 
(where REDD reductions would be integrated directly into the post-2012 
global carbon market) and the fund-based approach (dependent on official 
development assistance or institutional financing). The major advantage of 
the market approach is its ability to mobilise large amounts of funding; its 
downside is the potential to disrupt the global carbon market that is 
already functioning well. A fund approach would avoid disruption to the 
carbon market, but would likely fail to mobilise sufficient financial 
resources to reduce the deforestation significantly. THE DUAL MARKETS APPROACH TO REDUCING EMISSIONS | 105 
 
The Dual Markets Approach offers many of the advantages of these 
previous proposals while at the same time avoiding their major drawbacks. 
A separate REDD market assists learning-by-doing, allowing the REDD 
market to mature and stabilise before linking with the post-2012 global 
carbon market. The Dual Markets Approach would still leverage private-
sector resources, while minimising the risk of destabilising the post-2012 
global carbon market. Specific REDD targets adopted by Annex I countries 
would provide a minimum demand for developing countries’ REDD 
credits and would therefore facilitate planning of their national REDD 
programmes. Setting a maximum ceiling on Annex I REDD purchases 
would safeguard global stabilisation goals in case REDD reductions prove 
unreliable.  
While creating a new dual market system inevitably creates some 
risk, these are no larger than the risks of integrated-market or fund-based 
approaches. CCAP puts forth the dual markets approach as a workable 
solution for the post-2012 commitment period that can bridge the gap 
between competing proposals and enable effective action on REDD.  
2.  Cross-cutting issues  
To be effective, any new programme to reduce deforestation and 
degradation must address the following key issues: 
Financial incentives for participation by developing and developed countries. 
Appropriate incentives are needed to encourage developed countries to 
contribute financial resources. Annex I countries would either purchase 
credits in a market system or provide funds in a non-market system. 
Developing countries would need appropriate rewards for changed land-
use.  
Reference rate.2 The development of national reference rates for 
deforestation is the foundation of any international approach to REDD. 
Reference rates will require inventories of historical forest cover and carbon 
sequestration since 1990. Brazil has proposed that future reductions in 
deforestation and emissions be estimated through comparison with 
observed historical levels. Others have proposed using ‘virtual’ baselines 
developed as counterfactual business-as-usual trends in future years. To 
prevent domestic leakage, baselines would ideally be national.  
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Funding implementation and capacity-building in developing countries. 
This is necessary pre-2012 in order to provide a foundation for effective 
post-2012 action on REDD.  
Mitigation costs and reduction potential. Countries will require detailed 
knowledge of the costs and reduction potentials of mitigation options 
before investing in REDD actions. Accurate information will help establish 
credibility of the system in the eyes of developed countries.3  
Leakage. If not designed appropriately, a REDD mechanism could 
simply shift deforestation from one area to another. Unchanged 
international demand for certain commodities, such as palm oil or beef, 
could lead to deforestation in new areas not under government REDD 
policies.  
Net versus gross deforestation. The mechanism could support 
reductions in either net or gross deforestation. Gross refers to emissions 
from deforestation only, whereas net includes sequestration (for example, 
soils and regrowth). Rewards based on gross deforestation reductions help 
to ensure that replacement of cleared primary forests by cash crop 
plantations or reforestation projects are not credited. Net accounting would 
guard against inadvertently crediting countries where emissions have 
actually increased due to forest fires, logging, etc.  
Most proposals for REDD seek to address these issues in some way. 
The options for generating financing have proven to be among the most 
debated elements. We review the various financing proposals below, 
including specific submissions of parties, advantages and disadvantages.  
                                                      
3 Research in this area remains preliminary, but over the past few years some 
estimates of the costs of avoiding deforestation have been developed. For example, 
one study predicts that in 2025, measures costing <$6, <$14 and <$27 per tonne 
CO2e could sequester a total of 44, 98 and 137 Gt CO2e, respectively (Sohngen, 
2005). Another study projects that at $27 per tonne, tropical deforestation could 
nearly be stopped by 2055. This would require payments of $465-660 per hectare – 
about $2.5 trillion total (Sohngen & Beach, 2006). In addition, an analysis 
conducted for the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change concluded that the 
opportunity costs of avoided deforestation in eight countries (Bolivia, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea) would 
range from $3 billion to $6.5 billion annually, with $5 billion being perhaps the 
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3.  Financing REDD: Review of approaches  
The majority of REDD proposals submitted to the UNFCCC fall under two 
general categories: market and fund-based. A market-based approach 
would allow developing countries undertaking voluntary actions that 
reduce their deforestation rate or maintain carbon stocks to generate carbon 
credits, which they can sell at a market-determined price per tonne CO2e 
reduced. This market mechanism would be linked to a ‘post-2012’ carbon 
market as an extension of the existing Kyoto carbon market. Credits 
generated from REDD actions would be equivalent to ‘post-2012’ carbon 
credits (e.g. those generated through the CDM) and could be traded along 
with or in place of such credits.4  
Non-market approaches would rely on contributions to a fund or 
funds from developed country governments and sources such as through 
official development assistance (ODA), international financial institutions 
and the private sector. For the REDD mechanism, financing is then 
distributed from this fund to activities that either reduce deforestation or 
reward countries for successful forest protection. For example, Brazil 
proposed a strict fund-based approach that would provide direct payments 
to countries for carbon reductions achieved through REDD measures, but 
not generate carbon credits. Other types of funds have also been proposed, 
such as to cover REDD capacity-building activities and project 
implementation.5  
Parties have proposed the following financing mechanisms and 
funds: 
The REDD market mechanism would operate in the existing Kyoto 
Protocol carbon market. Crucial components include credits from reduced 
deforestation emissions tradable with developed countries and CDM 
credits, deeper targets by Annex I and additional crediting for early action 
(e.g. pre-2012 pilot projects, capacity-building, and monitoring). Reductions 
                                                      
4 For example, Compensated Reduction has been proposed as a market-based 
mechanism of rewarding actions that reduce deforestation rates by allowing the 
trading of reductions in the carbon market (Santilli et al., 2005).  
5 To date, most governments are in favour of some combination of market-based 
support and funds. One example is the proposal of the Coalition for Rainforest 
Nations which combines a market-based reward system for reducing deforestation 
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would be measured against a reference scenario determined by a reference 
emissions rate and a development adjustment factor. Market mechanisms 
are proposed by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations6 and supported by 
most developing countries. 
A non-market REDD fund, proposed by Brazil, would reward 
countries that demonstrate reductions in their deforestation rate through a 
direct funding mechanism. The funds would be distributed in proportion 
to the emission reductions achieved, measured against a reference scenario 
comprised of an historic national baseline. Funds would be awarded only 
after a reduction was demonstrated from this baseline, as opposed to a 
projected baseline.  
A non-market stabilisation fund7 would finance efforts to maintain, or 
stabilise, currently forested areas. This applies to countries with historically 
low rates of deforestation, to prevent the potential deforestation of their 
existing forests. This fund could be generated through taxes or levies on the 
carbon market, or through voluntary contributions. 
A non-market enabling fund8  would assist  REDD infrastructure 
development activities in non-Annex I countries (e.g. capacity-building, 
monitoring programme development, establishment of inventories and 
baselines). This fund would provide early financial resources to countries 
in need of infrastructure development, so that these countries could 
eventually participate effectively in a REDD mechanism. 
4.  Advantages and disadvantages of market and fund-based 
approaches 
An important advantage of the carbon market approach is the capability of 
providing large sums of money to support reducing deforestation9 by 
                                                      
6 This includes Bolivia, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu (joint submission February 2007 available at www.unfccc.int). 
7 Also proposed by Coalition for Rainforest Nations. 
8 Also proposed by Coalition for Rainforest Nations. 
9 For example, one presentation at the Cairns Workshop (Noble, 2007) outlined that 
$2-25 billion per year may be required for REDD incentives, while current non-
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creating a direct channel for private sector investments. A market-based 
system would also be self-functioning while carbon caps are maintained 
and would empower many public and private sector players. A market 
system would likely generate lower-cost REDD credits that can be 
purchased as offsets by developed countries.  
However, the global carbon market c o u l d  b e  f l o o d e d  w i t h  a  l a r g e  
volume of low-cost REDD credits, creating volatility or drops in carbon 
market prices. A strict carbon market approach will naturally incentivise 
the lowest price emissions reductions; in the long term, addressing the 
more difficult (and higher opportunity cost) drivers of deforestation may 
require higher cost incentives than the early stages of the REDD-included 
carbon market mechanism would generate.10  
The main advantage of the non-market (fund-based) approach relates 
to protecting the CDM. Because REDD credits would not enter the carbon 
market, the non-market REDD mechanism would better maintain the 
integrity of the post-2012 global carbon market. A fund proposal would 
make REDD actions more dependent on government leadership by 
reducing private sector forces. The largest drawback is that funding would 
depend upon voluntary contributions from Annex I countries or 
institutions, and would therefore not likely produce levels of funding 
comparable to market approaches. This approach lacks a crediting 
component that would incentivise sufficient Annex I contributions, making 
the REDD fund less appealing than the carbon market.  
5.  The dual markets approach: CCAP’s new proposal for REDD 
In this section we suggest an alternative proposal for supporting REDD 
actions – the dual markets approach. This proposal would create a new 
market for the sale of REDD credits post-2012, separate from the existing 
carbon market. The COP would establish a maximum percentage of the 
overall national carbon target that countries could choose to achieve 
through the new REDD market. Annex I countries could then elect to meet 
                                                      
10 This is likely only a concern to the extent that not providing incentives for the 
higher opportunity cost deforestation actions would ‘lock-in’ a certain level of 
deforestation trends. For example, investments in agricultural activities that lead to 
deforestation could be more difficult (and costly) to reverse once the infrastructure, 
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up to that percent of their post-2012 reduction target through purchasing 
REDD credits from the new REDD market. The proposal also highlights a 
pre-2012 preparatory phase to better enable developing countries to 
participate in the post-2012 REDD market.  
Pre-2012 capacity building and inventory development. Both developed 
and developing countries would lay the groundwork for an effective REDD 
mechanism. Annex I countries would commit to providing ODA and other 
financing to fund key activities including the establishment of developing 
country Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) emissions 
inventories, capacity-building, research studies of potential mitigation 
measures and costs, and implementation of pilot projects.11 
Post-2012 new REDD market. The cornerstone of the dual markets 
proposal is the creation of a new REDD-only carbon market. This market is 
separate from the traditional (Kyoto/CDM) carbon market. The REDD-
only market would begin in 2012 with the next commitment period. In this 
new REDD market, reductions generated through REDD actions in 
developing countries would be sold to Annex I countries to satisfy those 
countries' REDD commitments. Emission reductions from REDD activities 
in developing countries could not be substituted for traditional carbon 
reductions (e.g. CDM, emissions trading or emissions reducing actions) 
beyond the level established as that Annex I country's REDD commitments.  
Overall target-setting. The COP would first decide the maximum 
percentage of GHG reductions that Annex I countries can achieve through 
the REDD market for the first post-2012 commitment period. This can be 
viewed as a ceiling on purchases from the REDD market. The maximum is 
necessary to: 1) ensure that steady progress toward global stabilisation 
goals is not undermined by over-reliance on less-certain REDD credits, 2) 
allow the REDD market time to develop before integrating with the already 
mature Kyoto market and 3) avoid the risk of REDD credits flooding the 
post-2012 global carbon market. 
Annex I target setting. Individual Annex I countries would then 
commit to meeting a certain percentage of their own reduction target 
through CO2 equivalent reductions from REDD activities in developing 
countries. This percentage would be up to the maximum established by the 
                                                      
11 A pre-2012 phase has been noted as important in the majority of Party 
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COP. The Annex I REDD target would be a firm commitment, serving 
essentially as both a minimum and a maximum.12 Take as an example the 
current EU proposal for a 30% reduction in emissions by 2020.13 Under the 
REDD dual markets approach, the EU would allocate a share of this target 
(for example, 5%) to be met through the REDD market. The remaining 25% 
would then be achieved through domestic GHG mitigation or purchases in 
the traditional post-2012 carbon market.14 
Signalling strong demand for REDD activities. At the beginning of the 
post-2012 phase, developing countries would draw upon their experience 
in the preparatory pre-2012 phase to estimate the likely quantity and cost of 
reductions. They would draft land management plans to achieve these 
reductions. Annex I buyers would review these proposals and determine 
from which developing countries’ programmes to eventually buy. 
Developing countries therefore would know at the outset of a commitment 
phase which Annex I countries will buy their credits. This gives developing 
countries a minimum level of demand for REDD credits, and generates 
incentive to act early and develop effective programmes in order to recruit 
Annex I buyers. These agreements could take the form of bilateral 
contracts, including for example a certain amount of credits at a certain 
price per tonne, with built-in pricing mechanisms such as escalators linked 
to the global carbon price.  
Ensuring emissions reductions goals through non-REDD carbon credits or 
borrowing. If the ex-post reductions from REDD actions are lower than 
anticipated at the end of the first commitment phase, Annex 1 countries 
could move a portion of their REDD targets to traditional Kyoto caps. In 
other words, they could meet the remainder of their REDD targets through 
carbon market purchases or use any banked carbon allowances. Annex I 
countries would also have the option to borrow against their future REDD 
commitments. This flexibility provides options for Annex I countries if 
                                                      
12 Annex I countries could meet their REDD targets through use of government 
funds, mandates on companies (e.g. through targets in domestic emissions trading 
systems) or a combination. 
13 Contingent on participation by other developed countries. 
14 During the introductory post-2012 phase of the REDD mechanism, developed 
countries would not be allowed to increase their REDD share, in order to ensure 
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REDD shortfalls occur, while still ensuring that the overall global emissions 
reduction goals are eventually met. 
Review by the COP. The dual markets approach specifies that Annex I 
REDD targets stay constant for the upcoming post-2012 commitment 
period, and the COP determines the maximum percentage allowed from 
REDD. Constant percentages, with an emphasis on longer commitment 
phases (e.g. 2012-20 or 2012-30) could encourage real, long-term action. 
However, the COP would periodically review the dual market system, 
taking into account the quality and dependability of REDD credits and the 
stability of the REDD market. The COP can make needed changes to the 
system, such as altering percentages allowed from REDD, potentially 
permitting Annex I increases in their share and eventually determining 
whether to link with the global carbon market. 
6.  Questions and answers 
The CCAP Dual Markets Approach is a realistic strategy that circumvents 
many disadvantages of previous proposals. This question and answer 
section aims to clarify the logic of this new approach for those new to this 
approach and to the sinks policy field. It also addresses the practical 
functioning of the dual markets approach.  
Why is a separate REDD market necessary? Why is it necessary for the 
COP to set a maximum (ceiling) on REDD credits? For the next commitment 
phase (2012-20 or 2012-30), a separate REDD market with a maximum cap 
has many advantages. These stem from the fact that most developing 
country REDD programmes and policies would be new and untested at 
such a large scale. It may be difficult to determine precisely how many 
carbon tonnes can be sequestered from developing countries’ new REDD 
policies until those policies have had time to demonstrate results. A 
maximum set on REDD credits therefore provides some safety net for 
global stabilisation goals if REDD programmes produce ‘hot air’, or fail to 
produce reductions. The maximum prevents Annex I countries from 
relying too much on reductions from untested REDD programmes for the 
first commitment phase.15 The maximum therefore emphasises the 
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importance of domestic reductions by developed countries and safeguards 
demand for already-tested reductions such as the CDM. 
A separate REDD market avoids major disruption of the post-2012 
global carbon market. In a pure integrated-market approach such as 
compensated reduction, fluctuations in REDD supply and pricing would 
directly affect CDM prices, which could cause overall volatility in the 
carbon market that is currently functioning well. A dual markets approach 
keeps separate an emerging market (REDD) from the more mature carbon 
market until questions have been resolved.16 This approach allows the 
REDD market, and individual countries’ REDD programs, time to develop 
before integration with the existing global carbon market.17 Developing 
countries can craft and test functional REDD policies in a time frame 
appropriate to national circumstances. With countries testing national 
REDD programs for the first time, it is unlikely they would produce a large 
surplus of reductions that would exceed the maximum placed by the 
COP.18  
In a dual system, how will REDD market affect the existing carbon market? 
In the dual markets approach, REDD credits would probably affect carbon 
prices the most at the end of the commitment phase. If REDD tonnes fail to 
materialise sufficiently by the end of the first commitment phase and many 
Annex I countries use the carbon market to offset REDD shortfalls, carbon 
prices would rise at the end of the post-2012 commitment phase. This 
proposal mitigates the effect of REDD tonnes on the existing carbon 
market, compared to entirely integrated market approaches. Nonetheless, 
the option to achieve part of the national target through REDD will impact 
carbon prices to some degree throughout the commitment period. 
How will the private sector participate? This approach will facilitate the 
participation of the private sector. Annex I commitments for REDD will not 
                                                      
16 As discussed earlier, linking of the two markets could be decided eventually by 
the review system of the COP. 
17 Successful precedents for creating dual environmental markets already exist – in 
the United States, for example, national and state-level fuel economy standards 
and renewable portfolio standards (RPS), i.e. renewable quotas have functioned 
effectively along with independent emissions trading programmes for GHGs and 
criteria pollutants.  
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be official development aid; rather, countries can structure their 
commitment in a variety of market-friendly ways. First, governments could 
translate a REDD commitment into mandates on companies, such as 
company targets in an emissions trading scheme. A government could 
create an allowance system to meet their post-2012 targets through a cap 
and trade system (e.g. the EU emissions trading scheme). Private 
companies could be required to invest in the REDD market to achieve a 
specified level of reduced deforestation, or could be given this option up to 
a ceiling percentage. In this case, the sum of all companies’ REDD 
contributions would add up to a portion of the total REDD target of the 
country. Trading between the companies could also be allowed or 
encouraged. Under this scheme companies could meet a portion of their 
carbon responsibility through REDD investments and would also help that 
country meet their post-2012 REDD target.  
A creative way a country could leverage private sector finance to help 
meet a REDD target is included in the United States Senate's Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, which would set aside 2.5% of 
allowances in a US cap and trade system for REDD and other forestry 
projects.19 Proceeds from the sale of 2.5% of the allowances would 
ostensibly create a fund that he United States would use to invest in 
developing country REDD programmes. These would not serve as direct 
offsets for the industrial sector and would instead create additional 
reductions above and beyond the domestic reductions achieved under cap 
and trade. With proper carbon accounting it would be possible to measure 
the amount of reductions afforded by this sum of money. Annex I countries 
could estimate ahead of time the revenue needed, and the associated 
portion of allowances needed, for REDD projects in order to meet that 
Annex I country's post-2012 REDD goal. This approach would rely on the 
private sector as well, as their payments for auctioned allowances would 
comprise the financial source for the REDD funding.  
Would Annex I countries be allowed to increase their REDD targets during 
the commitment period? Annex I countries would not be allowed to increase 
their REDD targets during the first commitment period, but can adjust their 
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Environment and Public Works Committee on 5 December 2007, is the leading 
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REDD targets for the second commitment period. To address uncertainties 
in a new REDD market, the dual markets approach allows borrowing into 
the next commitment period. If these markets were not kept separate, 
countries could do more in the REDD market as a way to take greater 
advantage of borrowing and thus erode the level of reductions achieved in 
the next commitment phase. 
Why is it necessary for Annex I countries to decide at the outset which 
developing countries’ credits they will buy? Slowing deforestation requires 
considerable change and long-term planning to create such programmes, 
often at a significant cost. Developing countries will need some guarantee 
that there will be a buyer for their REDD credits. To determine REDD 
programme structure and implementation, host countries will also need to 
have some estimate of funds they will eventually receive. 
How can the pre-2012 phase be financed? Inventories, capacity-building 
and implementation will be financed by multilateral institutions and 
official development aid from Annex I governments.20 However, once 
countries and investors know that a REDD market will exist, some 
incentives should emerge for contributions to capacity-building. The ability 
to meet a portion of national GHG reduction targets through cheaper 
overseas REDD credits should encourage Annex I countries; reductions 
will also incorporate on-the-ground projects, which are ripe for private-
sector investment. One creative approach could be policy-based lending, 
which is a technique used by international finance institutions. Such loans 
(at a very low interest rate) cover the salaries or fees of experts in the host 
country to develop and implement policies.  
7.  Conclusion 
The development of a framework to encourage actions to reduce GHG 
emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries is 
crucial in order to address global climate change. With approximately 20% 
of carbon dioxide emissions globally coming from tropical deforestation, 
REDD actions on a broad scale will be necessary to stabilise GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere. A REDD mechanism will need to 
                                                      
20 The World Bank, for example, has started the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
and the government of Australia has committed funding for forest conservation in 
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address many issues, including establishing reference scenarios and 
baselines, creating effective incentives for developing and developed 
countries, and ensuring a sufficient and consistent flow of funding. Parties 
have submitted a variety of proposals for an international REDD 
mechanism, relying on carbon market integration and/or voluntary 
contributions. 
The dual markets approach would combine critical elements of 
previous market and fund-based approaches and address many 
shortcomings. By creating a separate REDD market, in contrast to other 
market-based proposals, the dual markets framework would maintain the 
integrity of the existing carbon market, while generating more financing 
than a fund-based approach. Annex I countries would agree to specific 
REDD targets, providing a guaranteed level of demand for developing 
country REDD credits while safeguarding stabilisation goals against 
potential uncertainties of REDD reductions. The proposal would provide a 
range of options to both developing countries and Annex I countries, 
including voluntary participation, borrowing from future REDD targets, 
making up REDD shortfalls with carbon market credits, and review by the 
COP to consider linking to the post-2012 carbon market. The dual markets 
approach would facilitate a system of learning-by-doing for the upcoming 
post-2012 commitment period and allow the international community to 
craft a workable incentive system to reduce emissions from deforestation. 
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9.  THE CRITICAL ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY 
CAROLYN FISCHER, CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER & 
MONICA ALESSI* 
1.  Introduction  
While there are different opinions about whether a stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in line with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) objective can be 
reached with technically proven technology,1 no one questions the need to 
develop new and technically unproven (i.e. breakthrough) technologies in 
the long term, and certainly beyond 2050. Unless a magic-bullet solution for 
reducing emissions can be found, a portfolio of technologies will be 
needed. Among these, wind, solar and biofuels are growing rapidly, albeit 
from a small base. Other technologies, such as hydrogen, are considered 
promising, but face substantial challenges in terms of cost and large-scale 
implementation. As fossil fuels are expected to dominate the world’s 
energy supply portfolio for some decades, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) may become an important bridge before we enter into a low-carbon 
future. Over and above inevitable technical hurdles, the scale of the task 
means that widespread global deployment of technologies, however 
                                                      
* Carolyn Fischer is Research Fellow in the Energy and Natural Resources Division 
of Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.; Christian Egenhofer is Senior 
Research Fellow at CEPS and Monica Alessi is Research Fellow at CEPS. 
1 Pacala & Socolow (2004) argue that the climate problem for the next 50 years 
could be solved with current technologies, whereas Hoffert et al. (2002) hold that 
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promising, will take decades before the cumulative effect of investments 
makes a substantive contribution to combating climate change.  
Such massive technological change depends on the right combination 
of public R&D investments (‘technology push’) and policies to provide 
economic incentives for private-sector innovation and widespread 
technology deployment (‘market pull’). A global climate change agreement 
can influence the full spectrum of the process of technological change. 
Commitments to GHG abatement policies are the source of market-pull 
signals that encourage innovation and deployment of low and near-zero 
carbon technologies. Commitments to R&D efforts represent an option for 
enhancing and coordinating technology-push policies, basically on three 
levels: support for basic research, mostly done by academic institutions; 
component testing in test facilities and laboratories; and full-scale 
demonstration, an important pre-requisite for market push. Given the 
primacy of technological advance in tackling the climate problem, a 
principal question for negotiators is how a global agreement affects 
technology development and diffusion.  
2.  The economics of R&D and innovation 
In the case of climate change, twin market failures are at play, inhibiting 
the emergence of sufficient incentive to produce technological solutions on 
their own.2 The most immediately relevant market failure is the fact that 
the costs of global warming are not borne directly by GHG emitters, which 
leads to fossil-fuel prices that are ‘too cheap’ and a level of GHG emissions 
that is too high from a societal perspective. The economist’s policy 
prescription is to ‘put a price’ on GHG emissions — for example through a 
GHG tax or cap-and-trade system — thereby forcing individuals and firms 
to internalise the cost that they are placing on everyone else when they emit 
GHGs. In addition, there also are market deficiencies related to the 
development and adoption of new technologies. These technology market 
problems are not as relevant for environmental problems addressed over 
the course of years as they are for climate policy developing over decades 
or centuries and requiring much more dramatic changes in technology. 
                                                      
2 This section draws on the summary in de Coninck et al. (2007). 120 | FISCHER, EGENHOFER & ALESSI 
 
Jaffe et al. (2005) identify the following relevant types of technology market 
imperfections.3  
•  First, due to ‘knowledge spillovers’, innovating firms cannot keep 
other firms from benefiting from their new knowledge and, therefore, 
cannot capture for themselves all the benefits of innovation. In 
addition, the process of competition typically will drive a firm to sell 
a new device at a price that captures only a portion of its full value. 
While patents and other institutions are employed to protect firms’ 
investments in innovation, such protection is inherently imperfect.4 
•  Second, ‘adoption spillovers’ may be relevant in the adoption and 
diffusion of new technology. For a number of reasons, the cost or 
value of a new technology to one user may depend on how many 
other users have adopted the technology. In general, users will be 
better off the more other people use the same technology, so there is a 
benefit associated with the overall scale of technology adoption 
(‘network externalities’). The supply-side counterpart, learning-by-
doing, describes how production costs tend to fall as manufacturers 
gain production experience. If this learning spills over to benefit other 
manufacturers without compensation, it can represent an additional 
adoption externality. Finally, network externalities exist if a product 
becomes technologically more valuable to an individual user as other 
users adopt a compatible product (as with telephone and computer 
networks). These phenomena can be critical to understanding the 
existing technological system, forecasting how that system might 
evolve, and predicting the potential effect of some policy or event.  
•  Third, market shortcomings arise through incomplete information. 
While all investment is characterised by uncertainty, the uncertainty 
associated with the returns to investment in innovation often is 
particularly large. Potential returns also are asymmetrically 
distributed and the developer of new technology typically is in a 
better position to assess its potential than others and may find 
investors sceptical about promised returns. In the context of 
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environmental problems such as climate change, the huge 
uncertainties surrounding the future effects of climate change and the 
magnitude of the policy response and, thus, the likely returns to R&D 
investment, exacerbates this problem further. Another type of 
information problem relates to the inability of current policy-makers 
to credibly commit to a long-term emissions path. As a result, the 
long-term price signal associated with GHG reductions is likely to be 
significantly diminished relative to what it would need to be in order 
to achieve significant future reductions.  
•  Finally, incomplete information lies at the source of principal-agent 
problems, as when a builder or landlord chooses the level of 
investment in energy efficiency in a building, but the energy bills are 
paid by a later purchaser or a tenant.  
The fact that markets underinvest in new technology (Jaffe et al., 
2005) strengthens the case for making sure that environmental policy is 
designed to foster, rather than inhibit innovation. In cases where 
environmental costs have not been fully priced, it also is likely that the rate 
of investment in such technology is significantly below the socially 
desirable level. And it is unlikely that environmental policy alone can 
create sufficient incentives.  
It is a basic principle of economics that sound policy-making requires 
at least as many types of policy instruments as there are market problems 
to be addressed (Tinbergen, 1956). Hence, the optimal set of climate policies 
likely includes instruments explicitly designed to foster innovation, and 
possibly technology diffusion, in addition to GHG emissions policies that 
stimulate new technology as a side effect of internalising the GHG 
externality. Likewise, long-term technology R&D alone is not sufficient 
because it provides no direct incentives for adoption of new technologies 
and because it focuses on the longer term, missing near-term opportunities 
for cost-effective emissions reductions (Philibert, 2003; Sandén & Azar, 
2005; Fischer & Newell, 2004).5  
                                                      
5 In addition to setting the proper stage for private investment, governments also 
have their own investments to manage. Public infrastructure is particularly 
important, as it has a long life span and predetermines people’s choices of where to 
live and work, what to consume, what sort of economic activities to carry out and 
of other people to communicate with. Infrastructure development will be a critical 
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3.  Technology and developing countries 
Arguably, the producers of new technologies are most likely to be the 
industrialised countries, although this is also true for some fast-growing 
developing countries (Brewer, 2007). Long-term success requires that 
effective R&D and emissions policies are put in place. In developed 
countries, that policy strategy will most effectively be a mix of largely 
market-based measures to overcome the market failures and smart public 
investments. However, the consumers of climate-friendly technologies will 
be all countries, including developing and transition economies. In these 
countries, poverty, limited institutional capacity, governance problems and 
other issues loom larger as barriers than the market failures discussed 
earlier. As a result, it is naïve to expect the market-based strategies for 
emissions reductions and innovation to generate the same results in these 
circumstances. Information exchange systems are particularly valuable in 
this context: not only do they contribute to accelerated technology 
deployment, but they also increase awareness of climate change and low-
carbon technology solutions. They may also enhance endogenous capacities 
and technologies in developing countries. For LDCs, access to technologies 
is a key issue, while for some fast-growing developing countries 
concessional finance is needed for wider technology cooperation.  
4.  Investment and finance  
In a strategy to stabilise CO2 at about 450 ppm in the low-carbon scenario, 
the World Bank has identified an investment need for non-OECD countries 
of around $165 billion p.a. for electricity generation, with current private 
and public sector resources funding around half.6 To fill that gap, three 
sources of funding for mitigation are available: voluntary actions; 
international grants, e.g. GEF; and carbon trading. Carbon trading is likely 
to confer the biggest flow of funds to developing countries – between $20 
and $120 billion per year – but it requires a long-term global regulatory 
framework (i.e. a 2050 target) with differentiated responsibilities and 
                                                                                                                                       
factor for both costs and overall effectiveness of climate policies. Moreover, history 
matters. Past infrastructure investment determines the present, although 
economists disagree on how widespread this path-dependency is.  
6 World Bank reports to the Development Committee in the spring and fall of 2006 
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intermediate targets. New financial instruments are required, especially to 
ensure market continuity in the post-2012 period.  
International financial institutions can be an important source of 
finance and policy and technical advice regarding the financing of 
investments needed for clean energy for development. Also the creation of 
new financing instruments e.g. for clean energy, power rehabilitation, 
project development or venture capital could support this effort in several 
possible ways (World Bank, 2006 and 2007). 
5.  Technology approaches within the UNFCCC and beyond  
Under Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC, industrialised countries have a special 
obligation to promote, facilitate and finance the transfer of technology to 
developing countries. The focus in the UNFCCC has thus primarily been 
the transfer of technology to developing countries for energy efficiency, 
and lately for adaptation. Various processes have been introduced. The 
Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) is the main instrument. It 
addresses technology needs assessments, information exchange, enabling 
activities and capacity-building. Two finance mechanisms that encourage 
technological diffusion through financial assistance and cooperation should 
be mentioned: the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). In addition to technology transfer being 
addressed within the UNFCCC framework, there have been ‘pull 
approaches’ to technological change within industrialised countries such as 
the Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), the Gleneagles Plan of Action 
(GPOA), the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
(APP), the Major Economies Meeting (MEM) or the idea of global sectoral 
industry approaches.  
5.1  The Expert Group on Technology Transfer7  
The Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) was established by the 
Marrakech Accords, with the objective of enhancing the implementation of 
Article 4(5) of the Convention, by analysing and identifying ways to 
facilitate and advance technology transfer activities and making 
                                                      
7 The authors would like to acknowledge useful comments and information 
provided by Bernard Mazijn, Member of the UNFCCC EGTT, Vice-Chair in 2005, 
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recommendations to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice. 
In collaboration with other agencies such as the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP), UN Development Programme (UNDP), Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) and the Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), the Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer has worked for six years on developing the 
key elements for the development and transfer of technology, namely 
technology information (via a clearinghouse and networking with regional 
technology information centres), technology needs assessments, enabling 
environments and mechanisms. 
During the last years, two new areas of work have been added: 
Technologies for adaptation and innovative options for financing. 
Technology and technology transfer appeared in the majority of 
decisions arising from COP-13 in Bali. A high-level workshop was held on 
technology cooperation during the conference. A strategic programme was 
launched to encourage concrete demonstration projects, to create more 
attractive environments for investment and to provide incentives to the 
private sector for technology transfer. This will be set up through GEF with 
international financial institutions and representatives of the private 
financial sector.  
After much debate, the mandate of the EGTT was extended for an 
additional five years. Particular attention will be paid to the assessment of 
gaps and barriers to the use of and access to financing resources as well as 
the development of performance indicators that can be used to regularly 
monitor and evaluate progress on the development, deployment and 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies.  
5.2  The Global Environmental Facility  
The UNFCCC’s central financial tool for technology transfer is the GEF. It is 
the main provider of grants for environmental projects in developing 
countries, of which climate change claims 40% of the current yearly budget. 
The Marrakech Accords in 2001 clarified the role of the fund and created 
three specific new funds to generate the conditions and leverage for private 
financing, including technology transfer for adaptation and mitigation 
purposes: The Trust Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and 
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). The management of the 
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5.3  The Clean Development Mechanism 
Although the CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate, 
it partly contributes to technology transfer by financing a number of 
emissions reduction projects that use technologies not yet available in the 
host country. Based on a survey of participants in CDM projects, Haites et 
al. (2006) find that 33% of project developers claim that technology was 
actually transferred, referring, according to this definition, to the transfer of 
equipment for the most part, but also with some involvement of knowledge 
transfer. CDM project participants also claim that technology transfer 
represents 66% of the estimated annual emissions reductions. Interestingly, 
projects claiming technology transfer are often substantially larger projects, 
often involving more than one country. Four countries – Brazil, China, 
India and South Korea – account for 67% of the projects claiming 
technology transfer and for 75% of the annual emissions reductions. Haites 
et al. also point out that the governments of China, India and South Korea 
mention technology transfer as a key eligibility criterion for CDM projects, 
implying that the CDM can be an important vehicle for technology transfer 
if the terms of project eligibility (i.e. explicitly including technology 
transfer) and administrative efficiency are guaranteed. 
The CDM could in particular become a vehicle for sector-based 
projects for technology transfer in developing countries. There are good 
arguments in favour of an extension towards a broader range of forestry 
and bio-energy projects and the development of the CDM into a more 
programmatic or sectoral crediting mechanism although many technical 
issues would need to be solved first. More importantly, massive expansion 
of the CDM or other credits needs to be matched by demand, most of which 
is currently provided by the EU ETS or other Kyoto Protocol signatories. 
There are a number of design features of the CDM that limit its scope 
and which have been highlighted, among others, in an ECP report 
(Egenhofer et al, 2005) on CDM. “As a market-based instrument, the CDM 
tends to favour projects that are cheapest and most secure. This has put 
countries with weak economies and a lack of adequate institutional 
infrastructure in a disadvantageous position to benefit from the CDM”. 
This weakness is confirmed by Haites et al. (2006): “This limitation is a 
barrier to avoid fossil-fuel-based development in countries in earlier stages 
of economic development.” To reduce the imbalances, compensatory 
actions may be needed, such as the use of different financing instruments 
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limitation of the CDM is the focus on limited types of gases, which excludes 
opportunities for a range of technologies to be developed and transferred. 
5.4  Beyond the UNFCCC  
While the UNFCCC’s focus has been on the transfer of technologies to 
developing countries, the industrialised member countries of the UNFCCC 
initiated a process focused on a ‘pull approach’ to technological change. 
The oldest of such initiatives emerged within the UNFCCC itself in 1995: 
The Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), which is implemented through the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA was later tasked by the 
Gleneagles G8+5 process8 with analysis, planning and knowledge 
dissemination during the implementation of the Gleneagles Plan of Action. 
Within the Gleneagles process, the focus has enlarged from technology 
transfer to all stages of the deployment of new technologies, from RD&D to 
commercial deployment. 
Other initiatives include the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate Change (APP), the Major Economies Meeting 
(MEM) and global sectoral industry approaches. 
•  The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change 
(APP) was created in 2006 by Australia, China, India, Japan, South 
Korea and the US, and is now joined by Canada. It is a public-private 
partnership on a regional scale, encouraging interaction of business, 
government and researchers from partner countries and designed to 
facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment and transfer of 
cost-effective, cleaner and more efficient technologies and practices 
among the partners through concrete and substantial cooperation 
aimed at achieving practical results (see Fujiwara, 2007 and chapter 2 
in this volume). 
•  Following the Japanese ‘Cool Earth 50’ proposal of May 2007, the US 
launched on 31 May 2007 the idea of a ‘major emitters’ initiative’ – 
later to become major economies meetings (MEM), crucially 
composed of all large emitters of GHGs in both developed and 
developing countries, with the aim of developing and contributing to 
a post-Kyoto framework on energy security and climate change by 
                                                      
8 Involving the eight member countries of the G8 plus five developing countries – 
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the end of 2008. The discussion focused on five key areas: i) low-
carbon fossil power generation, ii) transport, iii) land use, iv) market 
penetration of technologies and v) energy efficiency and finance. 
Hence, the MEM initiative takes a similar approach as the Gleneagles 
Plan of Action. See also chapter 2. 
•  There is an increasing political momentum behind ‘global sectoral 
approaches’. Some industries are concentrated in such a way that a 
small number of companies represent a large share of the world 
market and a significant share of the global GHG emissions. While 
there are different models of approaches across sectors and different 
models are only emerging, they all attempt to induce changes to 
technologies through either development of new and breakthrough 
technologies or accelerated deployment of existing technologies, 
essentially by means of cooperation between the firms. Global 
sectoral industry approaches may potentially improve data collection 
on the state of the sector, e.g. emissions (actual and projected), 
applied technologies, technology benchmarks and best-practice, 
identification and spread of best-practice and the development and 
diffusion of technology (Egenhofer & Fujiwara, 2007). 
6.  Towards an international framework for technology  
Many of the technology initiatives can be described as so-called ‘technology-
oriented agreements’ (TOAs). Such initiatives focus on the failures in the 
market for technological innovation, but they will operate best in 
conjunction with appropriate emissions-reduction policies, particularly 
market-based ones. This complementarity could be mutually reinforcing: as 
emissions-reduction policies spur the uptake of new technologies and 
increase the profitability of innovation, TOAs will spur additional 
innovation to lower the costs of mitigation and improve the social and 
political acceptability of emissions targets. TOAs could be negotiated 
separately, linked together or incorporated into the climate policy 
framework in a PAMs approach. More modest TOAs have the advantage of 
being able to be negotiated and implemented by a smaller set of countries, 
even outside of the UNFCCC.  
De Conink et al. (2007) survey the range of existing TOAs and 
identify four broad types:  
1)  Knowledge-sharing and coordination;  
2)  research, development and demonstration (RD&D);  128 | FISCHER, EGENHOFER & ALESSI 
 
3)  technology transfer; and  
4)  technology deployment mandates, standards and incentives.  
To date, most existing TOAs related to climate change fall into the 
first category or knowledge-sharing. These initiatives include the Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), Methane to Markets Partnership 
or the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy, and most 
recently, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
Change (APP) or existing global sectoral approaches. Agreements of this 
type offer relatively low-cost means to exchange information, promote 
common standards and facilitate innovation, but their effectiveness is 
limited by the voluntary, non-binding nature of the frameworks.  
To date, RD&D agreements, i.e. category 2, have primarily focused on 
fundamental research and demonstration projects, where expenses may be 
costly and where the technology is too far from commercialisation for 
intellectual property rights to be a concern. Examples of these cost-sharing 
arrangements include the ITER fusion reactor, the Solvent Refined Coal II 
Demonstration Project (SRC-II) and some research conducted by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). Technology cooperation and RD&D 
agreements will most likely reach their limits, however, when the 
technology moves from the pre-competitive to the post-competitive stage. 
Technology transfer, i.e. category 3, has been attempted within the 
UNFCCC. One of the shortcomings is that most advanced technologies 
consist of integrated products, which depend to large extent on know-how. 
Thus, simply transferring patents does not help.  
Category 4 of technology mandates is best exemplified by the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL). In the climate arena, one could imagine (and some have 
proposed) harmonised standards for renewable energy, building codes, 
energy efficiency or requirements for carbon capture and sequestration. 
These kinds of agreements fall more into ‘market-pull’ strategies. While 
they have bigger potential for generating emissions reductions, by virtue of 
their sector-by-sector nature, they raise cost-effectiveness questions in 
comparison to broad-based methods. On the other hand, in an international 
framework with incomplete participation, performance-based standards 
can have lesser effects on competitiveness than emissions price policies, 
since standards do not impose the additional direct costs of emissions, 
resulting in smaller product price increases (Bernard et al., forthcoming; 
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The use of TOAs as an effective substitute for an emissions-based 
approach is limited to the category of standards, mandates or substantial 
incentives as they would need to be applied on a sector-by-sector, if not 
technology-by-technology basis. This approach may make the most sense 
in certain specific settings: for highly trade-sensitive sectors that make 
agreement on targets and timetables difficult; for sectors not otherwise 
covered by emissions trading programmes; for sectors that can benefit from 
international coordination; and for situations where significant ancillary 
benefits are foreseen. For a comprehensive programme of reducing global 
emissions, TOAs are best viewed as playing a strong supporting role, 
alongside a well-designed emissions-reduction policy with long-term 
targets as the main instrument and driver. 
There have been a number of additional practical ideas:  
1.  A Global Energy Technology Strategy with international cooperation 
with public and private sectors (along the lines of the APP) can have 
merits in developing and diffusing technologies, but it ultimately will 
need to be complemented by incentives (e.g. regulation or carbon 
price) to provide robust encouragement for the uptake of 
technologies, as other technology-oriented agreements;  
2.  The proposal for the Consultative Group on Climate Innovation is a 
somewhat more concrete version of the above strategy (e.g. Milford, 
(2007a, 2007b). This approach goes beyond research and focuses on 
product development, targeted analysis, finance and cooperative 
policy development. The EU’s proposal for an International Energy 
Efficiency Platform or the idea for a Sustainable Buildings Network 
point in a similar direction. The new Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET-Plan) proposed by the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2007) can be seen as an EU variation of the same 
approach. Many countries have undertaken technology-mapping 
exercises. 
3.  Sectoral approaches that focus on the diffusion of best-available 
technologies within energy-using sectors.  
a.  Trade-sensitive sectors can potentially reach more stringent 
targets with technology standards than with emissions 
pricing alone. These standards could build on existing 
industry-led efforts, such as in cement, aluminium and steel. 
b.  Coordinated technology performance standards could help 
boost conservation by sectors not otherwise covered by 130 | FISCHER, EGENHOFER & ALESSI 
 
emissions trading programmes (e.g. vehicles or end-use 
energy demand). 
c.  Other sectors can benefit a great deal from better 
international coordination (e.g. building codes, appliance 
standards, regulation of vessels for international 
transportation). 
d.  The CDM could also be a vehicle for sector-based projects 
for technology transfer in developing countries, particularly 
if the terms of project eligibility and administrative 
efficiency are improved. 
4.  There have been a number of strategies to accelerate technology 
transfer.  
a.  One idea has been the establishment of a Multilateral Technology 
Acquisition Fund to buy out intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
and make privately-owned climate-friendly technologies 
available for deployment in developing countries. This strategy 
does not directly address the issue of technology development, 
but would have implications for it: the expected acquisition price 
helps determine the return on investment to the innovators of that 
technology. 
b.  Removing trade and investment barriers to climate change 
technology transfer. There are numerous trade barriers in 
developing countries and industrialised countries that constrain 
exports of ‘greenhouse gas intensity-reducing technologies’ in all 
directions but notably North-South, South-North and South-
South (see Brewer, 2007). 
c.  Finance is another key element for technology transfer. While a 
part could be financed by carbon markets, they are probably not 
sufficient, certainly in the short-term, in which case additional 
revenues are needed. Some proposals for a global carbon tax or 
safety valve price for emissions trading suggest that the revenues 
could be used to encourage a low-carbon transition in developing 
countries. 
d.  The CDM or other post-2012 mechanisms could be strengthened 
as a vehicle for technology transfer. There is potential to extend 
such mechanisms towards a broader range of projects, including 
forestry, bio-energy or adaptation projects or a programmatic or 
sectoral crediting mechanism. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY | 131 
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10. THE TECHNOLOGY AGENDA FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY: A TAXONOMY FOR STRUCTURING 
ANALYSES AND NEGOTIATIONS 
THOMAS L. BREWER* 
1.  The nature and uses of a taxonomy 
The taxonomy presented in this paper focuses on the needs of analysts and 
negotiators who are involved in negotiations concerning a post-2012 
international climate regime. 
In practical terms, a taxonomy can be used as a checklist of concepts 
and issues to be considered in particular negotiating circumstances. More 
generally, a taxonomy can also serve other related functions, such as 
structuring an analysis, identifying gaps in an analysis and expanding the 
scope of an analysis. Furthermore, it can stimulate new ideas as well as 
codify existing knowledge. Ultimately, however, it can only facilitate 
analysis; by itself, it is neither a representation of reality nor a set of 
guidelines for negotiations. The inherent nature of a taxonomy is that much 
of it is already familiar, since it is developed partly inductively on the basis 
of previous work, and much of it is cryptic presentation of categories, since 
it condenses many ideas and much information into short lists and 
definitions.1 
                                                      
* Associate Professor, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C. 
1 This paper largely ignores semantic issues about the differences between a 
‘taxonomy’ and an ‘analytical framework’, a ‘conceptual model’, an ‘empirical 
model’ and a ‘paradigm’ on grounds that they are too academic. Briefly, a 
‘ t a x o n o m y ’  i s  a  s t r u c t u r e d  l i s t  o f  c o ncepts; an ‘analytical framework’ or a 
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A key challenge in developing a taxonomy on any topic is to avoid 
lapsing into an analytically vacuous exercise that yields a list of ambiguous 
terms of undemonstrated significance. I have tried to avoid these pitfalls by 
drawing upon other work on technology, so that the taxonomy is directly 
responsive to the stated needs of those interested in the technology 
dimension of climate change. I have also related the taxonomy to others’ 
discussions of the post-2012 climate regime, so that it is grounded in a 
specific situation. Finally, I have used tangible examples, in order to clarify 
the meaning and relevance of the terms. 
2.  Elements of the taxonomy 
The taxonomy is in four parts, each of which is focused on a particular 
element of a decision-making process. Together, they encompass a mixture 
of descriptive, explanatory, evaluative and prescriptive tasks. Although the 
elements are typically addressed in interactive and iterative decision-
making processes in the ‘real world’, they can be separately identified as 
follows:  
1.  Describing technologies: What are their key features? How are they 
similar and different? 
2.  Identifying the context of technologies: How do economic and political 
factors affect the development and use of technologies? 
3.  Evaluating technologies: What goals and criteria are relevant for 
evaluating technologies? 
4.  Pursuing pathways into the future: How can the development and use 
of mitigating or adaptive technologies be facilitated? How can 
detrimental technologies be constrained? 
These elements are discussed separately in this section of the paper 
a n d  t h e n  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  an analytical tree in the concluding 
section. 
                                                                                                                                       
‘conceptual model’ links concepts verbally; an ‘empirical model’ links variables 
mathematically on the basis of systematic empirical data; and a ‘paradigm’ is a 
widely accepted understanding (in verbal and/or mathematical form) of a 
particular phenomenon. For a discussion of paradigms of international climate 
change technology transfer, see Brewer (2007). 136 | THOMAS L. BREWER 
 
2.1  Describing technologies 
A generic definition of technology i s  t h a t  i t  r e f e r s  t o  k n o w - h o w ,  w h e t h e r  
explicit or tacit, concerning products, production processes or managerial 
processes. The form of technology can be explicit or tacit. An example of an 
explicit form is a patent on a product or production process, while 
knowledge that is internalised in personnel and embedded in 
organisational processes, such as how to organise an international joint 
venture for R&D, is an example of a tacit form (Cantwell, 2001). 
The location of technology can be production processes (e.g. how to set 
up a manufacturing process for a specific item such as a computer chip), or 
managerial processes (e.g. the application of accounting rules to GHG 
emissions credits) or products (e.g. thermostat). The products can be goods 
(e.g. computers) or services (e.g. software development). 
Another distinction is also sometimes made between hard and soft 
technologies. The former refers to tangible things like machines or 
computers, while the latter refers to knowledge. 
There are numerous lists of industries and products (both goods and 
services) related to climate change. Among them are the following:  
•  In a European Commission (2003) ‘Environmental Technologies 
Action Plan’ document, there is a list developed by an advisory 
group. It includes 51 categories organised in a matrix based on two 
dimensions. One dimension is the industry sector (e.g. energy 
supply); and the other consists of energy efficiency/renewables/ 
carbon sequestration/hydrogen & fuel cells. See Table 6.1. 
•  Pacala & Socolow (2005) identify 15 ‘wedges’ based on the potential 
contribution of 1 gtCO2e reduction per year by 2054, each one 
quantified according to the effort needed (e.g. introduce carbon 
capture and storage at baseload coal-fired power plants of 800 
gigawatts). 
•  Stern (2007, p. 259) provides a list of nine types of technologies that 
could reduce carbon emissions in the energy sector: efficiency, carbon 
capture and storage, nuclear, biofuel, dCHP, solar, wind and hydro. 
•  The US Climate Change Technology Program (2006) itemises 
hundreds of technologies, which are listed in ‘current portfolios’ and 
‘future research directions’. They are organised according to end-
use/infrastructure (e.g. transportation), energy supply (e.g. 
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GHGs (e.g. methane from landfills) and measuring & monitoring 
capabilities (e.g. oceanic CO2 sequestration). 
•  A World Bank study (2007a) of trade issues related to climate change 
includes 43 climate-friendly goods identified by the code numbers 
used in the Harmonised System (HS) for international trade. 
Note that most of the items above rely at least in part on industry 
sectors as a basis for the classification of technologies. If the international 
negotiations on a post-2012 climate regime include a sectoral approach, 
among others, then the specific sectors used in the negotiations would be a 
natural basis for defining technologies.2 
There are related definitions. For instance, ‘clean and efficient energy 
technology’ has been defined to include technologies that result in reduced 
emissions of GHGs.3 
                                                      
2 When identifying technologies in terms of standardised product or industry 
classification schemes, such as the Harmonised System (HS) of the World Customs 
Union, or the International Standard Industrial Classification system or the UN 
Product Code, there are a variety of technical issues, which can be important in 
negotiations. These and related issues have been raised recently, especially in 
regard to international technology transfer and thus trade issues (see Howse, 2006; 
OECD, 2006; Sugathan, 2006; World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, at the WTO, 
classification issues are different for goods and services because the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) use different product classification schemes (Brewer, 2007). 
3 The complete definition in the proposed International Climate Cooperation Re-
engagement Act of 2007, which is part of a larger pending US energy bill, reads as 
follows [italics added]: ‘The term ‘‘clean and efficient energy technology’’ means 
an energy supply or end-use technology—(A) such as— (i) solar technology; (ii) 
wind technology; (iii) geothermal technology; (iv) hydroelectric technology; and 
(v) carbon capture technology; and (B) that, over its life cycle and compared to a 
similar technology already in commercial use — (i) is reliable, affordable, 
economically viable, socially acceptable, and compatible with the needs and norms 
of the country involved; (ii) results in — (I) reduced emissions of greenhouse gases; or 
(II)  increased geological sequestration; and (iii) may — (I) substantially lower 
emissions of air pollutants; or (II) generate substantially smaller or less hazardous 
quantities of solid or liquid waste.’ 138 | 
Table 6.1 Identification of key technologies for the reduction of greenhouse gases  
  Energy supply  Energy demand-
households + services 
Energy demand 
industry 
Transport Agriculture  Waste 
Energy efficiency  -  Advanced macro CHP 
-  Micro CHP 
-  Coal bed methane 
-  Ultra-high efficiency 
combined cycle gas turbines 
-  High efficient clean coal 
technology 
-  Building fabric 
-  Integrated building 
design 
-  Controls & building 
energy management 
systems 
-  Heating & cooling & 
ventilation equipment 
-  Energy efficiency 
equipment-office and 
domestic equipment 
-  Lighting 
-  Alternative 
equipment 
-  Combustion 
technologies 
-  Low temperature 
processing materials 
-  Process control 
-  Separation 
technologies 
-  Waste heat recovery 
-  Improvement internal 
combustion engine 
(diesel & gasoline) 
-  Hybrid vehicles 
-  Aeronautic technology 
-  Traffic management 
systems  
-  Diet 
composition 
for reduced 
enteric 
fermentation 
-  Waste treatment 
technologies 
-  Recycling/recovery 
(including eco-design) 
Low carbon- 
technologies 
 
Renewables  
-  Direct solar (Photovoltaic, 
Solar thermal power stations) 
-  Wind onshore/offshore 
-  Biomass-electricity 
generation 
-  Geothermal 
-  Tidal wave 
-  Small hydro 
-  Biomass-local heat 
generation 
-  Passive solar systems 
-  Biomass-process 
heat 
-  Bio-fuels-transport  -  Production of 
biomass 
-  Capture of bio-gas 
Low carbon 
technologies- 
CO2 
sequestration 
-  CO2 capture and storage 
(various options) 
-    -    -    -  Biological 
carbon 
sequestration 
-   
Hydrogen & fuel 
cells 
-  Production of hydrogen from 
renewable energy sources 
(including options such as 
photo electrolysis), fossil 
fuels with CO2 sequestration 
-  Fuel cells-domestic 
CHP 
-  Fuel cells- industrial  -  Hydrogen internal 
combustion engine 
-  Fuel cells-transport 
-  Hydrogen storage 
-  Hydrogen infrastructure 
-  Production of 
biomass for 
hydrogen 
productions 
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2.2  Identifying the context of technologies 
Differences among countries in their economic and political institutions, as 
well as their official status according to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
Annexes need to be taken into account. These differences include, in 
particular, countries’ varying technological needs (UNFCCC, 2007) and 
institutional capacities for absorbing new technologies (Mytelka, 2007). 
Key issues about the economic context of technologies concern market 
failures. There are two sets of problems. First, there needs to be a price on 
GHG emissions to internalise the costs and create incentives for 
technological change. Second, other specific technology market problems 
need to be overcome to avoid underinvestment in climate technologies. 
These include (Fischer & Egenhofer, 2007, pp. 1-2): 
•  Knowledge spillovers, i.e. innovating firms cannot capture all the 
benefits of their innovations because some of the new knowledge 
spills over to their competitors and other firms; 
•  Adoption spillovers, i.e. benefits accrue as a given technology becomes 
more widely adopted (sometimes called ‘network externalities’); and 
•  Incomplete information, i.e. information about future government 
climate change policies and thus carbon prices, as well as information 
about the effectiveness of technologies. 
As for the political context, the level of the institutional forum in 
which the issues are being considered and/or will be implemented needs 
to be taken into account. The levels are multilateral (e.g. UNFCCC), 
plurilateral (e.g. WTO Government Procurement agreement), inter-regional 
(e.g. EU-Mercosur), regional (e.g. NAFTA), national and subnational. 
International technology transfer involves distinctive issues that arise 
from a) differences in the economic, political-legal and cultural features of 
societies and b) barriers to transfers as a result of government international 
trade, investment and technology transfer policies (Brewer, 2007; IEA, 2001; 
UNFCCC, 2007). 
Private technology transfers, including by multinational firms (Barton, 
2007; Brewer, 2007; Cantwell, 2003), are especially important in 
international technology transfers. Private sector modes of transfer include: 
trade, investment, licensing and human mobility through employee 
international transfers and individual migration. 140 | THOMAS L. BREWER 
 
2.3  Evaluating technologies 
There are at least six evaluative criteria for assessing technologies: 
1)  Environmental impact. What are the potential reductions of GHG 
concentrations and emissions? Which technologies have the potential 
for the largest reductions of GHG emissions? 
2)  Technical feasibility and efficiency. Which technologies are the most 
feasible and/or efficient in engineering terms? 
3)  Economic cost-benefit relationships. What are the relative monetised 
cost-benefit relationships among technologies? 
4)  Political effects. What will be the distribution of costs and benefits of 
adopting the technology? Who pays and who benefits from a 
technology? Who supports it/opposes it? 
5)  Social effects. What are the beneficial and detrimental non-economic 
impacts of adopting the technology? Which communities or other 
groups experience renewal and which experience decline or 
dislocation? 
6)  Ethical issues. How do the political and economic and social impacts 
of the adoption of a technology vary across groups in terms of their 
responsibility for creating the problem? Do relatively wealthy or poor 
groups pay or gain? 
This paper emphasises mitigation technologies, but of course there are 
also numerous technologies for adaptation.  
Climate-friendly technology is a relative concept. Further, technologies 
can become more or less climate-friendly over time, as technologies change. 
“Energy efficiency”, for instance, is a “relative and evolving concept” 
(Sugathan, 2006, p. 8). For instance, as progress is made in home appliances 
to make them more energy efficient, earlier models become less energy 
efficient in relative terms. 
The specific goals of a technology can be described in terms of its: 
•  Scope – Are the goals global, regional, national or sub-national? 
•  Time frame – Are the goals short-term (within a year), medium-term 
(1-10 years) or long-term (more than a decade)? 
•  Relationship to other goals – Are particular technologies also relevant to 
energy security and/or sustainable economic development? Are 
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Specific technologies can constitute threat wedges (Wellington, et al., 
2007, p. 6), that is, technologies that are adopted for objectives other than 
climate change mitigation and that would increase carbon emissions. Three 
such technologies have received much attention in the context of energy 
security concerns, namely the production of synthetic fuels from coal, the 
extraction of oil from tar sands and the production of oil from crushed 
rocks (oil shale). 
2.4  Pursuing pathways into the future 
There are numerous stages in the technology innovation process, including 
basic R&D, applied R&D, demonstration, commercialisation and diffusion 
(Stern, 2007, pp. 395-399). Government policies often focus on the first three 
stages (sometimes with business partnerships), but there are also numerous 
ways for governments to facilitate commercialisation and diffusion – 
including subsidies for production, investments or purchases, market share 
mandates, performance standards, liability limitations, government 
procurement requirements, consumer information regulations, 
infrastructure development and international technology transfer support 
(Newell, 2007, p. 3). 
Portfolios of technologies are useful ways to address the problem of a 
priori uncertainties about the cost-effectiveness of individual technologies 
(Stern, 2007, pp. 273, 407-409, 418-419). 
Programmes for climate change mitigation or adaptation can interact 
with other climate change programmes. The proceeds from cap-and-trade 
allowance auctions or revenues from climate taxes can be used to support 
technological research and/or other stages of the innovation process. Issues 
that may arise from such uses of funds include: How much money is 
available? What are the technological objectives? What are the constraints 
on the use of the funds? 
Estimating and supporting the scale of the technological effort needed to 
address climate change issues is problematic (Wellington et al., 2007). Stern 
(2007, p. 394) estimates that a doubling of present annual world-wide 
government expenditures on energy R&D to $20 billion is needed (also see 
UNFCCC, 2007 and World Bank, 2007b). An example of large-scale diffusion 
of many technologies at the project level is the development on an island near 
Shanghai, China, of an entirely new ‘eco-city’ that is being built in a 
previously rural area (Stern, 2007, p. 437). 142 | THOMAS L. BREWER 
 
3.  Analytical tree 
The analytical tree depicted below highlights key nodes and choices when 
applying the taxonomy. This is only a partial synopsis; the entire analytical 
process in reality is of course highly iterative and interactive. In reality, the 
elements depicted here are typically addressed repeatedly and in a variety 
of sequences, when applied to a particular situation. 
Figure 6.1 Analytical Decision Tree 
What is the nature of the immediate analytical task? 
 
 
 
 Describing  Identifying  Evaluating Pursuing  pathways 
technologies  the context  technologies  to the future 
 
 
What industry  What constraints?  What criteria?   What paths? 
 sectors? 
 
 
 Energy  Institutional  Environmental  Technological 
   capacity  impact  innovation 
 
 Transport  Market  failures    Technical efficiency  Market 
      Intervention 
 
 Others  Policy  barriers  Economic costs,  Administrative 
     benefits  implementation 
 
     Political  effects 
     Social  effects 
     Ethical  issues 
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11. WHY INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT 
NEEDS A SECTORAL APPROACH 
MARKUS ÅHMAN* 
1.  Introduction 
The increased mobility of people and goods has been a critical factor in the 
phenomenal economic growth the world has experienced over the last 
century. Globalisation and growing international trade have had a deep 
impact on the world economy and helped many people across the world 
attain a higher standard of living. Some would even argue that the rapid 
development of international transport has made the world a better place. 
However, it is also evident that international transport poses a 
serious threat to the world’s climate system. It is one of the fastest growing 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and there is currently very little being 
done to curb this trend.  
This chapter discusses the background to the current regulation of 
international aviation and maritime shipping and gives an overview of the 
options to address emissions. It then offers an argument for why a sectoral 
approach is the most promising policy avenue for including these modes of 
transport in a post-2012 climate agreement. 
                                                      
* IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, the Clipore Research Team and 
member of the ECP Steering Group. The author would like to acknowledge David 
Mjureke (Swedish Ministry of the Environment), Åsa Löfgren (Göteborg 
University), Nardia Haigh (University of Queensland) and Asbjørn Torvanger 
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2.  Should we care about these emissions? 
Yes. Emissions from international aviation and shipping1 constitute a small, 
but rapidly increasing percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions, 
accounting for between 3-6% each today. In the period 1990-2004, these 
emissions, commonly referred to as emissions from ‘bunker fuels’, have 
grown 34% and 43%, respectively. If growth continues along its current 
path, emissions from international aviation and shipping could account for 
about 15% of global emissions by 2050. Forecasts for the sector suggest that 
EU international aviation emissions will increase by 150% between 1990 
and 2012, which would offset more than a quarter of the reductions 
required by the Community’s target under the Kyoto Protocol. 
To understand the problems and potential ways forward, it is useful 
to look at the background to the current regulation since it has a slightly 
different history and dynamic than that of land-based activities.  
3.  How did we end up here, and what is being done about it? 
To date, relatively little has been achieved that could slow the trend of 
growing emissions from international aviation and shipping. In fact, 
concrete results that could lead to significant mitigation of emissions from 
bunker fuels have been largely absent from the UN process. Emissions 
from bunker fuels have been part of the UNFCCC negotiations since before 
the Convention entered into force, but bunker fuels are not included in the 
targets specified in the Kyoto Protocol. For a long time, discussions have 
revolved around how to calculate and report emissions rather than around 
concrete action or commitments to reduce them. Since 2005, parties have 
not been able to agree on any conclusions concerning bunker fuels.  
In parallel to the UNFCCC, the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have 
carried out work.  
ICAO has had climate change on its agenda for a number of years 
and has set up a working group charged with developing a proposal on 
how to limit the climate impact from aviation, although no firm reporting 
date has been set for the group. The current legislation on international 
                                                      
1 For the remainder of this chapter, the term ‘shipping’ refers to maritime shipping 
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aviation is founded on the concepts in the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention that entered into 
force in 1947. The preamble to the convention states that civil aviation 
should be established on the basis of “equal opportunity”, a priority that 
still dominates talks on regulation of international aviation. ICAO has 
stated that it is positively disposed towards emissions trading in principle, 
but at the same time it adopted a resolution at its general assembly in 2007 
requiring any regional trading scheme to have bilateral agreements with 
any third party affected by the system. In practice this makes the EU 
initiative to include international aviation in the EU ETS impossible.  
The division of the sea and its resources is regulated through the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The current 
formulation restricts implementation of local and regional rules for 
international shipping. Policies to address emissions, unless associated 
with some service,2 would have to be voluntary according to the 
Convention. IMO has set up a work plan on greenhouse gas reductions, 
scheduled to finish in 2010. Member states will then have to decide if the 
IMO should establish a mandatory regime for the control of greenhouse gas 
emissions from shipping. To date, the principal result of the work plan is 
the development of a CO2 index – a description of CO2 efficiencies of ships 
including emissions per tonne of cargo, passenger, nautical mile, etc. This is 
now being introduced in a trial period until 2008.  
The striking lack of progress in the work at the international level 
begs the question: What is it that makes dealing with these emissions so 
difficult?  
4.  What makes international transport special? 
There are three principal factors that can help to explain the failure of 
international regulation in this field. First, the significance of international 
transport to the global economy makes the issue sensitive. Cheap transport 
is a major lubricant to trade and economic growth, and governments are 
reluctant to introduce measures that could impede their functioning and 
act as barriers to trade. Although barriers to trade may reduce emissions, 
                                                      
2 There are currently local fees for navigation, for instance, the fairway fees in 
Sweden. These can be applied since they are service-based, e.g. maintaining 
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they tend to be inefficient. Trade allows countries to develop comparative 
advantage in production and therefore, for instance, border tariffs are 
clearly second best to globally agreed policies aimed directly at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. There are also concerns that the desire to reduce 
transport emissions could become a pretext for other measures that are 
essentially protectionist and support inefficient industries. Since such 
measures could make it considerably more difficult to build the trust 
necessary for future international cooperation, these concerns should be 
taken seriously. Furthermore, a key driver behind growth in transport 
emissions is income; as people get richer, they tend to want to transport 
more goods and make longer trips. Transport emissions increase both 
because people travel more, and because as people get richer they tend to 
travel using more carbon-intensive modes (switching from bus to train, 
from train to air, from small car to large car, etc.). This link to economic 
development at the personal level adds emotional resistance to regulating 
transport.  
Second, countries’ limited jurisdiction in controlling emissions from 
activities occurring outside their national borders adds to the intricacies in 
the negotiations on policies. Existing international agreements place 
significant restrictions on what countries are required to do to curb 
emissions, and also on what they are allowed to do. For instance, there are 
legally binding provisions in a number of bilateral air service agreements 
that make it difficult (in the short and medium term) to introduce taxes that 
could distort competition between carriers of different nationalities. 
However, there are limits to these restrictions. For example, Article 2.2 of 
the Kyoto Protocol states that industrialised countries shall seek to limit 
emissions from bunker fuels through work in the ICAO and the IMO. If 
ICAO and IMO do not succeed in this, emissions might be regulated at the 
regional level, as long as the principles of ‘equal opportunity’ in the case of 
aviation and ‘innocent passage’ for maritime shipping are respected. This 
would suggest that countries do have the necessary legal authority to set 
emissions limits and reporting requirements, at least in the medium term. 
A third challenge is monitoring, reporting and verification. The fact 
that ships and airplanes move across national borders and jurisdictions 
makes monitoring and reporting difficult. This is particularly true for 
shipping since ocean-going vessels can bunker very large quantities of fuel. 
An issue in the relations between UNFCCC on the one hand and 
ICAO/IMO on the other hand is the split in Annex 1/non-Annex 1 
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ICAO or IMO. If a future agreement should make non-Annex I countries 
exempt from commitments, this must be dealt with. It is worth noting that 
although 75% of ships are registered in non-Annex I countries, a majority 
are owned by companies in Annex I countries.  
The national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions only include 
emissions occurring within the national territory, while international 
aviation and shipping are reported separately as so-called ‘memo items’ by 
the fuel-selling country. Any effective policy regime would need reliable 
data on the volume of emissions and a mechanism to allocate these 
emissions to an entity or party that can be held accountable in an 
agreement. For example, offshore bunkering, lack of clear definitions and 
errors in reporting are problems that cause statistical uncertainties in 
bunker fuel sold in the shipping sector. However, improvements in 
technology and reporting systems over the last decade strongly suggest 
that the remaining technical issues related to monitoring and reporting can 
be solved. For instance, the IMO already has a long-range tracking system 
that could provide for an activity-based approach to emissions reporting, 
which could give more precise data than marine bunker sales. Further, ship 
owners already have accurate data on bunker fuel volumes used. The same 
is true in the aviation sector; very detailed data exist in aviation companies 
and could be collected if so decided. There are no technical barriers to using 
such data, should reporting be made mandatory. In summary, the absence 
of global policies and measures seems due to institutional issues and 
political barriers rather than to technical shortcomings. 
In addition to these general factors, there are more specific issues 
associated with each mode of transport. For instance, the climate impact 
from emissions from aviation does not only depend on emitted volume, but 
also on flight altitude and weather conditions. The total climate impact of 
emissions from aviation is uncertain but it is significantly higher than the 
impact by CO2 emissions alone. Important emissions are NOx, SO2, soot 
(particles) and water vapour. Furthermore, it has proven more difficult to 
apply definitions and methods for reporting in the shipping sector than in 
the aviation sector.  Thus it is important to remember that aviation and 
shipping are qualitatively different and it is not obvious that they should be 
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5.  Is there a way forward? 
Against the backdrop described above, it is easy to be pessimistic. The only 
major new international or regional regulation currently planned is the 
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. It is scheduled for 2012, but the 
decision has already led to protests from other parties of the ICAO who 
claim that it is illegal of the EU to impose such a policy on flights that take 
off or land outside of Europe. The EU has also stated that maritime 
shipping might be included in the EU ETS, should the IMO not succeed in 
reaching an acceptable solution in 2009. To what extent new developments 
such as the launch of the Bali Roadmap, the election of a new government 
in Australia and the upcoming presidential election in the US can spawn 
new policy initiatives on international transport remain to be seen, but so 
far the prospects appear unchanged in the main. 
Nevertheless, there are also positive developments and promising 
policy avenues. The evolving emissions trading systems across the world 
and the maturing discussion on how to design such systems is one such 
development. The increased attention given to the potential in sectoral 
approaches is another. On the technical level, the growing consensus 
within the ICAO and the IMO that policies to control emissions are feasible 
from a reporting and monitoring perspective is a third critical 
development. 
So what are the policy options looking forward? 
•  The regulatory instruments referred to as ‘command and control’ are 
often specific, demanding certain technologies to be implemented or 
quantified environmental standards to be met by individual 
polluters. Polluters' compliance is based on monitoring and 
enforcement. Traditionally, these types of policies are regarded as 
effective, easy to manage, relatively simple to impose and broadly 
accepted. However, they are generally not cost-effective and therefore 
not socially optimal.  
•  Incentive-based instruments aim to internalise costs related to 
damages to the environment into the market by putting a price on 
emissions, thereby providing ‘market signals’ in the form of a 
modification of relative prices. Emissions charges or taxes, user 
charges, product charges or taxes, administrative charges or fees, the 
emissions trading system (ETS), deposit-refund systems and 
subsidies are all examples of incentive-based policy instruments. In 
theory, these types of instruments have all the efficiency properties of 152 | MARKUS ÅHMAN 
 
competitive market pricing, which guarantees an efficient allocation 
of resources in the economy, provided all costs are accounted for.  
Command and control approaches have frequently been put forward 
as the most feasible for international transport. Indeed, they are already 
used for other environmental problems, for instance by countries requiring 
double-hulled ships for certain routes. Looking ahead, it will be interesting 
to follow the discussion on standards on emissions levels and fuel 
efficiency.  
However, the most spectacular policy development during the last 
decade is the growing political popularity of emissions trading. Right now 
there are systems in place or being planned in all developed countries. 
Most proposals for a post-2012 climate agreement include emissions 
trading in some form. Many observers would like to see trading of 
emissions between countries extended to direct trading between 
companies. The option to include international transport emissions into a 
global emissions trading system is receiving increasing attention. The 
attraction of this is threefold: 
1)  As emissions from bunker fuels are virtually uncontrolled today, 
almost any form of policy would be an improvement over the current 
situation. 
2)  Including bunker fuel emissions under a cap could put an end to the 
present, seemingly unstoppable, growth. 
3)  The cost-saving potential of a trading system increases with broader 
coverage, which speaks in favour of integrating all major emitting 
sectors. 
The realisation of these benefits, however, requires some careful 
thinking when designing the trading system.  
At first glance, a trading system with allocation of emission 
allowances at the country level may seem like the most straightforward 
approach. However, the difficulties of assigning responsibility for 
emissions from international transport to individual countries seem likely 
to remain. Negotiations on this issue have so far produced little result, and 
the outlook for the future looks grim. This makes the feasibility of a trading 
system for bunker fuel emissions based on national allocations 
questionable. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the next chapter of this book, a quick 
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system seems unwise for economic reasons. The large differences in 
abatement costs and willingness to pay for emissions between industry and 
transport could trigger significant negative effects on industry. There is a 
relevant argument that if the cheapest abatement options exist in industry, 
then those are the ones that should be pursued. But at least in the medium 
term, the risk of severe economic disruptions in industry seems to 
outweigh the advantages offered by a fully integrated trading system. It is 
also unlikely that emissions from bunker fuels would be reduced 
significantly in an integrated system since most reductions would be 
carried out in industry. 
A potential solution would be to combine an emissions trading 
system with some form of carbon tax on bunker fuels, thereby offsetting 
some of the difference in abatement costs. This option has the advantage of 
controlling transport emissions while protecting industry from radically 
increased allowance prices. Although the economic benefit of the trading 
system would be reduced by such a solution as it would mean that 
different parts of the economy would pay different prices for emissions, the 
tax could gradually be reduced over time as abatement costs in transport 
approach those in industry. This said, reaching international agreements on 
taxes has proven extremely difficult. Thus any policy regime that is 
founded on such agreements is likely to fail, which basically excludes a 
global carbon tax as well as an integrated system with industry and 
international transport from the palette of policy options.  
6.  What about a sectoral approach? 
Another possibility would be to use a sectoral approach in the construction 
of the trading system. In this approach, separate emissions trading systems 
for industry and transport would be created. A target would be set for each 
system and the participants would not be able to trade allowances with 
each other. Considering the important differences between aviation and 
shipping, it is possible that they should be treated separately. As the 
formidable task of reaching a post-2012 climate agreement has become 
increasingly real to policy-makers, the concept of sector-based climate 
agreements has received growing attention. In fact, it is mentioned 
explicitly in the Bali Roadmap. There are several characteristics of 
international transport that make a sectoral approach particularly 
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•  Simply the fact that reaching a multilateral agreement based on 
countries has proven so difficult warrants serious consideration of a 
different approach, such as sectoral trading systems. 
•  International transport is similar regardless of which country it takes 
place in. Thus even though countries may differ in many respects, it 
could be possible to reach an agreement on a target for aviation and 
shipping. 
•  Transport is, almost by definition, linked to international competition 
and cross-border trade, which are two issues where sectoral 
agreements are suggested to be particularly useful. 
•  Emissions sources move across borders, which makes assigning 
responsibility and avoiding leakage even more difficult than for other 
goods and services. Assigning emissions to activity or operator 
would simplify this problem.  
•  The climate impact of aviation emissions is complex and differs from 
that of emissions at the earth’s surface, even if the emitted volumes 
are identical. This makes trading emissions between sectors 
problematic. 
•  International transport, in particular aviation, is dominated by a 
relatively small number of actors. This could ease the negotiating of 
an agreement considerably. 
An important advantage of a sectoral solution is that we can 
effectively put a cap on transport emissions. The disadvantage is that the 
total ‘global’ costs to reach a given global emissions target are higher than 
with an integrated ETS, since potentially cheaper emissions reductions in 
the industrial sector cannot be traded against emissions in the transport 
sector. 
Another advantage is that we can expect a lower impact on allowance 
price in the industrial ETS, since there will no longer be a demand for 
industrial allowances from the transport sector. Thus, the impacts from 
increased allowance price, such as increased operation costs, increased 
electricity price and risks for closures and carbon leakage, will be reduced. 
7.  Conclusions 
Emissions from international aviation and maritime transport constitute a 
small, but rapidly increasing, percentage of global greenhouse gas 
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international aviation and maritime shipping at 15% of global emissions by 
2050. To date, very little has been done to curb this trend. 
This development, coupled with the growing political popularity of 
emissions trading, has put the spotlight on the option of an integrated 
international trading system, which would include international aviation 
and shipping. The idea is to address emissions from international aviation 
and shipping and capture the cost savings that a broad emissions trading 
system offers. 
However, the characteristics of bunker fuel emissions, with close 
links to international trade and competition, the difficulties of allocating 
emissions on a country level and the complexities in estimating climate 
impact from emissions make the feasibility and effectiveness of a 
conventional emissions trading system questionable. Furthermore, a full 
integration of international transport and industry could cause significant 
negative effects for industry, without achieving substantial cuts in bunker-
fuel emissions. In the medium term at least, these negative effects seem to 
offset the advantages of an integrated system.  
Instead, a sectoral approach seems to be the most promising option if 
a cap and trade system for bunker fuels is to be negotiated in the medium 
term. Even though this would, in theory, raise the total cost of reaching a 
global emissions target as compared to an integrated emissions trading 
system, it offers several advantages. Most importantly, it seems feasible 
from a technical and political point of view and would allow the negative 
effects on industry to be managed, without compromising an effective 
control of emissions from international aviation and shipping. 
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12. HOW TO INTEGRATE INTERNATIONAL 
AVIATION AND SHIPPING INTO A 
GLOBAL EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM 
LARS ZETTERBERG* 
1.  Introduction 
Greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and shipping are 
growing at an alarming rate and little progress has been achieved in 
controlling these emissions. Meanwhile, substantial progress is being made 
in the development of international emissions trading. The EU emissions 
trading system is the most prominent main example, but we are also seeing 
the emergence of other national and regional emission trading systems, for 
example in Norway, Iceland, North Eastern USA, Australia and New 
Zealand. It is likely that there will be linkages between these systems and 
we may soon see the first steps of what could become a global emissions 
trading system. With this development, it is natural to address the 
possibility of including greenhouse gas emissions from international 
aviation and shipping into a global cap and trade system. The linking of 
transport to a global cap and trade system will be a crucial future challenge 
for the global climate change regime. It is unclear what the extent and 
distribution of costs and reductions would be on different actors. However, 
the example of integrating road transport into the EU emissions trading 
system holds many lessons for international aviation and shipping. The 
objectives of this paper are to discuss the pros and cons of integrating 
international aviation and shipping with a global industrial cap and trade 
system. 
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2.  What does experience and current research on emissions trading 
and transport tell us? 
Given the emergence of emission trading systems, it is obvious to address 
the possibility of including international transport emissions into a global 
emissions trading system (ETS). There are several attractions to such a 
development: 
1.  Firstly, greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and 
shipping are not controlled today. It is crucial to find a solution to 
control these bunker-related emissions. 
2.  Secondly, emissions from international aviation and shipping are 
growing at an alarming rate. This is partly due to an increased 
demand for international transport, but can also be explained by the 
absence of policy instruments. Putting these emissions under an 
emission trading cap could be an effective way to control them. 
3.  Thirdly, it is advantageous to broaden an emissions trading system 
by adding new sectors, countries and gases. In this way, more options 
for emissions reductions are available, and the total costs for 
achieving a given emissions target can be further reduced. Because 
international transport accounts for a considerable share of the 
carbon emissions globally, economic savings could potentially be 
achieved if transport were integrated in a global ETS. 
In order to understand the consequences of linking international 
transport to a global industrial ETS, important lessons can be drawn from 
recent theoretical studies of integrating EU transport with the EU ETS. 
Several studies have investigated the implications of integrating road 
transport into the EU ETS, e.g. Holmgren et al. (2006), CE Delft (2006) and 
Kågeson (2008). 
The crucial factor that determines the economic consequences of an 
integration is the difference in abatement costs between the two systems 
that are linked, in this case the transport sector and industry. This factor is 
the main determinant for the total cost savings, the distribution of 
emissions reductions and the distribution of costs among the participating 
actors. The larger the difference in abatement costs, the larger is the 
potential for total cost savings, but also the larger will be the redistribution 
of reductions and costs. 
If we first look at the EU example, it appears that the marginal 
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considerably higher in the EU transport sector than in EU industry. This 
can be seen by comparing current carbon taxation levels in the two sectors. 
The current taxation on petrol in the EU corresponds to a carbon tax that is 
10 to 20 times higher than the carbon taxation in industry, assuming an 
allowance price of €15. This difference in willingness to pay determines the 
consequences of including transport in the EU ETS. 
In contrast, international transport is not subject to carbon taxes at all. 
One could therefore argue that carbon abatement costs would be relatively 
cheap here. However, in aviation and shipping, fuel price is a major part of 
the operation costs and therefore considerable effort has been invested in 
increasing fuel efficiency. Since carbon emissions are closely related to 
energy consumption, these energy efficiency measures have also 
contributed significantly to reducing carbon emissions. It is therefore 
unlikely that we can harvest cheap carbon reductions through energy 
efficiency measures. This is also confirmed by studies that show that 
significant emissions reductions (more than 20%) in aviation and shipping 
are costly. So if transport emissions were to be restricted, for instance under 
an absolute emissions cap, and transport volumes continue to grow, the 
cheaper emissions reductions would soon be exhausted and abatement 
costs would then increase significantly. 
Even if the scientific evidence so far is incomplete, let us assume that 
abatement costs for international aviation and shipping are high. With this 
assumption, the case of linking international transport to a global industrial 
ETS would be similar to the case of including EU transport in the EU ETS. 
Both cases represent the linking of two systems with different abatement 
costs and we can expect similar patterns of consequences. Based on 
findings in recent theoretical studies of including EU transport in the EU 
ETS, we can estimate the consequences of integrating international 
transport into a global ETS. 
In order to analyse the consequences of integrating international 
transport into a global industrial ETS, we need to define a reference case. In 
this reference case we assume a global ETS without transport and that there 
is a requirement on international transport to reduce emissions within its 
own sector, either by implementing an ETS specifically for the transport 
sector or by means of another policy instrument. 
If transport were integrated into the same emissions trading system 
as industry, the two sectors would compete over the same emissions 
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shipping and aviation since these sectors don’t have a carbon tax today. 
When these ‘low hanging fruit’ have been harvested and international 
transport volumes had grown, the competition for emissions reductions 
would increase. As a consequence, the price of allowances would increase. 
Assuming that transport has a larger willingness to pay than 
industry, the transport sector would buy emissions reductions from 
industry and continue to release carbon to the atmosphere. 
In industry, regardless of allocation, the marginal operating costs, 
including the shadow price of allowances, would increase. The price of 
electricity would increase in liberalised markets and for some industries 
this would constitute a double impact (higher price for allowances and 
electricity). On the other hand, with higher allowance prices, new carbon-
efficient technologies that previously were not economically viable, may 
become profitable and experience a market breakthrough. 
Production in carbon-emitting industries would decrease and could 
lead to closures or reallocation of industries to countries outside the 
emissions trading system (carbon leakage). This risk would be lower the 
more economies that are included in the ETS globally. 
In the international transport sector, compliance costs would decrease 
as compared to a situation where international transport has to reduce 
emissions within the sector. This is likely to lead to continued increasing 
emissions. Ongoing carbon reduction programmes, with relatively high 
reduction costs, such as low-carbon fuel chains and CO2-efficient vehicles, 
may become unprofitable.  
For emissions trading in general, increasing the number of sources, 
sectors and gases would increase the number of available emissions 
reduction options and hence decrease the total costs for achieving a given 
emissions target. 
Free allocation to the industrial sector would significantly decrease 
the total costs for compliance for this sector. Industry would be able to sell 
allowances to the transport sector and these revenues would be important. 
However, the impacts on industry of a higher allowance price would be 
unchanged, including higher marginal production costs, decreased output, 
altered investments and closure of installations. 
However, even if we were to create a separate cap and trade system 
for transport and one for industry, as outlined in the preceding chapter, we 
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It is likely that the transport sector, indirectly, would influence the 
allowance price in the industrial ETS to some extent. The transport sector 
would need to find emissions reductions within its own sector in order to 
reach its emissions target. This may for instance include using bio energy 
for producing renewable transport fuels. Since bio energy is a finite 
resource, we can expect an increased price on bio energy. In the industrial 
ETS, bio energy is an important means for reducing carbon emissions, for 
instance in power production. The increased price of bio energy, caused by 
an increased demand from the transport sector, would clearly have an 
influence on the costs of emissions reductions in industry, which in turn 
would increase the allowance price. This effect is probably more significant 
for road transport than for aviation. We may also see an increased demand 
for transport-related electricity, for instance due to increased use of electric 
railways or plug-in hybrid cars. If this additional electricity were produced 
with bio energy, we could expect an even higher price on bio energy; and if 
it were produced by coal, it would increase the demand for allowances and 
consequently the price. A third example is that the transport sector may 
increase the global demand for CERs (Certified Emission Reductions), thus 
competing with industry. The CERs work as a common currency, linking 
different carbon regimes. 
3.  Summary 
Greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and shipping are 
growing at an alarming rate and little progress has been achieved in 
controlling these emissions. Meanwhile, substantial progress is being made 
in the development of international emissions trading. The EU emissions 
trading system is the main example, but we are also seeing other national 
and regional emission trading systems emerging, for example in Norway, 
Iceland, North Eastern USA, Australia and New Zealand. It is likely that 
there will be linkages between these systems. We may be seeing the first 
steps of what could become a global ETS. 
With the slow progress of controlling international transport, it is 
natural to look at the possibility of linking international transport to a 
global emissions trading system. There are several advantages with this. 
Putting transport under a common cap would effectively put a limit to the 
total emissions and create incentives for emissions reductions in the 
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more sectors is in general positive since it provides more options for 
reducing emissions.  
But there are also risks for industry associated with such a solution 
and in this aspect we can learn from recent theoretical studies of integrating 
road transport into the EU ETS. The main factor for determining the 
economic consequences of linking two emissions trading systems is the 
relative difference in abatement costs. Even if there are large differences 
between EU road transport and international aviation and shipping, we 
believe that it is plausible that abatement costs or willingness to pay for 
transport are high in international transport relative to industry. If so, then 
the example of integrating road transport into the EU ETS holds many 
lessons for international shipping and aviation. 
On the basis of this assumption, we consider that creating an 
integrated ETS with international transport and international industry, 
while potentially lowering the total costs for the included sectors to reach 
the common emissions target, could lead to considerably higher 
operational costs for industry and not necessarily reduce transport 
emissions. This may result in structural changes in the industry and 
possible carbon leakage even if this, of course, is reduced as we move 
towards a global ETS. 
An alternative option is to apply a sectoral approach by creating a 
separate ETS for international transport alone. Thereby, transport 
emissions can be effectively controlled. The impact on the industrial 
allowance price can be reduced, at least to some extent. It is, however, 
likely that even with separate systems the transport sector will indirectly 
influence the allowance price in industry. Both sectors will compete for the 
same emissions reductions such as bio energy, clean electricity and CERs 
(certified emissions reductions). The transport sector is likely to increase 
the demand for these solutions and thus indirectly increase the allowance 
price in the industrial ETS. Another disadvantage is that the total costs for 
reaching a global emissions target will be increased as compared to an 
integrated ETS for transport and industry. 
It is too early to judge which option is the best. Emissions from 
aviation and shipping need to be controlled and linking international 
transport to an ETS is an obvious option. This will be a crucial future 
challenge for the global climate change regime. But the issue is complex 
and there is no obvious best solution; therefore the issue will need further 
careful analysis. 162 | LARS ZETTERBERG 
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